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PAUL CLEMENT AND
THE STATE OF CONSERVATIVE LEGAL THOUGHT
SAM SINGERt
ABSTRACT
If 2011 is remembered as the year the states stood up to the Obama
Administration and its bold vision of federal power, Paul Clement will be
remembered as the lawyer they chose to make their case to the Supreme
Court. In addition to the healthcare challenge, Clement appeared on be-
half of Arizona in defense of the State's sweeping new immigration law
and helped Texas defend its new electoral map against interference from
the federal courts. Along the way, he became the go-to lawyer for the
"states' rights" cause-a "shadow Solicitor General" leading the states in
their push to reclaim power from the federal government.
This Essay reconciles the perception of Paul Clement as a champion
of states' rights with his less-visible work on behalf of the business
community-work that, because of the pro-federal slant of the business
agenda, often puts him at odds with the states' rights movement. I will
demonstrate that, despite the publicity he has gained for his high-profile
federalism cases, Clement has done more than most private lawyers in
recent memory to undercut the states' rights agenda. More broadly, I will
argue that the tension within his caseload-the push and pull between
federalism and deregulation-reflects a broader rift within the conserva-
tive legal movement. Exploring this rift through the lens of Clement's
work, I will consider whether legal conservatism can still embrace the
conflicting tenets of federalism and deregulation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I. LEGAL CONSERVATIVES FIND A PIN-UP
Last February, in a letter to the Speaker of the House, Attorney
General Eric Holder announced the Justice Department would be aban-
t Associate, Sidley Austin; Law Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (2011-
12); Law Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (2009-11); J.D., Emory University
School of Law; B.A., University of Michigan.
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doning its defense of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the federal
law that defines marriage as the legal union between a man and a woman
and lets states ignore same-sex unions classified as marriage by other
states.' Although the Obama Administration had defended DOMA in
several prior challenges, it was only in recognition of the Justice De-
partment's longstanding practice of defending duly enacted statutes
against legal attack, and then only in jurisdictions where judicial prece-
dent allowed it to mount a plausible defense without taking a position on
how closely courts should scrutinize laws that burden the gay communi-
ty. Now that challenges were pending in jurisdictions where the law is in
flux, the Attorney General explained, the Justice Department would be
required to take an affirmative position on the appropriate level of scruti-
ny, and the President was unwilling to take a stance contrary to his firm
belief that DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples
who are legally married under state law.2 The Attorney General would go
into further detail about the legality of DOMA and the Justice Depart-
ment's authority to withdraw support from unconstitutional statutes, but
the thrust of his message to Congress was clear: We don't like this law,
and we've exhausted every professionally responsible argument that can
3be made in its defense; it's your problem now.
The Holder letter was the first strike in a still-evolving conflict be-
tween the White House and House Republicans over the fate of DOMA
in the courts. Republicans blasted the move as irresponsible and ill moti-
vated, accusing the President of shirking the Justice Department's obliga-
tion to defend congressional enactments.4 By forcing the Justice Depart-
ment to abandon this role, critics asserted, the White House was not only
attacking DOMA, it was attacking the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress. Worse yet, the White House was making an end run around
the legislative process by using the Justice Department to effect an unau-
thorized veto.6
With the Justice Department out of the picture, it fell to Congress,
and specifically to Republican leaders of the House of Representatives,
to make provisions for DOMA's defense. House Speaker John Boehner
agreed to intervene in the lawsuit and defend the law in his capacity as
Speaker. He retained Paul Clement, a Solicitor General under President
1. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of




4. David Baumann, House Republicans Blast Holder on DOMA; Say DOJ Should Pay,
MAIN JUSTICE (May 3, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/05/03/house-judiciary-
republicans-blast-holder-on-domal.
5. David Badash, NOM's Maggie Gallagher Calls Obama's DOMA Position an "End-Run,"
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George W. Bush and one of the more sought-after lawyers in the Wash-
ington legal community. Boehner had originally threatened to slash the
Justice Department's budget to free up money for Clement's contract,
which his firm, King & Spalding, had accepted at a considerable dis-
count. When that road proved impassable (and most likely illegal), he
scraped together funds, now said to total three quarters of $1 million,
from an internal network of House accounts.
That Boehner would turn to Clement for such a momentous case
came as a surprise to nobody. There may be two dozen lawyers in the
United States who possess credentials commensurate with a case of this
magnitude. The number gets smaller if you factor in lawyers with experi-
ence defending federal legislation, and approaches zero if you limit it to
those with conservative bona fides. Having served at the helm of the
Bush Justice Department for eight years, the final four as Solicitor Gen-
eral; having argued before the Supreme Court on more than fifty occa-
sions, many of them for matters of rich historic significance like abortion
and campaign finance and the President's conduct of the war on terror-
ism; and having earned a reputation as a gifted advocate with the ear of
the Justices and an aptitude for winning big cases, Clement easily met all
three criteria.
But what really sets Clement apart from other elite constitutional
lawyers is his knack for avoiding controversy. Among the few lawyers to
leave the Bush Administration with a better reputation than he entered
with, Clement is in the enviable position of having worked at the helm of
one of the more polarizing Justice Department's in the modern era yet
having no reputational scars to speak of. This is due in part to the posi-
tions he took behind closed doors, where he is said to have clashed with
more hawkish Justice Department officials over the scope of the Presi-
dent's counterterrorism powers. But Clement is also emphatically likea-
ble, a Midwesterner known inside Washington as a scrupulous lawyer for
whom politics takes a backseat to the rule of law. As Walter Dellinger,
who served as Solicitor General under President Bill Clinton, told the
New York Times, "Paul is such a good advocate and such a cheerful
friend that it's easy to forget how conservative he is." 9
When Clement left the Justice Department, the legal community
was alight with speculation over where among the power circle of Wash-
7. Jennifer Bendery, John Boehner Has Collected $742,000 for DOMA Defense, Top House
Official Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2012, 9:02 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/john-boehner-doma-defense n-l 382990.html.
8. Jason Zengerle, The Paul Clement Court, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 26, 2012, at 28, 91.
9. Kevin Sack, Lawyer Opposing Health Law Is Familiar Face to the Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2011, at Al (quoting Walter Dellinger, Solicitor General under President Bill Clinton)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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ington law firms he would settle.' 0 For those who follow the churn of
lateral moves between the Justice Department and the private sector,
Clement's employment was one of the biggest stories in years. One
Washington lawyer described Clement as the "Holy Grail of law firm
recruiting," observing that "the buzz in the legal world about Clement is
like the buzz in basketball when LeBron James was coming out of high
school and turning pro."" Clement settled on King & Spalding, the At-
lanta-based powerhouse where he had headed the appellate practice be-
fore joining the Justice Department in 2001.12 His decision was viewed
as a significant victory for King & Spalding; the hire would unquestion-
ably raise the firm's profile in Washington, and many believed it would
vault King & Spalding into the upper echelon of the Washington appel-
late bar, a space occupied by an elite circle of firms specializing in high-
stakes litigation before the Supreme Court.' 3
By all accounts, Clement exceeded the firm's expectations, bringing
in prominent cases and influential clients and launching the firm into the
spotlight at the Supreme Court. By the time Clement secured the DOMA
contract, he had already assisted the National Football League and the
National Basketball Association in disputes with their respective players'
associations, represented the National Rifle Association before the Su-
preme Court in a landmark Second Amendment victory, and began work
on behalf of a consortium of state attorneys general in an historic chal-
lenge to the Affordable Care Act.14 The DOMA contract, a highly publi-
cized affair and a rare opportunity for a private firm to defend federal
legislation, was just the latest evidence that King & Spalding had struck
gold when it hired Clement.
But no sooner had the terms of the DOMA contract been negotiated
than King & Spalding withdrew its representation. In a statement ex-
plaining the decision, firm chairman Robert Hays apologized for the
withdrawal, insisting the "process used for vetting this engagement was
10. See Brett LoGuirato, Why Paul Clement Is the 'Lebron James of Law,' BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-04-05/politics/31292022 1_oral-arguments-
clement-comparison (there would be a massive bidding war).
11. Peter Page, Legal Life After 'W'for Many Bush Attorneys, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at
6; see also Natalie Singer, 'Defending Unpopular Positions Is What Lawyers Do': In an Era of
Ideological Fencing, Paul Clement '92 Won't Be Fenced In, HARV. L. BULL. (Winter 2012),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2012/winter/feature 2.php.
12. Dahlia Lithwick, The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Why Even Opponents of DOMA
Should Want It to Get a Vigorous Defense, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2011, 5:06 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2011/04/the-best offense is a good
defense.html.
13. Tony Mauro, King & Spalding Lands a Big Fish: Paul Clement, BLOG LEGAL TIMES
(Nov. 20, 2008, 12:15 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2008/l l/king-spalding-lands-a-big-
fish-paul-clement.html.
14. Robert Barnes, NRA Avoids Getting Shut Out of Gun Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2010, at
Al3; Sack, supra note 9; Tony Mauro, Viet Dinh 's Firm Aims for Appellate Big Leagues with Clem-
ent Hire, NAT'L L. J. ONLINE (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1202491418249.
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inadequate."15 What prompted the change of course is still disputed.
DOMA supporters tend to believe the firm caved to pressure-not only
from gay equality advocates but also from firm clients and employees.16
Firm insiders maintain that firm managers did not review the contract
until after it was signed, at which point they concluded the terms were
untenable and asked Clement to unwind it.17
Following the firm's decision, Clement announced he would be
leaving King & Spalding and taking the DOMA contract with him.'8
Explaining his decision in a widely circulated resignation letter, Clement
said he was resigning "out of the firmly-held belief that a representation
should not be abandoned because the client's legal position is extremely
unpopular in certain quarters." 9 Having accepted the representation,
Clement continued, "I believe there is no honorable course for me but to
complete it."20
Clement, naturally, would land on his feet. He joined Bancroft, an
elite Washington, D.C. boutique founded by Viet Dinh, head of the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel under President Bush and a close friend of Clem-
ent from Harvard Law School. To the extent a law firm can have an ideo-
logical slant, Bancroft tilts decidedly rightward, its staff comprised of a
star-studded collection of former Bush Administration lawyers and Su-
preme Court clerks. 2 ' Anyone following the Clement saga could sense
Bancroft was a good fit, a place free from the institutional constraints of
a major firm, where he could take on polarizing public interest cases
without fear of upsetting the apple cart (or the business committee that
stocks it). But few could have anticipated just how well Clement would
take to his new environment, nor how swiftly his stock would rise inside
the Washington legal community.22
When Clement joined Bancroft in April 2011, he brought the
DOMA contract and the healthcare litigation, two of the biggest cases of
the year. Those matters alone would have been a handful for a firm of
15. Ashby Jones, After King & Spalding Drops DOMA Case, Clement Drops Firm, WALL ST.
J. L. BLoG (Apr. 25, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/25/after-king-spalding-
drops-doma-case-clement-drops-firm/.
16. Greg Sargent, Gay Rights Group: You're Damn Right We Pressured Law Firm on DOMA,
PLUM LINE (Apr. 26, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/gay-
rights-group-youre-damn-right-we-pressured-law-firm-on-doma/2011/03/03/AFii9bqE blog.htmi.
17. Jim Galloway & Bill Rankin, King & Spalding to Withdraw from Defending DOMA;
Clement Resigns, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 25, 2011, 10:30 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/king-spading-to-withdraw-from-defending-
doma-clem/nQst6/.
18. Letter from Paul Clement to Robert D. Hays, Chairman, King & Spalding LLP (Apr. 25,
2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/04251 I clementresign.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Galloway & Rankin, supra note 17 (supporting the proposition that Bancroft is known for
advancing conservative causes). The proposition that they hire conservative Supreme Court clerks
and former government attorneys comes from author's personal knowledge.
22. Mauro, supra note 14.
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Bancroft's size, which still had to manage its normal, pre-Clement case-
load. But within months Clement would pile on several additional mat-
ters destined for the Supreme Court, including two blockbuster federal-
ism cases.
The first case, Perry v. Perez,23 involved a controversial provision
of the Voting Rights Act requiring states with histories of electoral dis-
crimination to preclear new electoral maps with a federal court.24 Texas
had prepared a new map for the 2012 elections but, because of delays in
the preclearance process, had been required to use an interim map drawn
up by a federal judge.2 5 On its face, the case presented a narrow issue-
Could the court's interim map serve as a proper substitute for the map
proposed by the State, or was the court required to honor the State's poli-
cy judgments regarding the size and location of new districts?
Stirring below the surface, however, were weightier questions-
Must Southern states with histories of voter discrimination continue to
operate under the watchful eye of the federal courts? Are the widespread
civil rights violations that made federal legislation necessary in 1965
comfortably behind us? Who, between federal courts and state legisla-
tures, should control redistricting under these circumstances? In a sym-
bolic victory for the "states' rights" movement, the Supreme Court sided
with Texas, concluding federal courts must defer to the policy judgments
of state lawmakers when drawing up interim maps.2 6
In the second case, Clement represented Arizona in a politically
charged dispute with the Justice Department over the State's sweeping
new immigration statute. 27 The Justice Department claimed the law inter-
fered with federal immigration policy; Arizona claimed that it was simp-
ly trying to help Congress carry that policy out. 28 The question for the
Court was how much latitude states should be allowed in using their own
penalties and procedures to enforce federal immigration laws.2 9 Next to
healthcare, it was the most important federalism case to reach the Court
in years, and when the Court gutted the law, striking down the majority
of the challenged provisions, it dealt the states' rights movement its most
decisive loss of the term.
More recently, Clement agreed to represent yet another state gov-
ernment in a voting rights dispute with the Justice Department.3 0 In this
case, South Carolina challenged the Justice Department's decision to
23. 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 939.
25. Id. at 940.
26. Id. at 944.
27. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK) (CKK) (JDB), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146187 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012).
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block implementation of the State's new voter identification law. 3 ' The
Justice Department claims the law, which requires voters to show gov-
ernment-issued identification before casting a ballot, will have the effect
of denying certain residents the right to vote on account of their race.32
Last October, a three-judge district court handed Clement a partial victo-
ry. Although the court refused to preclear the photo identification re-
quirement for the November 2012 election, citing concerns that immedi-
ate implementation would have an unlawful retrogressive effect on mi-
nority voters, it ruled that the provision would not disproportionally bur-
den minority voters in elections beginning in 2013 and beyond.33
Clement had become the bespectacled face of the conservative legal
agenda. He was making the case against the White House on health care,
immigration reform, and gay marriage, but more broadly he was making
the case against unbridled federal power and the Obama Administra-
tion's vision of government. "Clement's career is cresting just as the
momentous legal crusades of a radicalized Republican Party are reaching
the appellate level," wrote New York Magazine.34 In a term about the
scope of congressional authority, he had the entire lineup of federalism
cases, two of which-healthcare and Arizona immigration-promised to
leave lasting changes on the balance of power between the states and the
federal government. If it's hard to imagine a private attorney wielding so
much power, it's because there's no modern precedent for it.
Perhaps it was Clement's appeal as a symbol of unity in the midst of
a divisive primary season, or perhaps it was the obvious parallel to the
DOMA saga (just as the White House had walked out on Congress by
refusing to defend DOMA, King & Spalding had walked out on Clem-
ent), but Clement's resignation elevated him to new heights of celebrity.
"There's no doubt that Paul has become the leading advocate for the
most deeply conservative causes in the law," said David Frederick, a
prominent Supreme Court lawyer.35 Clement is a profile in courage, a
lawyer with the backbone to stand for principle in the face of politics.
King & Spalding would become the perfect foil in the Clement narrative,
the firm's perceived cowardice in the face of pressure only magnifying
Clement's courage and resolve. As one conservative writer put, "Where
King and company demonstrated cowardice, Clement showed charac-
31. Id. at *4.
32. James Rosen & Rebecca Cohen McClatchy, Trial to Look at Voter ID Law, Discrimina-
tion History, MCCLATCHY, Aug. 25, 2012, available at
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/31/164598/sc-voter-id-law-takes-some-hits.html.
33. See South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094,
at *9-11 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 2012).
34. Zengerle, supra note 8, at 30.
35. Martin Gould, Obamacare Foes Pick Experienced Lawyer for Their Case, NEWSMAX
(Mar. 23, 2012, 4:09 PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/ClementBondihealthcaresupreme/2012/03/23/id/43373 1.
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ter." 36 Glenn Beck called Clement a modem-day hero, equating his res-
ignation with John Adams's decision to represent a British soldier ac-
cused of murdering American patriots in Boston.37 As for King & Spal-
ding, Beck hopes the firm goes out of business.
This tidy narrative obscures a more realistic picture of Clement's
place in the conservative legal landscape. Contrary to most accounts in
the popular press, Clement is not a mouthpiece of the states' rights
movement. He's done a spate of high-profile work for the states, but he
makes his living as a business lawyer representing the interests of large
corporations in cases before state and federal appellate courts. Those
interests coalesce around the common cause of deregulation, or failing
that, less burdensome regulation. We don't read about his business cases
because they concern the private sector and tend to be dryer, low profile,
and devoid of the battleground political issues that animate his other
work.
They also tend to be at odds with his federalism cases. Although
there is nothing inherently inconsistent in fighting for federalism and
deregulation at the same time, in practice the two positions are bound to
clash. Over time the business community's litigation agenda has taken on
a pro-federal bent.39 National businesses prefer the uniformity of federal
law to the conflicts and redundancies of overlapping state regimes. 40 This
is especially true during periods of deregulation, when federal law dis-
places state law without imposing new burdens of its own, creating the
optimal regulatory environment. But even during periods of heightened
regulation, litigation trends suggest that most businesses would still pre-
fer a standardized set of federal rules to a patchwork of state regula-
41tions.
Clement's story, then, is more complicated than most observers ap-
preciate. While Clement's public image is bound up with his states'
rights work-Clement has been variously referred to as an "anti-solicitor
general" (New York Magazine),4 2 a right-wing "uber-attomey" (The
36. Doug Carlson, On DOMA: The Courage of Clement, Cowardice of King, ETHICS &
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY COMM'N (May 4, 2011), http://erlc.com/article/on-doma-courage-clement-
cowardice-king/.
37. Carlos Maza, Beck Lashes Out at King & Spalding, Compares Clement to Civil Rights
Heroes, -EQUAL. MATTERS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2011, 12:48 PM),
http://equalitymatters.org/blog/201 104280005.
38. Beck Hopes Firm Goes out of Business for Failing to Refusing to Defend DOMA, EQUAL.
MATTERS BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 8:20 PM), http://equalitymatters.org/emtv/201104270014 (quoting
Glenn Beck Show (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011) ("[B]ut Clement's law firm caved
under pressure when things got just a little too uncomfortable, well, I hope they go out of business,
quite frankly.")).
39. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 133 (2004).
40. SOLVEIG STEVENSON, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., RETHINKING FEDERALISM: THE CASE
FOR PREEMPTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (2011).
41. See infra Part Ill.
42. Zengerle, supra note 8, at 30.
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Guardian),43 a conservative "ideological warrior" (Daily Beast)," and
the "go-to guy for controversial conservative causes" (Above the
Law)4 5-he continues to make his living as a commercial litigator, help-
ing the business community pursue a pro-federal legal agenda. Both roles
are "conservative" in the sense that they further objectives commonly
associated with the political right, but one requires him to champion fed-
eralism while the other requires him to rein it in. From a legal standpoint,
there is nothing wrong with challenging federal power on Wednesday
then turning around and promoting it on Thursday; a lawyer's pursuits
are governed by the interests of the client, not ideological purity.
But what about from an ideological standpoint? Remove Clement
from the picture and examine the two principles in the abstract-Is the
push for federalism at odds with the push for deregulation? Can legal
conservatism embrace both tenets and still claim to represent a coherent
body of principles? If not, which tenet lies closer to the heart of modern-
day conservative thought?
These questions need answers before there can be a serious discus-
sion about the future of legal conservatism. As Professor Ernest Young
has observed, "[C]onfusion about ideological labels has seriously distort-
ed the debate about constitutional interpretation generally." 46 The confu-
sion begins with our language. We speak of legal conservatism as if it
were a uniform and ordered whole when in fact it is messier, less orga-
nized, and more fragmented. Legal conservatism is not a monolith but
rather a collection of principles and doctrines cobbled together under a
shared label.
Our understanding of "conservatism" is pliable enough to bend with
context. According to Professor Young, "virtually all participants in the
debate have defined conservatism operationally, as whatever jurispru-
dence is advocated by judges, academics, and politicians generally con-
sidered to be on the rightward end of the political spectrum." 47 We saw
the term manipulated in the wake of the healthcare decision, when oppo-
nents of the Affordable Care Act criticized Chief Justice Roberts for fail-
ing to reach the "conservative" outcome 48 at the same time that support-
43. Matt Seaton (MattSeaton) on Twitter, TWITTER (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:49 AM),
http://twitter.com/mattseaton/status/185393313719918593.
44. Chris Geidner, Paul Clement Argues Both Sides of the Federalism Debate, DAILY BEAST
(Apr. 26, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articies/2012/04/26/paul-clement-argues-
both-sides-of-the-federalism-debate.html.
45. Staci Zaretsky, Lawyer of the Month: March Reader Poll, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 5, 2012,
2:37 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/04/lawyer-of-the-month-march-reader-poll/.
46. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 623 (1994).
47. Id. at 621.
48. Luke Johnson, John Roberts Outrages Conservatives in Health Care Ruling, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 28, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/john-roberts-
conservatives-health-care-rulingnl 634512.html.
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ers applauded his restrained and "conservative" approach to judicial re-
view.4 9 One side was using "conservative" to refer to a substantive polit-
ical outcome, the other to a legal philosophy, but both had laid legitimate
claim to the term.
We fall into similar semantic traps when we talk about Paul Clem-
ent. Clement can advance a "conservative" cause by helping states push
back against expansive interpretations of national power. But he can also
advance a "conservative" cause by representing cost-weary businesses
seeking to replace patchy state regulations with uniform federal laws.
Determining which cause is closer to the heartland of conservative
thought ought to be a priority for legal conservatives, if not for their ben-
efit then for the common good, because nobody is well served when
pundits and politicians speak of "conservative" laws or "conservative"
rulings or "conservative" judges without having the cloudiest idea which
principles the term embraces.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND DEREGULATION
In his memoir about his years as Solicitor General under President
Ronald Reagan, Charles Fried says the most frustrating aspect of his job
was catering to ideologues inside the Administration who would cry foul
anytime the Justice Department took a position in tension with the Ad-
ministration's stance on federalism.o The Reagan Administration was
resolved to rein in the federal bureaucracy and redress the yawning dis-
parity in power between the state and federal government. "The driving
force behind [its] argument was the belief, widely held in the generation
that had framed and ratified the Constitution, that strong local institutions
were a bulwark of democracy and a protection against impositions by an
arrogant, distant, and overreaching national government."5' For the "fed-
eralism police," as Fried dubbed them, the Administration's vision of
state autonomy was an article of faith, a project to be elevated above
most other domestic policy goals.52 Pressing ideas inconsistent with this
orthodoxy, even when they stemmed from equally settled conservative
tenets like deregulation, "seemed like defiance of the Holy Office."
Fried thought the Administration's dogmatic approach to federalism
shortsighted. He left the Harvard Law School faculty to join the Reagan
Administration because he believed in one of its central missions: reliev-
ing American business of the burden of excessive regulation. He ques-
49. Harvard Law Prof: Roberts' Ruling Was Conservative, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2012, 8:25
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57463529/harvard-law-prof.-roberts-ruling-was-
conservative/.
50. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 182 (1991).
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id. at 188.
53. Id at 52.
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tioned whether deregulation could be achieved in conjunction with the
Administration's promise to restore greater regulatory power to the
states. He feared that devolving regulatory authority to states would lead
to more regulation and less economic liberty, outcomes inimical to the
Administration's pro-business agenda.5 4 His distrust of local government
stemmed in part from his years in Cambridge (he calls it the "The Peo-
ple's Republic of Cambridge"), a city notorious for its draconian ap-
proach to rent control." In Cambridge, as in his birth country of Czecho-
slovakia, Fried witnessed local government at its most stifling. He came
to Washington intent on defending capitalism wherever it might be
threatened, convinced economic freedom was no more secure from pro-
vincial government bodies than national ones. "[T]he same social forces
that had produced overregulation in federal programs were hard at work
at the state level and could sometimes only be resisted by uniform federal
standards," Fried wrote. 56
Although Fried's skepticism was weakening his influence inside the
Administration, he continued to voice it. When the Justice Department
was told to advocate for a legal presumption favoring local regulations to
the extent they conflict with federal law, Fried resisted. "This seemed to
me a disastrous idea," he wrote.57 "Better that firms operating on a na-
tional basis be subject to one uniform system of regulation than to scores
of different ones. In a fractured and uncoordinated situation, businesses
would as a practical matter be forced to comply with whatever regula-
tions were most stringent."
Fried was speaking from personal experience, but he might as well
have been describing the last several decades of conservative legal
thought. Conservatives had been wrestling with the competing tenets of
federalism and deregulation well before Fried joined the Reagan Admin-
istration. According to Walter Dellinger, a Solicitor General under Presi-
dent Clinton, the tension between deregulation and federalism is a matter
of "timeless debate." 59 "There is a genuine fissure," he says, "between
the twin poles of states' rights on the one hand and freedom from exces-
sive and multiplicitous and often inconsistent regulations on the other."60
When we speak of states' rights, it is often with the curious assump-
tion that devolving regulatory authority to state governments will make
for less regulation.61 There is a perception that the states' right move-
54. See id
55. Id. at 186-87.
56. Id. at 52.
57. Id. at 187.
58. Id.
59. The Roberts Court and Federalism: Minutes from a Convention of the Federalist Society,
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ment, being a project of the right wing, is synonymous with free markets
and deregulation. For Dellinger, states' rights had always called to mind
classic conservative imagery like "George Corley Wallace standing in
the schoolhouse door."6 2 But whereas proponents of states' rights would
undoubtedly prefer their project work in harmony with conservative ten-
ets like deregulation and economic liberty, the more sensible among
them have come to understand it does not always work out that way.
Today, Dellinger says, "states' rights look more appealing to people who
want to urge more liabilities on corporations, more recovery, more puni-
tive attitudes, more regulatory protections."
Emboldened by years of deregulation under President Reagan, lib-
eral interest groups redoubled lobbying efforts in state legislatures. Many
had success-the environmentalists in California, New York, and Mas-
sachusetts; the labor unions in California and Michigan; the anti-tobacco
groups in New England; and the bank reformers in New York. But per-
haps no group antagonized the business community with as much suc-
cess as the trial lawyers. In cooperation with consumer protection
groups, the trial bar has gradually tilted the scale in civil litigation by
pushing laws that make it easier to sue and collect damages from corpo-
66rations.66 Year after year, state by state, it has succeeded, securing longer
limitations periods, restrictions on arbitration clauses, expanded tort lia-
bility for employers and manufacturers, as well as countless reforms de-
signed to make civil litigation a vexing and costly enterprise for corpora-
tions.67 Meanwhile, state courts fashioned creative remedies permitting
plaintiffs to recover damages from multiple corporate defendants based
on their respective shares of the market, and state attorneys general have
ramped up litigation against corporate defendants in areas of national
interest like firearms, lead paint, mortgage practices, and greenhouse
68
gasses.
The business climate is especially uninviting in states where the tri-
al bar acts at the behest of the government. In these states, the attorney
general plays the role of general contractor, auctioning off potential tort
62. Id
63. Id. at 334.
64. See Young, supra note 39, at 133-34.
65. Richard P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1859 (2000).
66. See, e.g., Tim Murphy, Rick Perry v. The Trial Lawyers, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 22, 2011,
6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/08/rick-perry-vs-trial-lawyers; Lamar Smith,
Trial Bar v. Tort Reform, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2009, 8:25 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27761.html; Marilyn Tennissen, Business, Trial Bar at
Odds over Pending Texas Asbestos Bills, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 6, 2009, 2:29 PM),
http://legalnewsline.comlasbestos/220228-business-trial-bar-at-odds-over-pending-texas-asbestos-
bills.
67. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1501, 1511-12 (2009).
68. Id. at 1503.
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judgments to plaintiff firms eager to assume regulatory power.69 The
practice, known in the scholarly community as "regulation through litiga-
tion," gained national attention in the 1990s when plaintiff lawyers made
a mint suing tobacco companies and gun manufacturers on behalf of state
governments, 70 and was further popularized by Eliot Spitzer during his
tenure as attorney general of New York.
Spitzer is not whom the Reagan revolutionaries envisioned when
they set out to restore a balance of power between state and federal au-
thority. Yet he was, in a peculiar way, precisely what they bargained for.
Spitzer embodied a modem and muscular vision of state sovereignty.
Before figures like Spitzer emerged, state attorneys general were viewed
as watchdogs for consumers, their mandate limited to tracking down
unscrupulous landlords and corrupt nursing homes. 7 1 But Spitzer envi-
sioned an entirely different role for his office, combining his investiga-
tive authority with an ambitious interpretation of New York's jurisdic-
tion to insert the state into areas traditionally reserved for federal en-
forcement. His project culminated in the late 2000s with a string of en-
forcement actions against Wall Street financial institutions. Spitzer went
after the banks, the mutual funds, the insurers, and reinsurers.72 He even
went after the record companies, accusing some of the world's largest
labels of withholding millions of dollars in royalties. 73 Most of his targets
would pay extravagant fines and accede to severe restrictions on their
business practices.74
But for all of his anti-business crusading, it may have been Spitzer's
coziness with the trial bar that permanently estranged him from the busi-
ness community. To maximize the threat of liability, Spitzer deputized
plaintiff lawyers and invited them to carry out his oversight role through
contingency-fee suits. 7 5 These suits, which allowed private lawyers to
wield the power and prestige of the State, had a way of bringing compa-
nies to the settlement table, and dozens of corporate defendants were
forced to change their business practices or pay significant settlements as
a result.76 What sets regulation through litigation apart from the tradi-
69. Joseph Forderer, State Sponsored Global Warming Litigation: Federalism Properly
Utilized or Abused?, 18 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 n.7 (2010).
70. Edward T. Schroeder, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the Distinction Between
Regulation Through Litigation and Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 897, 900-01 (2005).
71. William B. Eimicke & Daniel Shacknai, Eliot Spitzer: "The People's Lawyer"-
Disgraced, 10 PUB. INTEGRYry 365, 367 (2008).
72. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, SEC, Spitzer Sue Mutual Fund Firm; Columbia Is Accused of
Hurting Investors, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 2004, at E4 (describing suits against mutual fund firms);
Floyd Norris, When Spitzer Speaks, Insurers Take Note, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at Cl (describ-
ing Spitzer's investigation of insurance companies).
73. Lola Ogunnaike, Record Labels Must Pay Shortchanged Performers, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2004, at El.
74. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 182
(2005).
75. See id. at 203 n.117.
76. Id. at 181-82.
603
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tional tort suit is the plaintiffs motivation: regulatory lawsuits are moti-
vated by a desire to change the behavior of the defendant, rather than by
a desire to collect money damages.
Pro-business conservatives take particular offense to the practice
because it combines two of their least favorite things-government regu-
lation and the class action lawsuit. It is, critics say, an abuse of govern-
ment power and a circumvention of the democratic process because un-
like private litigants, government "super plaintiffs" can protect them-
selves from the injurious conduct through regulation or taxes. 7 7 "These
discretionary decisions of state attorneys general regarding which manu-
facturing industries to target represent a critical aspect of product regula-
tion in today's economy and a major shift in the allocation of powers
among the coordinate branches of government."78 Or, as Senator Mitch
McConnell put it, "The more fundamental problem with 'regulation
through litigation' is that private parties obtain through lawsuits what
legislatures have not chosen, or have even chosen to reject."79
It's not only the cost of litigation that dogs the business community,
it's the uncertainty and second-guessing that poisons decision making.80
Tort liability is most burdensome in states where the standards of care
are set by state court judges and juries rather than by legislatures. In
those states, manufacturers have less guidance in developing safety
measures, and because juries don't undertake the cost-benefit analysis
that lawmakers do, liability standards tend to be skewed in favor of con-
sumers.8' Meanwhile, the interests of the countless consumers who actu-
ally benefit from the product, be it a prescription drug or a safety belt or
a lawnmower, are not represented in court.
Your position on tort reform, then, is a strong indicator of where
you fit inside the conservative legal movement. Tort reform is a fixture
on the GOP platform, and Republican lawmakers who rely on corporate
donors neglect it at their own peril. But if you are serious about states'
rights, you must be willing to accept the consequences of state regula-
tion, and one of the most controversial consequences of state regulation
is more litigation. That's why tort reform tests the nerves of states' rights
conservatives: it requires sharing common ground with natural enemies
like trial lawyers.
Early last year, House Republicans proposed capping the damages
awardable by state court judges in medical malpractice and personal inju-
77. Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens
Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 938 (2008).
78. Id. at 938-39.
79. Paul Weyrich, Willpower: Losing Weight the Responsible Way, NAT'L CTR. FOR PUB.
POL'Y RES. LEGAL BRIEFS (Apr. 16, 2004), http://www.nationalcenter.org/LB4 1.html.
80. Klass, supra note 67.
81. Seeid atl5lln.31.
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ry cases. 82 The law received a warm reception from the business lobby,
which has for years been calling on Congress to reform the civil justice
system and reign in the trial lawyers; and a predictably fiery one from
House Democrats, who criticized Republicans for weakening accounta-
bility in the provision of healthcare and giving negligent doctors a free
pass.8' The real story was opposition from certain corners of the Repub-
lican Party. 84 Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, a leader in the
push to overturn the Affordable Care Act, said the bill was "breathtak-
ingly broad in its assumptions about federal power."85 He pointed to the
proposed law as evidence of a "constitutional disconnect" among Repub-
licans who oppose federal power when it's used for ill (he gives the ex-
ample of Obamacare) yet still feel comfortable telling state court judges
how to conduct civil trials. 86 Congressman Louie Gohmert, a Texas Re-
publican, said he was "reticent to support Congress imposing its will on
the states by dictating new state law in their own state courts."8 Echoing
these concerns, Senator Tom Coburn wondered where the line would be
drawn once Congress put its "nose under the tent to start telling [states]
what their tort law will be."
Randy Barnett, the prolific right-wing legal scholar and one of the
most vocal opponents of the Affordable Care Act, was more direct.
"What constitutional authority did the supporters of the bill rely upon to
justify interfering with state authority in this way?"89 Barnett asked, be-
fore accusing the bill's proponents of practicing "fair-weather federal-
ism," which is to say, supporting federalism only to the extent that it is
consistent with other policy objectives.90 In Barnett's circle, this is a po-
lite way of calling someone spineless.
Barnett didn't coin "fair-weather federalism." The pejorative has
been in use for decades, reserved for "hypocritical" conservatives who
speak fondly of state rights' one day and then turn around and undermine
82. See Todd Ruger, House GOP Pushing Tort Reform Bill that Democrats Say Will Fail in




84. Julian Pecquet, State Lawmakers Blast House GOP's Medical Malpractice Reform Bill,
THE HILL (Mar. 14, 2012, 4:04 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/state-issues/216099-state-
lawmakers-blast-medical-malpractice-reform-bill-.




87. David Nather, Tort Reform Bill Hits Speed Bump, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2011, 6:45 PM),
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=BBCOOAF8-35CA-46D7-8DCD-AA3DOEDIECO5
(internal quotation mark omitted).
88. Eli Y. Adashi, The Sustainale Growth Rate-What Happens Now?, MEDSCAPE NEWS
(June 30, 2011), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/745412.
89. Randy E. Barnett, Tort Reform and the GOP's Fair-Weather Federalism, WASH.
EXAMINER (May 21, 2011, 12:54 AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/39943.
90. Id.
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them the next. They called President Bush a fair-weather federalist when
he supported a federal cloning ban, ' and they said the same thing about
Governor Rick Perry, who has suggested Texas might be better off a
secessionist state, when he said he would back a federal constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman.92
Barnett's criticism would have had more resonance in the 1980s,
when legal conservatives were all camping under one tent. Back then
everybody shared the same priority-undoing the damage wrought by
the Warren Court and two decades of judicial overreaching. The move-
ment was still in a reactive posture, united under the banner of judicial
restraint, its common interest in reforming the courts masking long-
buried ideological differences.
Although a shared distaste for the Warren Court can kindle a
movement, it cannot sustain it-at least not from an organizational
standpoint. A legal movement needs a support structure before it can
produce consistent results in the courts. But notwithstanding a surge in
membership and popular support, legal conservatism remained weak and
disorganized, a movement without sway in the legal academy or a viable
agenda in the courts.93 So while the conditions had been ripe for a con-
servative revolution in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Nixon appointed
four Justices to the Supreme Court between 1969 and 1974), the move-
ment still had no legs to stand on, no way to turn anger and frustration
into concerted action.
In his book about the rise of the conservative legal movement, Ste-
phen Teles chronicles the movement's transformation from a fringe and
widely discredited ideology to a mainstream school of thought. 9 4 Begin-
ning in the 1970s, when conservatives began populating law school fac-
ulties, the outlines of the modern movement started to take shape.9 5 Con-
sistent with grooming processes long familiar to the left, right-leaning
graduates from top law schools were encouraged to begin their careers in
prestigious clerkships with conservative judges and justices. 6 The idea
was to "replicate the function that major universities serve on the left of
creating a community of people with similar views on similar issues."97
These clerkships, in turn, opened doors to faculty appointments and gov-
ernment placements previously dominated by left-leaning lawyers.
Around the same time, a group of young academics founded the Federal-
91. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Fair-Weather Federalism?, Fox NEWS (Apr. 22, 2002),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50840,00.htmi.
92. Mike Riggs, Rick Perry's Fair-Weather Federalism, REASON.COM (July 29, 2011),
http://reason.com/archives/2011/07/29/rick-perrys-tenuous-understand.
93. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 2 (2008).
94. Id. at 4-5.
95. Id. at 91.
96. Id. at 140.
97. Id. at 164.
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ist Society with the aim of building a conservative "counter-elite" to
challenge the dominance of the liberal orthodoxy in the nation's top law
schools and legal institutions. These were positive developments, and
the Federalist Society would eventually prove instrumental to the move-
ment's development, but it was not until conservatives began channeling
resources into long-term litigation campaigns that the movement started
reaping dividends in the courts.
Following the lead of established public-interest groups like the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the
American Civil Liberties Union, conservatives leveraged their newfound
foothold in the legal academy by recruiting young lawyers into public-
interest law firms (PILFs) where they could further the movement's liti-
gation agenda.99 Their progress was slow going. According to Teles, the
"first-generation PLLFs" struggled to build strong reputations because
they were too closely linked to local business interests, their main source
of funding.'00 Intimate ties to the business lobby frustrated their efforts to
develop a public-interest identity, and it took the emergence of a second
generation of PELFs, this one funded not by local chambers of commerce
but by individual donors and other public-interest groups, to set the
states' rights agenda on track.o'0 As Mark Tushnet put it, "[T]he first
generation of conservative public interest law firms was unable to pull
off the public-relations move of identifying the interests of large busi-
nesses with the public interest."' 0 2
The second wave of PILFs went some way toward addressing the
organizational problem, lending the movement more authenticity and
garnering a strong base of ideological support.103 Public-interest groups
prefer ideological donors because they do not demand instant gratifica-
tion and won't limit funding to projects promising quick payoffs. ' Ra-
ther, they tend to appreciate the grinding pace at which movements are
built and equipped to compete with the well-endowed institutions on the
other side of the aisle.
But while the P1LFs overcame their organizational problems, they
made only modest headway in the courts. The movement appeared to
gain traction in the 1990s when the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions scaling back the broad interpretation of federal power that had
prevailed in the Court since the New Deal era. It was during this period
98. Id. at 138.
99. Id. at 67.
100. Id. at 221.
101. Id. at 68-69 ("The firms' business-heavy caseload lent credence to their adversaries'
argument that, far from being defenders of the public interest, they were nothing more than shill for
conservative business interests.").
102. Mark Tushnet, What Consequences Do Ideas Have?, 87 TEX L. REV. 447, 453-54 (2008)
(reviewing TELES, supra note 93).
103. TELES, supra note 93, at 221.
104. Id. at 222.
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that the Supreme Court, for the first time in six decades, invalidated a
federal law on the ground that it exceeded congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.'05 Although the Supreme Court had not struck
down a federal law since 1937, it would strike down thirty-three over the
next eight years,'06 a trend that led experts to predict the Court would
adopt a pre-New Deal approach to the commerce power.
But the trend would be short-lived. Although judicial conservatism
remained ascendant throughout the period, over time it stopped paying
dividends for the states' rights movement. In 2005, the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress could, consistent with its authority under the Com-
merce Clause, proscribe the production and use of homegrown marijua-
na, even though the marijuana was permitted under state law and intend-
ed for personal consumption.'07 The Court based the decision, Gonzales
v. Raich, on an expansive interpretation of the commerce power,'os dash-
ing hopes that it would restore the pre-New Deal vision of limited federal
power.
Scholars disagree about the point at which the Court took a nation-
alist turn, with some contending it was the late 1990s, others suggesting
it was the early years of the Roberts Court, and still others convinced it's
been a pro-federal court all along. But everyone agrees the Court's deci-
sion in Raich was a death knell of sorts for the states' rights move-
ment.109 In retrospect, the Court's flirtation with states' rights in the
1990s has been attributed not to the movement but rather to the presence
on the Supreme Court of ideological allies like Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. "The two Justices who believed most strongly in federalism
have both left the Court," wrote David Strauss, a professor at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, in a piece about the waning influence of judicial con-
servatism.1o
The Supreme Court would continue to uphold expansive interpreta-
tions of federal power well into the 2000s, but the Court's nationalist,
pro-business agenda would find its stride in the Roberts Court."' The
Roberts Court is rightfully viewed as a business-friendly court, but its
pro-business orientation owes much to its bold vision of federal power."
2
105. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
106. Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 233, 280-83 app.A
(1999).
107. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
108. See id. at 22.
109. See Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional
Framework, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 977 (2006).
110. David A. Strauss, The Death of Judicial Conservatism, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 10 (2009).
11. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 38.
112. See Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary
Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 950 (2009).
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Since Chief Justice Roberts took the helm in 2005, the Court has been
preoccupied with preemption. The issue has been a fixture on the Roberts
Court docket since the beginning, and the Court's decisions tend to favor
federal law and the particular corporate stakeholder invoking it."1 3
[A]t the same time the Court was cutting back on Congress's authori-
ty under the Commerce Clause in the name of states' rights, it began
to limit significantly the ability of states to provide tort rights and
remedies for its citizens by preempting common law and statutory
claims for damages associated with drugs, medical devices, and con-
sumer products .... 114
Each statutory scheme is different, of course, and the Court's ap-
proach toward preemption will vary from case to case. Still, the general
trend favors uniformity over multiplicity, federal over state. More specif-
ically, it reflects the Court's suspicion of tort litigation as a means of
regulating commercial conduct.115 The Roberts Court is happy to uphold
federal power if it means not subjecting businesses to the whims ofjuries
or state trial judges.
Conservatives devoted to promoting deregulation are finding it in-
creasingly difficult to share common ground with the states' rights
movement. Their differences sharpened during the financial crisis, when
the business community supported some of the Obama Administration's
more dramatic federal interventions into the economy. While the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber) went on record in support of the
stimulus package and the Troubled Asset Relief Program, states' rights
groups accused the federal government of overreaching and challenged
the program in court.l 16 Since parting ways in the late 1970s, the two
camps have found independent sources of funding, occupied separate
spheres of power, and advanced diverging positions on some of the big-
gest cases of the day. Although still loosely linked together under the
conservative banner, the camps have little left in common, and often find
themselves on opposing sides of the same case. Remarking on this trend,
Professor Young said, "It is no longer possible to equate a vote for state
autonomy with a vote for a politically conservative result."'1 7
113. See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-66 (2012) (holding
that state law tort claims of defective design and failure to warn were preempted by the Locomotive
Inspection Act); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075-76 (2011) (holding that National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempts all design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers
brought by plaintiffs who seek compensation for injury or death caused by vaccine side effects).
114. Klass, supra note 67, at 1504-05.
115. See id.
116. Seth Bailey, TARP Challenged in Federal Court, OPENMARKET.ORG (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.openmarket.org/2009/02/09/tarp-challenged-in-federal-court/.
117. Ernest Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874, 875
(2006).
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Organizationally, the business community is the strongest camp in
the conservative legal establishment, its advantage so considerable that at
least one scholar describes it as being outside the establishment entirely.
"[W]e may have seen a return of business-oriented conservative litiga-
tion, but it is now outside the conservative legal movement's institutional
framework," Professor Mark Tushnet observed."' The business commu-
nity owes part of its institutional strength to the Chamber, the world's
largest business federation, whose membership comprises more than
300,000 companies." 9 The Chamber spends a mind-blowing amount of
money-more than the national committees of both major parties com-
bined-to advance its agenda in Washington, and its litigation wing, the
National Chamber Litigation Center, has had unparalleled success before
the Supreme Court, both in its capacity as a party and as amicus writing
in support of the business community.120
Viewed against this backdrop, the 2011-2012 Supreme Court dock-
et offers a skewed picture of the state of modern conservatism. While the
Supreme Court has shown a renewed interest in federalism cases, it's
seldom that their outcomes favor the states' rights movement. "[O]ne
thing you cannot say," lamented Professor David Strauss, in addressing
the Court's pro-federal trend, "is that this is a Court that cares deeply
about local prerogatives and protecting local governments from the intru-
sions of people in Washington, D.C."'21
III. PREEMPTION AND THE FATE OF THE STATES' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
In November 2008, the Federalist Society hosted a seminar on the
Roberts Court and its commitment to federalism.12 2 Paul Clement was
there, flanked by an impressive panel of law professors and lawyers,
including Walter Dellinger, former Solicitor General under President
Clinton. Dellinger opened the discussion on a confrontational note, call-
ing attention to a rift in conservative legal thought between deregulation
and states' rights.123 Dellinger was a Democrat addressing a room full of
Republicans, and he undoubtedly recognized that he was treading on
precarious ground with this topic. But he forged on, insisting conserva-
118. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 456.
119. About the Chamber of Commerce, USCHAMBER.COM, http://www.uschamber.com/about
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013). But see Josh Harkinson, US Chamber Shrinks Membership 90%,
MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2009/10/us-chamber-
caves-membership-numbers.
120. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al; Eric Lipton et al., Large Donations Aid U.S. Chamber in Election
Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at Al; see also David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-
Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2009).
121. Strauss, supra note 110, at 11.
122. See Roberts Court and Federalism, supra note 59, at 330.
123. See id. at 333.
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tives were due for a reckoning: they would eventually have to decide
which tenet embodies core conservatism.12 4
Clement spoke later. He had prepared remarks about federalism and
the Roberts Court, but he was not about to let Dellinger's comments
slide. Clement rejected the idea that the two schools of thought are inher-
ently contradictory.12 5 The question, he said, was not how much regula-
tion is acceptable but rather who should be doing the regulating.126
Clement believes you can defend a limited role for the federal govern-
ment and still accept uniform federal authority in areas where states can-
not act collectively.12 7 By the same token, he said, you can favor deregu-
lation and still recognize room for state action in areas where state laws
won't create tension.128
Clement's remarks echo a position he took a decade earlier in a
short essay about preemption he co-authored with Viet Dinh, now his
colleague at Bancroft.12 9 The authors criticized commentators for mistak-
ing the Court's preemption cases for cases about federalism. 3 0 In their
view, federalism cases present big-pictre scholarly questions-
questions about the boundaries of federal and state authority, about
which sovereign can act and when.131 Preemption cases tend to be nar-
rower, their outcomes turning on the scope of a statute or the intent of
Congress, the cases often decided without regard for constitutional prin-
ciples.13 2 "There is no real tension between the Supreme Court's federal-
ism decisions and its preemption cases because the latter, properly un-
derstood, are not 'about federalism."" 33
Clement's explanation has logical appeal, but is there any evidence
that it works that way in practice? In other words, does the states' rights
agenda operate in tension with that of the business community? Is the
business community considering where its agenda fits with legal con-
servatism generally and federalism specifically, and if so, will it pull
back where its success threatens to undermine the ongoing campaign for
states' rights?
Clement knows better than anyone that the two sides are pushing
the courts in different directions, their most common point of contention
being preemption, or the extent to which federal law displaces state law
124. See id at 336.
125. Id. at 352-53.
126. Id. at 360-61.
127. See id. at 353.
128. See id at 360.
129. Paul D. Clement & Viet D. Dinh, When Uncle Sam Steps In: There's No Real Disharmony
Between High Court Decisions Backing Preemption and the Federalism Push of Recent Years,
LEGAL TIMES, June 19, 2000, at 66, 66.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 66, 67.
133. Id. at 66 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).
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in a particular policy area. Having argued both sides of the preemption
debate, Clement knows the business community has come to value the
doctrine with the same fervor that the states' rights movement has come
to detest it. By the same token, he knows the success of one side often
comes at the expense of the other. A Supreme Court decision upholding
the supremacy of federal law not only threatens to displace state action in
the affected policy area but also strengthens the preemption doctrine by
making it more likely that federal law will displace state action in other
areas.
Clement knows this because he helped the business community se-
cure some of the signature preemption victories of the last decade. He
regularly appears on behalf of the business lobby in the Court's preemp-
tion cases, often with the aim of obtaining precedents at odds with the
states' rights agenda. In Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 34
a case about the preemptive scope of federal seatbelt regulations, he filed
an amicus brief on behalf of a group of auto manufacturers. 135 He argued
that a state court judgment imposing liability on Mazda for failing to
incorporate lap-shoulder seatbelts in certain seating positions was
preempted by federal regulations allowing manufacturers to install lap-
only belts in the same positions.136 His argument ultimately failed, and
it's a good thing for the states' rights crowd, because implicit in the
claim was the legally fraught proposition that states may not mandate
what Congress left optional.
Clement would have better luck in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,'37 a
highly anticipated preemption case about vaccine safety.' 38 The issue
there was whether federal law could shield vaccine manufacturers from
tort suits arising from vaccine-related injuries. Clement, writing on be-
half of the vaccine industry, argued that subjecting vaccine manufactur-
ers to state law liability for design defects would upset the federal regula-
tory regime.' 39 That regime had been carefully calibrated to hold manu-
facturers accountable to plaintiffs injured by defective vaccines, while
still limiting manufacturers' exposure to frivolous lawsuits. Introducing
state tort liability, manufacturers argued, would upset this delicate bal-
ance.140 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the vaccine manufacturers,
134. 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
135. See Brief of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (No. 08-1314),
2010 WL 3820816.
136. Id. at 21.
137. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
138. Id. at 1072.
139. See Brief of Glaxosmithkline L.L.C. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
6, Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (No. 09-152).
140. Id.
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cementing another victory for the business community in its push for
control of the Court's preemption doctrine.141
In Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,14 2 Clement filed an
amicus brief on behalf of General Electric (GE), the world's leading
manufacturer of diesel-electric locomotives. He argued that the Locomo-
tive Inspection Act broadly preempts the field of locomotive safety,
crowding out state laws aimed at regulating the design and construction
of locomotives.143 He asked the Court to hold that federal locomotive
regulations preempted a state law tort claim against a distributor of lo-
comotive parts that contained asbestos.'" GE's position on preemption
was aggressive-even more so than that of the Justice Department,
which allowed for the possibility that states could permissibly regulate
non-operational locomotives. The Supreme Court sided with GE and the
parts distributor, concluding the Locomotive Act leaves no room for state
action in the field of locomotive safety.145
Clement also had a hand in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,146
one of the more undervalued preemption victories of the decade.147 The
suit began as a class action brought by AT&T customers who had been
charged sales tax for the retail price of phones they received for free.14 8
When AT&T invoked a provision in the sales contract disallowing class
action suits, the plaintiffs cried foul, claiming the class action is the only
cost-effective way to pursue small-dollar claims against large corpora-
tions like AT&T. It would be unconscionable, they argued, to let con-
sumers sign away their rights to their only realistic remedy.' 4 9 The ques-
tion before the Court was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
preempts state laws that prohibit contracts with class action waivers. so
The Court said yes-at least to the extent such rules interfere with the
objective of the federal statute that the Court identified as promoting the
expeditious and informal resolution of consumer claims.' 5 ' The Court
takes a dim view of state laws that restrict the formation of arbitration
agreements, especially when they have the effect of requiring the availa-
bility of remedies like the class action suit, which "interfere[] with fun-
141. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082.
142. 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).
143. Brief for General Electric Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7-8, Kurns
v. R.R. Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (No. 10-879), 2011 WL 4872044, at *7-8.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270.
146. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
147. Clement was retained by the wireless industry lobby to write an amicus brief in support of
AT&T's position on preemption. See Brief of CTIA-The Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3183858.
148. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
149. See id. at 1745.
150. Id. at 1744.
151. See id. at 1748.
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damental attributes of arbitration and thus create[] a scheme inconsistent
with [federal law]." 52
After Concepcion, corporations can use collective action waivers to
shield themselves from high-volume, small-dollar suits then rest com-
fortably knowing consumers will seldom pursue claims individually. As
Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, "The realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30." 153 Critics fear the effects of the deci-
sion will spill into other areas like labor law where class action waivers
promise to considerably limit exposure to civil liability.' 54 Already, law-
yers are advising employers to insert class action waivers in their em-
ployment contracts.155
All of the doctrinal developments of recent years circumscribing the
reach of class actions pale in import next to the game-changing edict
that companies with possible exceptions that warrant close scrutiny
may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action
waiver language in their standard-form contracts with consumers (or
employees or others). s6
Taken together, Clement's preemption cases tell the story of a law-
yer who spends as much time challenging states' rights as he does pro-
moting them. Clement's victories for the business community have not
occurred in a vacuum: today's preemption victories lay the groundwork
for tomorrow's, strengthening the business lobby's litigation agenda by
reinforcing the doctrinal case for uniform federal law. The Court's deci-
sion in Bruesewitz will stand in the way of state legislatures seeking to
regulate vaccine manufacturers and similar industries subject to close
federal supervision, while its decision in Kurns makes state law a non-
factor in the area of railroad safety. Kurns is especially notable because it
would later be cited by the Justice Department as support for its preemp-
tion position in the Arizona immigration case,157 forcing Clement, Arizo-
na's lawyer, to argue against a pro-preemption decision he helped secure.
But neither decision rivals Concepcion in its potential to alter the
balance of power between the federal government and the states. Before
152. Id
153. Id at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d
656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Nantiya Ruan, What's Left to Remedy Wage Theft?: How Arbitration Mandates that Bar
Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. passim (forthcoming).
155. See, e.g., Lisa M. Carvalho, US. Supreme Court Reverses Ninth Circuit: Federal Arbitra-
tion Act Preempts California Law to Uphold Waiver of Class Action Option in Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, EMP'T L. WATCH (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.employmentlawwatch.com/tags/att-mobility-v-
concepcion/.
156. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012).
157. See Brief for the United States at 27, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. I1-182), 2011 WL 5548708, at *27.
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Concepcion, state courts could regulate the use of arbitration agreements
by enforcing only those deemed fair to consumers and consistent with
state policy. The FAA was the business community's response to this
judicial hostility, Congress's way of telling the states to stop meddling in
the affairs of the business community.
The Concepcion decision is already changing the relationship be-
tween state regulators and corporations in the area of consumer protec-
tion. According to David Arkush, a consumer advocate with Public Citi-
zen, "[c]orporations can now prevent consumers and small business
owners from exercising what is often their only real option for challeng-
ing companies that defraud them by millions or even billions of dollars:
banding together to file class action lawsuits."' 58 The decision has cast
doubt on dozens of state laws designed to protect consumers from the
harsh effects of arbitration. Among the laws now in question are class
action-waiver bars in Georgia, California, South Carolina, and New Jer-
sey, as well as a West Virginia law prohibiting nursing homes from using
arbitration clauses in their admission agreements that strip residents of
their right to bring personal-injury claims to court.'59
This is just a sample, drawn exclusively from Clement's caseload,
of pro-business outcomes that made life more difficult for the states and
their allies in the conservative legal movement. If you expand the inquiry
to the entire Supreme Court docket, more examples abound. In CSX
Transportation v. Alabama Department of Revenue,160 the Supreme
Court made it easier for interstate railroad companies to challenge state
tax laws under a federal statute prohibiting discriminatory taxes against
railroads.161 More recently, in National Meat Ass'n v. Harris,162 the
Court ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act preempted California's
restrictions on using non-ambulatory farm animals for slaughter.' 63 The
Chamber submitted a brief in support of the slaughterhouses.'6
More troubling for states' rights proponents is the fierceness with
which the Chamber is pursuing its agenda. Recall that the Reagan Ad-
ministration wanted the Justice Department to push for a legal presump-
tion favoring state and local regulations to the extent they conflict with
158. David Arkush, U.S. Supreme Court to Major Corporations: You Write the Rules,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-arkush/us-
supreme-court-to-major b 854714.htmi.
159. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110 (2012); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-15-130 (2012); W. VA. CODE R. § 16-5C-15(c) (2012); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank,
912 A.2d 88, 99-101 (N.J. 2006); see also Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (1Ith Cir.)
(holding that, under Georgia law, such clauses are considered on a case-by-case basis).
160. 131 S. Ct. I101 (2011).
161. Seeid.at 1114.
162. 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).
163. Id. at 968.
164. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Nat'l Meat, 132 S. Ct. at 965 (No. 10-224), 2011 WL 3821399.
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federal law. Charles Fried had opposed the idea, worried it would tip the
scale too far toward the states. Now the Chamber and its allies in the
business community are pushing in the opposite direction, inviting the
Court to abandon the "presumption against preemption," which requires
courts to assume a state law is valid in the absence of an affirmative
showing that it conflicts with federal law.' 6 5 The presumption is an out-
growth of the principle that state power is meant to protect state law from
the displacing effect of federal regulation. Doing away with it would tip
the scale even further in the business lobby's favor, eliminating one of
the states' most powerful defenses in preemption litigation.
These developments belie Clement's assurance that the two schools
of thought can work in harmony. If the Chamber were sensitive to the
interests of the states-if it were motivated even in part by conservative
unity-it would seek narrow holdings in preemption cases. But more
often than not, when the Chamber appears before the Supreme Court, it
is pushing not only for a business-friendly outcome but also for pro-
federal doctrinal change that will endure beyond the particular dispute.
The Chamber will not be satisfied to advance its cause in a piecemeal,
case-by-case fashion. It wants to create a legal environment conducive to
broad federal power and uniform federal regulation.
It appears to be doing just that. The federal courts are gradually
changing the division of labor between Congress and the states, enlarg-
ing Congress's license to legislate in policy areas once reserved for state
legislatures. This shift is consistent with one. commentator's belief that
the Chamber is not simply trying to secure favorable outcomes for its
members; it's trying to set the "intellectual foundation for a newly mus-
cular preemption jurisprudence."' 66
Consider how the two sides positioned themselves on the defining
issues of the term-healthcare and immigration. While the states' rights
movement rallied behind the opponents of the Affordable Care Act, stak-
ing its position in a series of fiery briefs from organizations like the Cato
Institute, Project Liberty, and the American Legislative Exchange Coun-
cil, the Chamber kept a safe distance from the case. Although the Cham-
ber filed two amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, neither took a position
on the law's constitutionality.' 67 The Chamber wrote only to stress the
importance of a prompt resolution, and to suggest that if the individual
mandate is struck down, the rest of the Affordable Care should fall with
it, because when push comes to shove, the Chamber's members would
165. See Tom Goldstein, Argument Preview: Will 'Presumption Against Preemption' Survive?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/201 1/1 l/argument-preview-
will-%E2%80%9Cpresumption-against-preemption%E2%80%9D-survive/.
166. Franklin, supra note 120, at 1033.
167. See Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal as to the Severability Issue, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11400), 2012 WL 454626 (combining and briefing the cases).
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prefer the status quo to the hollowed-out mess of a health care policy that
would remain in the absence of the mandate.' 6 8
The Chamber was altogether absent from the Arizona immigration
case, but if the position it took in a similar case last term is any indica-
tion, it probably would have aligned itself with the Obama Administra-
tion. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,169 the Chamber asserted that
the Legal Arizona Workers Act interferes with federal immigration poli-
cy by imposing more onerous penalties than federal law on businesses
that employ illegal aliens.170 There is such a thing, the Chamber main-
tained, as a state that's too cooperative in enforcing federal law. The Su-
preme Court ultimately sided with Arizona, concluding the State had
"taken the route least likely to cause tension with federal law."' 7 ' But the
Chamber's objection was clear: allowing states to determine for them-
selves whether someone is employing an unlawful alien frustrates federal
law and leaves businesses at the mercy of fifty independent and poten-
tially conflicting enforcement regimes.172
This, I think, is what Professor Tushnet meant when he said the
business community is operating "outside the conservative legal move-
ment's institutional framework."173 Healthcare and immigration were
indispensable opportunities for states' rights proponents. Winning either
case would have lifted the besieged movement from a decade-long slump
and dealt a devastating blow to the Obama Administration and its vision
of federal power. The conservative "institutional framework," with its
elaborate network of think tanks, advocacy groups, and public-interest
law firms, mobilized accordingly. The campaign was unyielding: signs
were hoisted, editorials submitted, briefs filed. Meanwhile, the Chamber
kept quiet. The Chamber had no position on the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act, at least none it felt comfortable detailing in an ami-
cus brief. And it had already telegraphed its position on Arizona immi-
gration, in the Whiting case, when it sued Arizona on the same pro-
federal theory the Justice Department was using this time around.
IV. THE BIG TENT
Professor Young, who has written extensively on federalism and
conservative political theory, argues that legal conservatism would be
adrift were it not for its devotion to federalism.174 Young believes fidelity
to the framers' vision of a balance between state and federal power is
168. Id. at 2, 15-16.
169. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
170. Brief for the Petitioners at 13-15, Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1968 (No. 09-115), 2008 WL
2131124,at*13-15.
171. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1987.
172. See id. at 1979.
173. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 456.
174. See Young, supra note 117, at 886-87.
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reason enough for conservatives to keep federalism near to their
hearts. 175 He maintains that limitations on centralized power can safe-
guard individual liberty, and that using the states as laboratories for polit-
ical reform "fits the conservative view that change is both essential and
dangerous."' 7 6 In making the conservative case for federalism, Young
hopes to "provide principled reasons for a conservative court to favor
federalism and to remind conservatives why they ought to be more con-
sistent in that cause."' 77
Young's argument provides a useful starting point, but so far it has
not found an audience outside academia, where it is needed most. Writ-
ing last year in Slate, Dahlia Lithwick and Barry Friedman observed that
"federalism cases have always made . .. fickle friends."l 7 8 "They put
people in an awkward spot," the authors wrote.179 "Either choose some
rule regarding state (versus federal) power and apply it no matter what
issue is at stake, or pick an outcome you like on any given issue, then
assign governmental power." 80 Lithwick and Friedman were addressing
the tension between federalism and the conservative social agenda, a
conflict that has left Republicans in the uncomfortable position of paying
lip service to states' rights while defending invasive federal programs
like the war on drugs and DOMA. But their criticism is also true of the
tension between federalism and deregulation.
The conflict, simply stated, is this: giving states more regulatory au-
thority requires accepting the consequences of more regulation, whereas
pushing for regulatory uniformity at the federal level requires accepting a
circumscribed role for the states. The two schools of thought cannot exist
without tension in a national market economy, but there has always been
a flickering hope that their proponents might stay out of each other's way
in the greater interest of the movement. This hope has faded over the last
decade with the prospect of a united conservative legal movement giving
way to the reality that two of its main components, the business commu-
nity and the states' rights movement, no longer share an agenda.
The Federalist Society took off in the 1980s because it found a way
to attract lawyers from a range of political and intellectual backgrounds.
It billed itself as a "big tent" institution, a place where conservatives
could come together to share fruit plates and listen to people like Paul
Clement talk about how much they have in common. This worked well
175. See id.
176. Id at 886.
177. Id. at 887.
178. Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Rediscovers Federalism Just in
Time for the 2012 Election, SLATE (Dec. 14, 2011, 4:53 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2011/12/the supreme court-redisco
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three decades ago when conservatives were living in the shadow of the
Warren Court, with the legal academy still overrun by liberals. But as the
movement gained strength, infiltrating the very institutions it once op-
posed, the impulse that once united its factions grew fainter. Today legal
conservatism is said to encompass the same assorted membership as it
did thirty years ago, even though the forces that once united it have dis-
sipated and the movement's various components have sought out their
own identities and agendas.
We see this trend at work in the media's portrayal of Paul Clement.
Both sides of the conflict would claim him as their own, even though
history shows him to be beholden to neither. The best one can say for the
standard trope about Clement is that it is right for the wrong reason.
Clement is the go-to lawyer for the conservative legal agenda, but it does
not follow that his success will advance the goals of legal conservatism,
writ large. Call him a states' rights crusader and you're forced to recon-
cile his preemption work on behalf of the business lobby. Call him a shill
of the business community and you're forced to account for his states'
rights work, much of it in tension with the business community's vision
of federal power. You can look to the common denominator and call him
a "conservative," but then you're right back where you started, left with a
label whose meaning has been stretched beyond usefulness.
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Whether commercial general liability insurance policies cover
claims for construction defects has been the subject of debate for many
years in Colorado and across the United States. When a division of the
Colorado Court of Appeals ruled in 2009 that negligent work could not
give rise to a covered "occurrence" under the pertinent policy language,
the state legislature responded with a statute rejecting this view. Disputes
continued in the courts until late 2011, however, when the Tenth Circuit
reviewed a diversity case and predicted that the Colorado Supreme Court
would hold that standard liability policies do in fact cover unforeseen
damage to property arising from faulty workmanship. This Article exam-
ines the history of construction liability insurance policies, the interpreta-
tion of such policies in Colorado, and the Tenth Circuit's holding in
Greystone Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
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With its decision in Greystone Construction, Inc. v. National Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has greatly clarified the law of construction insurance in the State
of Colorado. The opinion, announced in late 2011, followed years of
fighting between policyholders and carriers in Colorado's state courts,
federal courts, and legislature. Underlying all of these battles was a fun-
damental dispute over whether builders' liability insurance policies could
cover property damage and construction defect claims arising from neg-
ligent work. Although this war is certainly not over, the Tenth Circuit's
decision represents a significant victory for policyholders.
I. HISTORY
A. ISO Policies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
The institution of insurance is at least as old as the earliest records
of human civilization in Greece, Rome, and China.2 Modem concepts of
business insurance date back to the Middle Ages, when traders sought a
means to offset the risk of hazardous maritime travel and other threats to
their property.3 In the late nineteenth century, however, a new form of
risk emerged: the civil judgment. As the Industrial Revolution brought
about trains, automobiles, and other new technologies wonderfully suited
to people hurting themselves, businesses sought to insure against the risk
that a court would order them to compensate third parties for bodily inju-
ry or property damage.4 This desire begat the modem commercial gen-
eral liability (CGL) insurance policy.5
Until the 1930s, each insurance company drafted its own unique
policy language to cover potential liabilities, "resulting in little uniformi-
ty and a great deal of confusion and litigation." 6 These concerns prompt-
ed the various carriers to create an independent service agency to devel-
op standardized language for all general liability policies. 7 This agency,
now known as the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), published its
first standardized liability policy in 1940 and has updated its policy
forms periodically since then.8
1. 661 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 2011).
2. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED
RULESOF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 6.3.1, at 756 (Aspen Law & Business rev. ed. 2002).
3. Id. at 756-57.
4. Id. at 758-59; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 87-88 (2001); James A. Robertson, How Umbrella Policies Started
Part 1: Early Liability Coverage, INT'L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (Mar. 2000),
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2000/robertsonO3.aspx.
5. Abraham, supra note 4, at 89.
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Today, a few basic ISO forms define the scope of liability coverage
available for nearly all businesses throughout the United States, regard-
less of what type of work the business may do.9 Although there would be
obvious advantages to creating specialized policies tailored to individual
industries, this approach would present challenges as well: whenever a
carrier seeks to adopt new policy language, it must first obtain approval
from the government of each state where the policy would have effect,
educate its employees on the meaning and application of the new lan-
guage, and calculate premiums based on predictions of how courts may
interpret the policy in future disputes.'o Given these administrative hur-
dles, most insurers opt to use the standard, tested language." As one
commentator has noted, however, this results in a situation where "much
the same policy is issued to an earthmoving and excavating contractor as
to a wholesale bakery."' 2
The very first ISO liability policies were written to cover legal obli-
gations arising out of injury or damage "caused by an accident." 3 Ques-
tions emerged, however, over whether an "accident" included harm that
took place over an extended period of time. To address such questions,
the ISO amended its standard policy language in 1966 to state that the
carrier must pay all "sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' .. .
caused by an 'occurrence' that takes place in the 'coverage territory."'l 4
The policy in turn defined "occurrence" to be "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harm-
ful conditions."' 5 The 1973 revision defined "occurrence" in a similar
manner but added an element of fortuity, deeming an "occurrence" to be
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured." 6
Beginning with the 1986 revision, ISO policies have defined an
"'occurrence" as "an accident including continuous or repeated exposure
to substantially the same general harmful conditions," moving the "nei-
9. Id.
10. Id. As Turner notes, the McCarren Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012), delegates the
regulation of insurance policies to the states and territories, effectively requiring the ISO to obtain
the approval of fifty-three separate governments before adopting new language. See TURNER, supra
note 6.
I1. For a further discussion of the forces encouraging standardization of insurance policies,
see I ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §§ 2.1-2.2,
at 189-202 (2d ed. 1996).
12. TURNER, supra note 6.
13. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 74 (Wis. 2004) (quoting 16
HOLMES & RHODES, supra note I1, § 117.3, at 240).
14. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 75-76 (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Clifford J. Shapiro & Neil B. Posner, It Was an Accident: Inadvertent Construction De-
fects Are an "Occurrence" Under Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies, 3 J. INS.
COVERAGE, Autumn 2000, at 55, 59 (quoting 1973 revision of CGL policy).
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ther expected nor intended" language to the exclusions section of the
policy.17 The policies have never defined the word "accident," prompting
courts to look to common usage and dictionary definitions, which gener-
ally describe an accident as being something that happens by chance or
from an unknown or unexpected cause.' 8
As the policy language evolved, insured builders sought coverage
for the cost of repairing property that had sustained damage due to inad-
vertent defects in their workmanship. Although the 1966 and 1973 ISO
policies excluded coverage for damage to the "work" or "product" of the
named insured, some argued that such exclusions were inapplicable to
property damage included within the "Products-Completed Operations
Hazard" or similarly titled provisions, which the policies defined to
comprise property damage arising out of work that had been completed
or abandoned." Few courts of the era were persuaded, however.20 A
1971 law review article opined that the "business risk" exclusions of the
contemporary CGL policies were evidence that the ISO drafters had not
intended to cover the possibility that the policyholder might not perform
contractual obligations.
The products hazard and completed operations provisions are not
intended to cover damage to the insured's products or work project
out of which an accident arises. The risk intended to be insured is the
possibility that the goods, products or work of the insured, once re-
linquished or completed, will cause bodily injury or damage to prop-
erty other than to the product or completed work itself, and for which
the insured may be found liable. The insured, as a source of goods or
services, may be liable as a matter of contract law to make good on
products or work which is defective or otherwise unsuitable because
it is lacking in some capacity. This may even extend to an obligation
to completely replace or rebuild the deficient product or work. This
liability, however, is not what the coverages in question are designed
to protect against. The coverage is for tort liability for physical dam-
ages to others and not for contractual liability of the insured for eco-
17. TURNER, supra note 6, § 6:53 (quoting post-1986 policies).
18. Id. § 6:54. Turner suggests that, because "accident" is subject to many possible meanings,
it is an ambiguous term that courts should interpret in whatever manner maximizes coverage for the
insured. See id. § 6:53. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, meanwhile, has cited two applicable defini-
tions of this word:
The dictionary definition of "accident" is: "an event or condition occurring by chance or
arising from unknown or remote causes." Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as
follows: "The word 'accident,' in accident policies, means an event which takes place
without one's foresight or expectation. A result, though unexpected, is not an accident;
the means or cause must be accidental."
Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d at 76 (citations omitted).
19. See Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations: What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REv. 415, 419-24 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522 F.2d 1207, 1211
(8th Cir. 1975); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235
(Minn. 1986); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 792 (N.J. 1979).
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nomic loss because the product or completed work is not that for
which the damaged person bargained.21
The Supreme Court of New Jersey quoted this article in a 1979 case,
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. ,22 in which the court concluded that an in-
surance carrier had no duty to defend allegations that an insured contrac-
tor was liable for replacing defective stucco and roofing materials.23 The
court then offered its own example to guide future litigants.
An illustration of this fundamental point may serve to mark the
boundaries between "business risks" and occurrences giving rise to
insurable liability. When a craftsman applies stucco to an exterior
wall of a home in a faulty manner and discoloration, peeling and
chipping result, the poorly-performed work will perforce have to be
replaced or repaired by the tradesman or by a surety. On the other
hand, should the stucco peel and fall from the wall, and thereby cause
injury to the homeowner or his neighbor standing below or to a pass-
ing automobile, an occurrence of harm arises which is the proper sub-
ject of risk-sharing as provided by the type of policy before us in this
case. The happenstance and extent of the latter liability is entirely
unpredictable the [sic] neighbor could suffer a scratched arm or a fa-
tal blow to the skull from the peeling stonework. Whether the liabil-
ity of the businessman is predicated upon warranty theory or, prefer-
ably and more accurately, upon tort concepts, injury to persons and
damage to other property constitute the risks intended to be covered
under the CGL.24
Notably, it does not appear that the plaintiffs in Weedo alleged that the
defects in the stucco and roofing products led to any water intrusion or
property damage within the home, so the court never reached the ques-
tion of whether the policy would have covered damage to nondefective
components of a builder's work.25
In any event, though the reasoning of Weedo and similar cases may
have correctly interpreted the CGL policies of the time, it also suggested
that builders had little means of protecting themselves against liability
for subcontractor errors or other construction defects. Any modem busi-
ness wants to insure against potential liability, and this gap in available
coverage presented a problem, both for the builders and the affected
property owners.26 The ISO addressed this problem in 1976 by offering a
21. Henderson, supra note 19, at 441 (footnote omitted).
22. 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 791-92.
25. Id. at 789.
26. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 85 ('The idea that businesses can insure against liability is
so axiomatic that it has very nearly become a form of legal reasoning itself."). The moral question of
whether society should allow tortfeasors to insure against civil liability is beyond the scope of this
Article, but one should not overlook that liability coverage exists both for the benefit of the insured
and also "for the protection of the innocent tort victim who suffers personal injury or property dam-
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new product, the "Broad Form Property Damage" endorsement.27 For an
additional premium, a builder could add this endorsement to its policy
and obtain coverage for liability arising from damage to the builder's
completed work that resulted from a subcontractor's errors. 28 Ten years
later, the ISO incorporated this language directly into its standard CGL
policy by narrowing the exclusion applicable to property damage within
the Products-Completed Operations Hazard.29 Policies written in 1986
and later, including those at issue in Greystone, expressly stated that the
exclusion for damage to an insured's completed work does not apply "if
the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was per-
formed on [the named insured's] behalf by a subcontractor." 30
Following publication of the 1986 revision, industry commentators
offered a new example of how the ISO drafters intended the contempo-
rary CGL policy to apply in negligent construction cases.
The named insured is a general contractor who has built an apartment
house with the services of numerous subcontractors. After the build-
ing is completed and put to its intended use, a defect in the building's
wiring (put in by a subcontractor) causes the building, including
work of the general contractor and other subcontractors, to sustain
substantial fire damage. The named insured is sued by the building's
owner. Although the named insured's policy excludes damage to
"your work" arising out of it or any part of it, the second part of [the
exclusion] makes it clear that the exclusion does not apply to the
claim. That is because the work out of which the damage arose was
performed on the named insured's behalf by a subcontractor....
Thus, barring the application of some other exclusion or adverse pol-
icy condition, the loss should be covered, including the part out of
which the damage arose.
Nevertheless, disputes continued. Despite selling these new policies to
builders, some carriers balked at paying claims relating to subcontrac-
tors' defective work. Unable to convince courts that the new, more lim-
ited policy exclusions should bar coverage for defective work, these car-
riers shifted their strategy to the threshold question of whether defective
work constituted an "occurrence" in the first place.32 A number of courts
agreed, holding that there was no occurrence when faulty workmanship
age for which the insured is liable." Friedland v. Travelers Indem. Co., 105 P.3d 639, 646 (Colo.
2005). If an insolvent builder damages a home, for example, the homeowner's only recourse may be
to pursue the builder's insurance policy.
27. See Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2007).
28. Id.
29. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 83 (Wis. 2004).
30. Id. at 82.
31. O'Shaughnessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogat-
ed on other grounds by Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2002) (quoting The
Nat'l Underwriter Co., Public Liability: Exclusions, FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BULLETINS, Sept.
1993, at Aa 16-17) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See Shapiro & Posner, supra note 16, at 56.
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damaged only itself and did not inflict any harm on the property of a
third party.33 Other courts reached the opposite conclusion and ruled that
accidental damage to an insured's own product could indeed constitute a
covered occurrence.34 These conflicting decisions presented a situation
that was, in the words of one court, an "intellectual mess."3 s
B. Meanwhile, in Colorado ...
Interpretation of an insurance policy is, like interpretation of any
contract, a matter of state law.36 Thus, even when considering identical
language in standard policies, courts in different states may reach differ-
ent results. The opinion of Worsham Construction Co. v. Reliance Insur-
ance Co. 37 illustrates this. In Worsham, a builder sought coverage under
its CGL policy for the cost of repairing construction defects in an office
building. 38 Reversing a grant of summary judgment for the carrier, the
Colorado Court of Appeals expressly rejected the business risk analysis
of Weedo and instead focused on the language of the policy, which the
court found to be ambiguous.39 One section of the policy excluded cov-
erage for contractual liability but then stated that "this exclusion does not
apply to a warranty of fitness or quality of the named insured's products
or a warranty that work performed by or on behalf of the named insured
will be done in a workmanlike manner."40 This language, the court noted,
seemed to contemplate coverage for property damage resulting from a
breach of the builder's duty to perform its work in a non-negligent man-
ner.41 Although the carrier argued that other sections of the policy ex-
cluded "property damages to the named insured's products arising out of
such products or any part of such products" as well as "property damage
to work performed by the named insured arising out of such work or any
portion thereof," the court concluded that these exclusions conflicted
with the former language and created an ambiguity that, under Colorado
law, had to be resolved in favor of the insured.42
33. See, e.g., J.Z.G. Resources, Inc. v. King, 987 F.2d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1993); Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., 684 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Neb. 2004).
34. E.g., Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 523 (Alaska 1999); Sheets v. Brethren Mut.
Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 551 (Md. 1996); High Country Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 648
A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994).
35. Edwin L. Doemberger & Theresa A. Guerin, Construction Defects as an "Occurrence":
State Legislatures Weigh In, COVERAGE, Nov./Dec. 2011, 18, 19 (quoting Crossmann Comtys. of
North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 26909, 2011 WL 93716 at *3 (S.C. Jan. 7,
2011), modified on reh'g, 717 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 2011)). The original opinion that contained this pithy
quote has since been withdrawn, but it remains an apt description.
36. E.g., Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Am. Fence Co., 115 F.3d 805, 806 (10th Cir. 1997).
37. 687 P.2d 988, 991 (Colo. App. 1984).
38. Id. at 990.
39. Id. at 990-91.
40. Id. at 990.
41. Id. at 991.
42. Id. at 990-91.
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Subsequent rulings in Colorado adhered to the reasoning of Wors-
ham when deciding the applicability of these business risk exclusions to
construction damages.43 Some carriers countered with the argument that
the exclusions section of a policy could never expand their obligations,
under the theory that "an exception to an exclusion can never amount to
a grant of coverage but by nature, can only limit coverage."" In Simon v.
Shelter General Insurance Co., the Colorado Supreme Court justices
acknowledged "the technical merits" of this argument, but they were not
persuaded.45 The justices reiterated that insurance policies had to be read
as a whole and considered from the perspective of persons of ordinary
intelligence, not from the perspective of legal or insurance experts.46
With regard to whether damage from construction defects should be
treated as an occurrence under Colorado law, two lines of cases devel-
oped. Beginning with the Colorado Supreme Court's 1991 decision in
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,47 one line of cases
focused on "the knowledge and intent of the insured."4 8 If the result of
the insured's actions was not expected or intended, it would be covered
as an accident.49 Quoting the Second Circuit, the Hecla court explained:
In general, what make injuries or damages expected or intended ra-
ther than accidental are the knowledge and intent of the insured. It is
not enough that an insured was warned that damages might ensue
from its actions, or that, once warned, an insured decided to take a
calculated risk and proceed as before. Recovery will be barred only if
the insured intended the damages, or if it can be said that the damag-
es were, in a broader sense, "intended" by the insured because the in-
sured knew that the damages would flow directly and immediately
from its intentional act.50
43. See, e.g., Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 236, 242 (Colo. 1992); Colard v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 709 P.2d I1, 14 (Colo. App. 1985). But see Union Ins. Co. v. Kjeldgaard, 820
P.2d 1183, 1187 (Colo. App. 1991) (noting that absent ambiguity, policy excluded coverage for
damage to insured's work).
44. Simon, 842 P.2d at 240.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
48. Id. at 1088 (quoting City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150
(2nd Cir.1989)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting City of Johnstown, 877 F.2d at 1150) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Some courts have employed the analogy of a speeding driver to explain this distinction. See, e.g.,
Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279-80 (Ct. App. 1989). A driver who is late
for an appointment may intentionally drive too fast and negligently cause a collision. His insurance
will still cover the damage because although the act of speeding was intentional, the damage was an
unintended accident. This contrasts with the scenario in which a driver deliberately runs over his
hated rival in a crosswalk. In the latter case, there is no coverage because the injury was the intended
result.
628 [Vol. 90:3
2013] INSURING RISK OF CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS
The Colorado Court of Appeals relied on Hecla in 2005 when it de-
cided Hoang v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn) LLC." The Monterra
Homes case arose after several homeowners had sued their builder, Mon-
terra, in state court over construction defects. 52 Shortly before trial, Mon-
terra's insurance carrier commenced a separate action in federal court
seeking a declaration that its policies would not cover any of the damag-
es that the homeowners were seeking.53 The jury in the state court action
eventually returned a verdict in the homeowners' favor, at which point
the homeowners served the carrier with a writ of garnishment from the
state court.54 The federal court then stayed the carrier's declaratory
judgment action because it concluded that it would be improper to grant
declaratory relief in relation to an ongoing state court garnishment suit.55
Recently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a similar order from a Kansas dis-
trict court, and it appears unlikely that many federal judges in this circuit
will choose to grant declaratory relief concerning insurance lawsuits that
56are actively pending in the state courts.
After the federal court declined to rule on the coverage issues in
Monterra Homes, the state trial court considered the evidence and found
that the property damage in question had in fact resulted from an occur-
rence. 57 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed:
Here, the trial court found that Monterra may have known, based
on the soil reports and other engineering reports, that there was a
substantial risk that damages would occur, but the evidence did not
show that Monterra actually intended or expected the damages....
Insurers maintain that, by focusing on the result rather than on the
knowledge and intent of the insured, the trial court applied an errone-
ous legal standard in determining that there was an "occurrence" un-
der the policies. A review of the court's order, however, demon-
strates that the trial court properly focused its inquiry on Monterra's
knowledge, actions, and intentions.5
51. 129 P.3d 1028, 1034 (Colo. App. 2005), revd sub nom. Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am.,
149 P.3d 798 (Colo. 2007).
52. Id. at 1032, 1034.
53. Id. at 1032.
54. Id.
55. Order, No. 01-CV-2439 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2002) (copy of minute order on file with
author).
56. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Vill. at Deer Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 685 F.3d 977, 986
(10th Cir. 2012). Whether to grant relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (2012), is discretionary. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995). In addition
to the Monterra Homes litigation, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado has
declined to grant declaratory relief in at least two other unpublished rulings involving garnishments
over construction defect judgments. See Order Granting Defendants Motion to Stay, No. 04CV-
1924REBOES, 2005 WL 2359125, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2005); Order, No. 02-CV-0366-WDM-
BNB (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2002).
57. Monterra Homes, 129 P.3d at 1034.
58. Id.
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The court went on to hold that the policy covered portions of the judg-
ment but that certain exclusions limited coverage.59
Both the homeowners and the insurers petitioned for a writ of certi-
orari, the former challenging whether any exclusions applied and the
latter arguing that the builder's faulty workmanship did not constitute an
occurrence. 60 The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the nar-
row issue of whether an exclusion voided insurance coverage for proper-
ty damage occurring when a claimant's predecessor in interest owned the
property, but it denied the remainder of the petition and cross-petition.
Such a denial is not necessarily an endorsement of the court of appeals's
decision, 62 though the supreme court's subsequent discussion of the na-
ture and timing of an occurrence necessary to trigger coverage suggests
that the justices likely agreed with the lower courts' determination that
Monterra's accidental errors did indeed constitute an occurrence.63
A second line of cases emerged with the opinions in Union Insur-
ance Co. v. Hottenstein64 and McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. 6 5 In Hottenstein, a homeowner obtained an arbitration award against
a remodeling contractor for various sums, including the costs necessary
to complete the contractor's work, fix various defects, pay for lost use,
and repair damage to an existing roof 6 6 The contractor's carrier agreed
to pay for the roof damage but refused to cover the remaining amounts,
contending that these were breach-of-contract damages that its policy did
67not cover. In a 2003 opinion, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
summary judgment for the carrier.68 The court noted that the ambiguous
"exception to the contract exclusion" found in Simon (and Worsham) was
not present in the policy, and it rejected the homeowner's efforts to re-
characterize her breach-of-contract judgment as one for negligence.6 9
The court further held that, based on decisions from the Eighth Circuit
and the Iowa Supreme Court, a contractor's breach of its construction
contract was not an accident that could constitute a covered occurrence
under the contractor's CGL policy. 70
59. Id. at 1039.
60. Plaintiffs and Defendant's Joint Reply Brief at 1, 10, Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149
P.3d 198, 800 (Colo. 2007) (No. 05SC389), 2006 WL 2618808, at *1, *10.
61. Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., No. 05SC389, 2006 WL 1586645, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 20,
2006).
62. See COLO. APP. R. 35() ("Denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court shall not necessarily
be taken as approval of any opinion of the Court of Appeals.").
63. See Hoang, 149 P.3d at 802.
64. 83 P.3d 1196 (Colo. App. 2003).
65. 100 P.3d 521 (Colo. App. 2004).
66. Hottenstein, 83 P.3d at 1198.
67. Id at 1201.
68. Id. at 1198.
69. Id at 1201.
70. Id. (citing Pace Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 177, 179-80 (8th Cir.
1991); Yegge v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 100, 102-03 (Iowa 1995)).
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McGowan, announced several months later, described similar facts.
A husband and wife hired a contractor to build a house but noticed a
number of serious defects during construction. 71 They eventually fired
the contractor and obtained a default judgment for breach of contract,
negligence, and other claims, and they attempted to collect on their
judgment from the contractor's insurance carrier.72 The trial court found
that the couple had alleged "property damage" resulting from an "occur-
rence" as the terms appeared in the relevant CGL policy, but that the
policy's exclusions barred coverage.73 The Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed. Relying indirectly on Tenth Circuit precedent, the court ob-
served that "[c]omprehensive general liability policies normally exclude
coverage for faulty workmanship based on the rationale that poor work-
manship is considered a business risk to be borne by the policyholder,
rather than a 'fortuitous event' entitling the insured to coverage."74 The
court further noted that CGL policies "are not intended to be the equiva-
lent of performance bonds." 75 Turning to the specifics of the case, the
court held that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for damage
to the contractor's work unless it fell within the exception for completed
operations.76 Because the contractor had been fired in the midst of the
project and much of the damage reflected the cost of finishing the con-
tractor's work, the "completed operations" exception did not apply, and
the exclusion controlled.7 7 The Colorado Supreme Court denied a peti-
tion for certiorari.
Despite the very different outcomes, the lines of cases represented
by Monterra Homes and McGowan can be reconciled. The property
damage in Monterra Homes was an unexpected result of the insured de-
71. McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 P.3d 521, 522 (Colo. App. 2004).
72. Id. at 522-23.
73. Id. at 523.
74. Id at 525 (citing 9 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §
129:11, at 129-31 (3d ed. 1995) (citing Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 888 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Colo. 1995), affd, 1995 WL 539479, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 1995)). It is not clear if the
court's use of the adjective "comprehensive" in place of "commercial" was deliberate. The first ISO
policies bore the name of "Comprehensive General Liability" insurance; beginning with the 1986
revisions, the drafters kept the CGL initials but changed the name to "Commercial General Liabil-
ity" insurance. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 89.
75. McGowan, 100 P.3d at 525 (citing Union Ins. Co. v. Hottenstein, 83 P.3d 1196, 1202-03
(Colo. App. 2003); Kvaemer Metals Div. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 825 A.2d 641, 655 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003)). A performance bond is an agreement by a third party to guarantee the completion
of a construction contract upon the default of the general contractor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1253 (9th ed. 2009).
76. McGowan, 100 P.3d at 525. Had the contractor abandoned the job instead of being termi-
nated, the result may have been different. See Thomas v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. CV I1-40-M-DWM-
JCL, 2011 WL 4369519, at *10 (D. Mont. Aug. 24, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No.
CV I 1-40-M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 4369496, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 19, 2011).
77. McGowan, 100 P.3d at 525-26. The insurance industry does offer another product-
builder's risk insurance-that provides first-party coverage for certain forms of property damage
arising prior to the completion or abandonment of a project, and prudent construction professionals
may wish to purchase both forms of coverage.
78. McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 04SC354, 2004 WL 2377173, at *1 (Colo.
Oct. 25, 2004).
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veloper's negligence that appeared well after the completion of the pro-
ject. By contrast, the unfinished work in McGowan was neither a tradi-
tional form of property damage nor anything that would typically be con-
sidered an accident. Although the appellate panel in McGowan suggested
that negligent work should never be considered an occurrence, and that
courts should interpret CGL policies to avoid overlap with performance
bonds, these comments were merely dicta; the holding of the case was
based on unambiguous exclusions for damage to the insured's incom-
plete work. Thus, these cases gave insured builders and their creditors
little reason to fear that Colorado courts would refuse to enforce CGL
insurance policies in future construction disputes. The situation changed
in 2009, however, when the Colorado Court of Appeals announced Gen-
eral Security Indemnity Co. v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.79
C. The General Security Case and Colorado House Bill 10-1394
General Security arose from a large construction defect suit be-
tween a homeowners association and a builder.80 The builder asserted
third-party claims seeking indemnity from its subcontractors, and one of
these. subcontractors in turn filed a complaint against its own subcontrac-
tors (the sub-subcontractors). 8' After the original plaintiff and defendant
settled, this subcontractor's insurer, General Security Indemnity Compa-
ny of Arizona (GSINDA), filed a separate action seeking contribution of
defense costs and other relief from the sub-subcontractors' insurers. 82 fn
a series of rulings, the trial court determined that the property damage
alleged by the homeowners association had not been caused by an occur-
rence, and it therefore dismissed GSINDA's claims.8 3
GSINDA appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which af-
firmed.84 The judges acknowledged that another division of their court
had concluded that defective workmanship was an occurrence when de-
ciding Monterra Homes, but they declined to follow this holding.85 In-
stead, they criticized the Monterra Homes division for failing to consider
case law from other states and follow what they characterized as the
"majority rule." 86 According to the General Security division, a majority
of jurisdictions had held "that claims of poor workmanship, standing
79. 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), superseded by COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808 (2012), as
recognizedin TCD, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 296 P.3d 255 (Colo. App. 2012).
80. Id. at 531.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Id at 532.
84. Id at 538.
85. Id at 536.
86. Id How General Security selected its majority is unclear; the opinion identified five
jurisdictions as defining the "majority" yet listed six jurisdictions as representing the "minority." The
court's primary basis for this statement appeared to be an editorial written by an insurance industry
commentator who claimed to have collected cases from other states denying coverage, but the court
did not name the author's cases nor provide any further explanation of its dubious arithmetic. See id.
at 535.
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alone, are not occurrences that trigger coverage under CGL policies."87
Although the division acknowledged that "a corollary to the majority rule
is that an 'accident' and 'occurrence' are present when consequential
property damage has been inflicted upon a third party as a result of the
insured's activity," the judges found this corollary inapplicable to the
facts of the case.88 The judges likewise declined to follow Hecla, con-
cluding that it was not binding because the Colorado Supreme Court had
considered a slightly different definition of "occurrence" in that case.89
On its face, the General Security decision seemed to invite certiorari
review by the Colorado Supreme Court under the criteria of the applica-
ble state rule: the case decided a significant question of law in a manner
probably not in accord with the rationale of Hecla and similar supreme
court decisions, and it presented a conflict with Monterra Homes and
other divisions of the court of appeals.90 Nevertheless, GSINDA chose
not to petition for review.
It is easy to speculate why GSINDA may have made this choice.
Some commentators have suggested that a dispute between two insur-
ance companies, continuing after the original claimant and the insured
defendants have settled, presents a "poor forum for determining signifi-
cant insurance coverage questions."91 This theory seems plausible, given
that an adversarial, common law system depends on parties aggressively
defending their own interests. In a dispute between two insurance carn-
ers at the appellate level, the system may fail insofar as a carrier may
face "the prospect of winning the coverage battle but losing the war if an
insured turns the insurer's winning coverage arguments against that in-
surer in a different case." 9 2 In other words, GSINDA may have decided
that a published opinion stating that carriers have no duty to pay con-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 537. Whether this was a valid basis for departing from binding precedent is likewise
dubious. As discussed above, the pre-1986 policy considered in Hecla included the language "nei-
ther expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" as part of the definition of an "occur-
rence," whereas post-1986 policies moved this language to the exclusions. See TURNER, supra note
6, § 9:1 (quoting the pre-1986 policy) (internal quotation mark omitted). Although this change may
have the procedural effect of shifting the burden of proof to the carrier, see id., it does little to sug-
gest that the concept of accident considered in Hecla has been superseded. On the contrary, com-
mentators have noted that "the industry still equates an occurrence with the insured neither expecting
nor intending the injury or damage." Harmon S. Graves et al., Shoddy Work, Negligent Construction,
and Reconciling the Irreconcilable Under the CGL Policies, 38 COLO. LAW., Nov. 2009, at 43, 46 &
n. 48 (citing The Nat'l Underwriter Co., Public Liability: CGL Coverage Form-Coverage A; Bodily
Injury and Property Damage Liability, FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BULLETINS, July 2008, at A.3-
4).
90. Colorado appellate rules provide that the character of reasons for granting certiorari in-
clude, inter alia, situations where the court of appeals has "decided a question of substance in a way
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court," and situations where a
division of the court of appeals has rendered a "decision . .. in conflict with another [division of said
court]." COLO. APP. R. 49.
91. Graves et al., supra note 89, at 44.
92. Id at 44 n.2.
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struction defect claims would be worth more in the long run than what-
ever damages it might have recovered from the sub-subcontractors' in-
surers had it convinced the supreme court to reverse the General Security
holding.
In any event, the General Security ruling soon received criticism
from both sides of the coverage universe. Representatives of policyhold-
ers complained that the decision departed from established Colorado
precedent, went against the intent of the ISO drafters, rendered portions
of the CGL policy superfluous, and created uncertainty as to what con-
struction damages were covered. 9 3 Lobbyists for the insurance industry,
in turn, testified that General Security and related cases "took it too far,"
came as a "shock" to the industry, and were "not the way courts have
ruled in other jurisdictions." 94
Although GSINDA was content to let the published decision stand
without further review, Colorado's legislators were not. In the following
session, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 10-1394,
which unequivocally rejected the "majority rule" that had enamored the
court in General Security.9 5 The legislators declared that "[t]he interpre-
tation of insurance policies issued to construction professionals is of vital
importance to the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Colora-
do," and stated:
(1) The policy of Colorado favors the interpretation of insurance
coverage broadly for the insured.
(II) The long-standing and continuing policy of Colorado favors a
broad interpretation of an insurer's duty to defend the insured under
liability insurance policies and that this duty is a first-party benefit to
and claim on behalf of the insured.
(III) The decision of the Colorado court of appeals in General Se-
curity Indemnity Company of Arizona v. Mountain States Mutual
Casualty Company does not properly consider a construction profes-
sional's reasonable expectation that an insurer would defend the con-
struction professional against an action or notice of claim [for con-
struction defects].96
The bill, eventually codified at section 13-20-808 of the Colorado Re-
vised Statutes, took effect in May 2010 and applied to "insurance poli-
cies currently in existence or issued on or after the effective date of this
93. Id. at 47.
94. Ronald M. Sandgrund & Scott F. Sullan, H.B. 10-1394: New Law Governing Insurance
Coverage for Construction Defect Claims, 39 COLO. LAW., Aug. 2010, at 89, 90 (quoting House
Testimony on H.B. 10-1394 Before the H. Comm. on Bus. Affairs & Labor, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. 21:2-11 (2010)).
95. See H.B. 10-1394, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010) (codified at COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 13-20-808, 10-4-110.4).
96. H.B. 10-1394 § I (citation omitted).
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act." 97 Since then, several other states have followed suit, enacting simi-
lar legislation." Before the bill became law, however, several state and
federal courts in Colorado relied on the General Security holding to deny
coverage to insured builders. One such case was Greystone Construction,
Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co.99
II. THE GREYSTONE LITIGATION
A. Background and Procedural Posture
Greystone arose out of two state court cases in which homeowners
had sued their builders for construction defects, including foundation
movement that caused extensive damage to the homes' living areas.' 00 In
both cases, the homebuilders had used subcontractors to perform most, if
not all, of their work.'0 American Family Mutual Insurance Company
(American Family) had insured the builders during the time of construc-
tion and shortly thereafter, and National Fire & Marine Insurance Com-
pany (National Fire) had issued policies covering later dates. 10 2 In both
cases, American Family had tendered a defense to the homebuilders sub-
ject to a reservation of rights.0 3 National Fire denied owing the home-
builders any defense under its policies, and American Family eventually
paid to settle both cases.10
American Family and the homebuilders subsequently sued National
Fire in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. They
alleged jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and asserted claims
for declaratory relief, contribution or equitable subrogation, breach of
contract, bad faith breach of contract, and violation of the Colorado Con-
sumer Protection Act. 05 The court bifurcated the issue of policy interpre-
tation, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking
a determination of whether the underlying cases had alleged an occur-
rence that fell within the coverage provisions of the policies.'06 Relying
heavily on General Security, the district court ruled that there was no
occurrence to trigger coverage under National Fire's policies because the
97. Id. § 3.
98. See Doemberger & Guerin, supra note 35, at 20-22; accord ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-
155 (2011); HAw. REV. STAT. §431:1-217 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70 (2011).
99. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'1 Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1219 (D.
Colo. 2009).
100. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'1 Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir.




104. Greystone, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
105. Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, 6-10, Greysone, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1213 (No. 07-cv-
00066-MSK-CBS), 2007 WL 703348, at *2, *6-10.
106. Greystone, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1215-16.
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underlying complaints had not alleged property damage to anything other
than the insureds' own work.'0o
B. Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Following the district court's ruling, American Family and the
homebuilders appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Because the Colorado state
courts had not issued a clear ruling on the subject, the Tenth Circuit certi-
fied a question to the Colorado Supreme Court: "Is damage to non-
defective portions of a structure caused by conditions resulting from a
subcontractor's defective work product a covered 'occurrence' under
Colorado law?"108 The Supreme Court declined to consider the issue.109
House Bill 10-1394 passed in the midst of the appeal, and the Tenth
Circuit permitted additional briefing on the new statute before announc-
ing its final decision in November 2011.110
1. The Policies
To start its discussion, the court noted that the National Fire policies
at issue were all versions of the post-1986 CGL policy, which contained
the same material language:
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property
damage" to which this insurance applies. We will have [no] duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does not ap-
ply ....
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "property damage"
only if:
(1) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" is caused
by an "occurrence" that takes place in the "coverage territo-
ry ";
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage occurs dur-
ing the policy period ... .
The court also noted that the policies contained various business risk
exclusions, including the "your work" exclusion that barred coverage for
107. Id. at 1219-20.
108. Certification of Question of State Law at 1, Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1276 (No. 09-1412),
2010 WL 5776109, at *1.
109. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1277.
110. See id.
Ill. Id. at 1277-78 (footnote omitted) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Although it did not affect the holding, the court appears to have misquoted a portion of the
policy.
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"[p]roperty damage" to "your work" arising out of it or any part of
it and included in the "products-completed operations hazard."
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out
of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a sub-
contractor.1 12
The policies defined an "occurrence" as "an accident, including continu-
ous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful con-
ditions" but contained no definition of "accident."'"
2. Applicability of Section 13-20-808
The Greystone court first asked, "Does § 13-20-808, which defines
the term 'accident' for purposes of Colorado insurance law, apply retro-
actively to this case?" 1l4 The court acknowledged that, if the statute ap-
plied, it "would settle this appeal."" 5
Considering the text of the statute, the court observed that the Colo-
rado legislature had expressly rejected General Security and established
a definition of "accident" that required courts interpreting CGL policies
to "presume that the work of a construction professional that results in
property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is
an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the
insured.""'6
The court also noted that the statute's enabling act provided that it
applied to all insurance policies "currently in existence" at the time the
statute took effect, but the court questioned how to interpret this lan-
guage in the context of an occurrence policy.1 7 Such policies typically
apply for a specified period of time and provide coverage for any damage
that occurs during that period, even if a claim is not made until years
later. "In this way, an occurrence policy does not expire, but, rather, con-
tinues in effect after the policy period ends.""" After reviewing Colorado
law regarding retroactive application of statutes, the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that despite the legislature's directive, there was no clear intent to
apply the statute to policies where the policy period had expired."' The
court therefore declined to apply section 13-20-808 to the Greystone
dispute.
112. Id. at 1278 (footnotes omitted) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1279.
116. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808(3) (2012)).
117. Id. at 1280.
118. Vill. Homes of Colo., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 148 P.3d 293, 296 (Colo. App.
2006).
119. Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1280.
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3. Whether the Builders' Negligence Created an "Occurrence"
Having decided that the new statute was inapplicable, the Tenth
Circuit then considered whether property damage arising from poor
workmanship could give rise to an occurrence under existing state law
and the policy language.120
The court acknowledged that there was no consensus among federal
and state courts on this issue, and it began its analysis by looking to the
Colorado Court of Appeals's most recent decision on the subject, Gen-
eral Security, which had concluded that "a claim for damages arising
from poor workmanship, standing alone, does not allege an accident that
constitutes a covered occurrence."' 2 ' The Tenth Circuit panel noted that
it found this interpretation to be persuasive, but it also recognized that
federal courts are not bound by the rulings of intermediate state courts
when there is convincing evidence that the state's highest court would
decide otherwise. 122 The judges then made their key decision: notwith-
standing their own agreement with much of General Security's reason-
ing, they "predict[ed that] the Colorado Supreme Court would construe
the term 'occurrence,' as contained in standard-form CGL policies, to
encompass unforeseeable damage to nondefective property arising from
faulty workmanship." 23
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit first examined the ap-
proaches taken by other jurisdictions as to whether damage caused by
faulty workmanship constitutes an occurrence under a standard CGL
policy.1 24 The court noted that the General Security opinion, despite its
statements to the contrary, had not actually followed the majority view;
in reality, most federal and state courts had found an occurrence under
similar circumstances, and the more "recent trend . . . interprets the term
'occurrence' to encompass unanticipated damage to nondefective proper-
ty resulting from poor workmanship." 25 The court rejected the argument
that damage arising from defective construction can never be a covered
"occurrence," because this view "creates a fundamental inconsistency
with the logic of CGL policies" insofar as it renders other policy provi-
sions, such as the your work exclusion, superfluous.' 26
Next, the Tenth Circuit held that "injuries flowing from improper or
faulty workmanship constitute an occurrence so long as the resulting
damage is to nondefective property, and is caused without expectation or
120. Id. at 1281.
121. Id. (quoting General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 534
(Colo. App. 2009)).
122. Id. at 1281-82 (citing United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, 633 F.3d
951, 957 (10th Cir. 2011) (declining to follow General Security on other grounds)).
123. Id. at 1282.
124. Id. at 1282-83.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1283.
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foresight."l 27 The court rejected General Security's definition of "acci-
dent" as requiring "an element of 'fortuity,"' calling this "an overly nar-
row view of CGL-policy language" that would be "inconsistent with the
inherent structure of CGL policies." 28 The court examined prior Colora-
do appellate law in McGowan, Hottenstein, and Monterra Homes and
found that "fortuity is not the sole prerequisite to finding an accident
under a CGL policy. To the contrary, an unanticipated or unforeseeable
injury to person or property-even in the absence of true fortuity-may
be an accident and, therefore, a covered occurrence." 2 9 The court also
relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Hecla, which had
concluded that under similar policy language, "damages were covered
because the term 'occurrence' excludes from coverage only 'those dam-
ages that the insured knew would flow directly and immediately from its
intentional act.""
3 0
To bolster its ruling, the Tenth Circuit also considered the history
and evolution of CGL policies and noted how the current policy lan-
guage arose from the desire "to provide general contractors with at least
some insurance coverage for damage caused by the faulty workmanship
of their subcontractors."' 3 ' The court found that the subcontractor excep-
tion that the ISO added to the your work exclusion in 1986 was particu-
larly instructive.132 This language "specifically contemplated coverage
for property damage caused by a subcontractor's defective perfor-
mance."l 3 3 The court observed that insurance carriers can remove this
language from future policies or add a specific endorsement limiting
coverage if they decide that they no longer wish to insure such losses.' 34
By contrast, General Security's approach of not allowing coverage
where a subcontractor causes the damage to nondefective property "ren-
ders the 'your work' exclusion a phantom" in light of the subcontractor
exception included in the standard-form CGL policies.' 35 The court
acknowledged the importance of the exclusions in CGL policies to limit
the initial broad grant of coverage and recognized that the exceptions, in
turn, narrow the exclusions' scope to restore coverage under the original
grant. 36 Under the logic of General Security, the Tenth Circuit conclud-
127. Id. at 1284.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1284-85.
130. Id. at 1285 (quoting Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo.
1991)).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1288.
133. Id. (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.
2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
134. Id. (noting that the ISO now publishes an optional endorsement eliminating the subcon-
tractor exception from coverage).
135. Id. at 1289.
136. Id. (citing David Dekker, et al., The Expansion of Insurance Coverage for Defective
Construction, 28 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 19, 19-20 (2008)).
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ed that "the 'your work' exclusion and the subcontractor exception are
illusory if damages to the contractor's nondefective work product-
whether caused by poor workmanship or otherwise-are not covered in
the first place." 37 By rejecting this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit judg-
es thus gave effect to the your work exclusion, which, in their view,
could only apply if the "physical injury caused by poor workmanship-
whether to some part of the work itself or third-party property-may be
an occurrence under standard CGL policies."' 38
The Tenth Circuit also observed that "interpreting a CGL policy so
as to provide coverage for a subcontractor's faulty workmanship does not
transform the policy into a performance bond." 39 The court noted that a
CGL policy has different traits and protects other parties, and that, ulti-
mately, "even if the CGL policy does share some characteristics of a
performance bond, that alone is an insufficient reason to ignore the plain
language and intent of the policy." 40
The court declined to consider whether any exclusions might alter-
natively bar coverage, remanding the case to the district court to decide
this question and any other issues.141
4. Defective and Nondefective Property
Although the central holding of Greystone correctly interpreted the
intent of the ISO drafters, the court's conclusion that only damage to
nondefective property presents an occurrence is curious. The express
language of a standard CGL policy does not make this distinction, but
the Tenth Circuit nevertheless held that "CGL policies implicitly distin-
guish between damage to nondefective work product and damage to de-
fective work product." 42 The court based this conclusion on the premise
that the "obligation to repair defective work is neither unexpected nor
unforeseen under the terms of the construction contract or the CGL poli-
cies," 43 and "the recognition that the faulty workmanship, standing
alone, is not caused by an accident-but that damage to other property
caused by the faulty workmanship (including both the nondefective work
product of the contractor and third-party property) is the result of an ac-
cident."'" In Greystone, this meant that the damage to the homes was
covered, but that damage to the exterior drainage and structural systems
was not, because these repairs represented "an economic loss that does
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1288.
140. Id. at 1288-89.
141. Id. at 1290.
142. Id. at 1286 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 1286 (noting that this reasoning is also in line with the Fourth Circuit's holding in
French v. Assurance Co. ofAm., 448 F.3d 693, 703 (4th Cir. 2006)).
144. Id. at 1287.
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not trigger a duty to defend under the CGL policies."l4 5 The court noted
that its ruling was thus largely consistent with General Security's "corol-
lary rule," which had recognized that "injury to third-party property may
be covered" under a CGL policy.14 6
Some have suggested that this portion of the Greystone opinion is
an "ancillary holding" that conflicts with the underlying logic of the
case.14 7 Regardless of its reasoning, this aspect of the case leaves several
questions unanswered, not the least of which is whether the court meant
to establish a subjective test for coverage that takes into account the
knowledge and intent of the insured, or whether the court contemplated
an objective analysis limited to the components of property involved. For
example, an insured builder seeking coverage for a subcontractor's de-
fective work might argue that Greystone adopts the foreseeability test of
Hecla, and that the cost of repairing such work is not foreseeable under
the Hecla standard unless the builder actually knew of the subcontrac-
tor's errors.14 8 In response, the carrier might argue that the builder's
knowledge is irrelevant because the implicit exclusion for damage to
defective property recognized in Geystone is independent of such
facts.149 How the courts will resolve questions like this remains to be
seen.
III. THE EFFECT OF GREYSTONE ON FUTURE CASES
Although federal court decisions ate generally not binding on state
tribunals, the Colorado Supreme Court's reluctance to revisit this issue
means that Greystone will likely define the law of construction insurance
in Colorado for the immediate future.150 The Colorado Court of Appeals
has, in fact, already relied on Greystone in two published decisions.
145. Id. (citing French, 448 F.3d at 703).
146. Id. at 1287 (citing Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205
P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. App. 2009)).
147. See Ronald M. Sandgrund, Greystone and Insurance Coverage for "Get to" and "Rip and
Tear" Expenses, 41 COLO. LAW. 69, 71 (2012).
148. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1286 (10th Cir.
2004); see also Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 1991) (noting that
the fact that an insured was warned of possible damage or decided to take a calculated risk does not
mean that there was no accidental occurrence under CGL policy).
149. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1286-87.
150. As discussed above, the Colorado Supreme Court has denied petitions for certiorari re-
view of what constitutes an occurrence in at least three construction cases over the last decade:
Greystone, Hoang, and McGowan. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1277; Hoang v. Assurance Co. of
Am., No. 05SC389, 2006 WL 1586645, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 20,2006); McGowan v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., No. 04SC354, 2004 WL 2377173, at *1 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004). Recently, the court denied a
fourth petition in the TCD case discussed below, in which the plaintiff had argued that the Colorado
Court of Appeals improperly relied on General Security to conclude that allegations of construction
defects did not suggest an occurrence that triggered a carrier's duty to defend. TCD, Inc. v. Am.
Fam. Mutual Ins. Co., No. 12SC351, 2013 WL 673985, at *1 (Colo. Feb. 25, 2013). At the time of
this writing, a fifth petition relating to this issue is pending in the Colorado Pool case, also discussed




In TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,"' the court
of appeals reviewed an order granting summary judgment to a carrier
that had argued that it had no duty to defend a contractor accused of in-
stalling a defective roof.15 2 The court expressly noted that section 13-20-
808 had superseded General Security, but it declined to apply the statute
to the policies in question because their coverage periods had ended prior
to the statute's enactment, and the court found no legislative intent to
apply the statute retroactively.15 3 The court observed that the "corollary
rule" from General Security was similar to the conclusion from Grey-
stone that "an 'accident' and 'occurrence' are present when consequen-
tial property damage has been inflicted upon a third party as a result of
the insured's activity."15 4 The court determined that this rule did not ap-
ply, however, because the parties had not alleged any consequential
damage to any third party or to any nondefective property, and it there-
fore affirmed the judgment.5
Several months later, another division of the court of appeals an-
nounced Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., 156 in
which a carrier had refused to defend or indemnify a contractor accused
of installing rebar too close to the surface of a concrete swimming
pool.157 The division in Colorado Pool took a different view of sec-
tion 13-20-808 and recognized that the state legislature had indeed in-
tended to apply the statute retroactively, noting that its enabling act ex-
pressly provided that the law "applies to all insurance policies currently
in existence or issued on or after the effective date of this act,"' 8 and that
the statute itself provided that its purpose was to "to guide pending ac-
tions, on policies that have been issued." 59 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that application of the statute to policies created before passage of
section 13-20-808 would violate the Colorado constitution's prohibition
of retrospective laws that impair vested rights, create new obligations,
impose new duties, or attach new disabilities to transactions that have
already occurred.16 0
Having concluded that section 13-20-808 did not apply, the court
then considered how to interpret the policy under Colorado common law.
The contractor argued that Hoang should control, whereas the carrier
151. 296 P.3d 255, cert. denied, No. 12SC351, 2013 WL 673985 (Colo. Feb. 25, 2013).
152. Id Jill 1-2.
153. See id. 1|1 23-24, 26.
154. Id. 1 16-17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Mountain
States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. App. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. 1|17.
156. 2012 COA 178.
157. Id. 112 ,9.
158. Id. 1 31 (quoting 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 1128).
159. Id. 131.
160. Id. 1134 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 854 (Colo.
2002)).
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relied on General Security.16' The court held that neither of these deci-
sions had properly considered all of the policy terms, and that the proper
test for coverage was that defined by the Tenth Circuit in Greystone.162
The court discussed the Greystone holding in detail and recognized that
"injuries flowing from improper or faulty workmanship constitute an
'occurrence' so long as the resulting damage is to nondefective property,
and is caused without expectation or foresight," regardless of whether the
resulting damage is to the insured's own work or to the work of a third
party.163 Applying the Greystone test to the facts of the case, the court
held that the contractor's policy did not cover the cost of replacing the
defective pool itself, but that the policy did cover the cost of repairing
other property that had been damaged during the course of replacing the
pool.16 The trial court had therefore erred by granting summary judg-
ment.
Colorado Pool is significant for two main reasons. First, by explic-
itly identifying Greystone as the correct test for determining CGL policy
coverage, the Colorado Court of Appeals has effectively made the feder-
al Greystone opinion binding on state trial courts.16 5 Second, the opinion
interprets Greystone to require carriers to indemnify the cost of repairing
what some commentators have called "rip and tear" expenses: the cost of
ripping and tearing out undamaged property in order to access the in-
sured's defective work.'66 In Colorado Pool, the court found that this
damage included the cost of removing a pool deck, sidewalk, retaining
wall, and electric conduits; none of these components was initially dam-
aged or defective, but each stood in the way of the pool materials that the
contractor was legally obligated to replace, and each became damaged in
the course of the ensuing repairs.167 This is a noteworthy analytical shift,
insofar as it arguably extends coverage to some intentional property
damage necessary to correct an unintentional defect.168
161. Id 42.
162. Id 43.
163. Id 145 (quoting Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272,
1284 (10th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id I 45, 48.
165. See COLO. APP. R. 35(f) (mandating that published opinions of the Colorado Court of
Appeals "shall be followed as precedent by the trial judges of the state of Colorado").
166. See, e.g., Sandgrund, supra note 147, at 73; R. Stephen Rawls, Do CGL Policies Cover
"Rip and Tear" Expenses?, IRMI ONLINE (Mar. 2011),
www.irmi.com/expert/articles/201 1/rawlsO3-liability-insurance-coverage-law.aspx.
167. Colorado Pool, 2012 COA 178,1 48.
168. Cases such as this may invite tedious distinctions as courts try to distinguish whether
certain elements of property damage result from the alleged occurrence itself or from the repair of
said occurrence. Compare Dewitt Constr. Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that CGL policy covered cost of demolishing nondefective work during repair of
defective property), with Desert Mountain Props. Ltd. P'ship. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 236 P.3d
421, 441-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that there was no coverage for "get to" expenses associ-
ated with repair of defect), aff'd, 250 P.3d 196 (Ariz. 2011); see also Sandgrund, supra note 147, at
73 & nn.41-42 (collecting cases). Some courts have sidestepped this question by relying on the
policies' alternate definition of "property damage," which includes loss of use of property that has
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CONCLUSION
In a diversity action such as Greystone, federal courts apply the
substantive law of the forum state. 69 It has thus been said that "[t]here is
no federal general common law."1 70 Nevertheless, in the course of apply-
ing state insurance law, the judges of the Tenth Circuit have historically
tended to favor a strict view of fortuity and business risk principles.'
The Greystone decision may therefore have surprised observers who
expected the panel to rule for the carrier.
Greystone should not have come as a surprise. Although the case
gave the Tenth Circuit discretion to predict how the Colorado Supreme
Court would decide certain coverage issues, it ultimately required little
more than a traditional application of contract principles to effectuate the
intent of the parties. Implementing that analysis, the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that ISO drafters intended for builders' CGL insurance policies to
cover liability for property damage caused by defective work. It is oft
said but bears repeating: if the insurance industry wants to eliminate cov-
erage for defective construction, it can easily do so. 72 It has not. On the
contrary, when given the opportunity, its drafters have elected to expand
coverage for construction defects, first by creating the Broad Form Prop-
erty Damage endorsement in 1976 and later by incorporating the broad
form language into all standard CGL policies in 1986. Although some
opportunistic lawyers have argued that allowing CGL policies to cover
negligent workmanship improperly converts insurance policies into per-
formance bonds, any such similarity is not the work of activist judges. As
one court succinctly stated, "[w]e have not made the policy closer to a
performance bond for general contractors, the insurance industry has." 7 3
The fact that the insurance industry has made this choice likely re-
flects simple principles of supply and demand: so long as builders are
willing to pay premiums for protection from liability for defective work,
insurance companies will be willing to sell them an appropriate product.
The system only breaks down when a carrier collects a builder's premi-
not been physically injured. See Rawls, supra note 166 (discussing Clear, LLC v. Am. & Foreign
Ins. Co., No. 3:07-cv-001 IOJWS, 2008 WL 818978 (D. Alaska Mar. 24, 2008)). The U.S. District
Court for the District of Western Oklahoma recently applied this approach in a case with similar
facts to Colorado Pool when it found coverage under a concrete supplier's policy for repairs to
nondefective components of a bridge that had to be ripped out in the course of replacing substandard
concrete. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grayson, No. CIV-07-917-C, 2008 WL 2278593, at *6
(W.D. Okla. May 30, 2008).
169. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Adair Group, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 477 F.3d 1186, 1187-88
(10th Cir. 2007); Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., No. 94-1412, 1995 WL 539479, at
*5-6 (10th Cir. Sept. I1, 1995).
172. See Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2007) (noting
that the ISO recently published an optional endorsement eliminating the subcontractor exception to
the "your-work" exclusion for builders who do not wish to purchase such coverage).
173. Kalchthaler v. Keller Constr. Co., 591 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
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ums but refuses to honor the policy when the builder files a large
claim.174 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Greystone makes clear that
Colorado law does not permit this, and that builders and homeowners can
expect Colorado state and federal courts to enforce CGL provisions that
cover property damage resulting from construction defects.
174. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 103 (discussing the economics of insurance and noting that
policyholders "now speak facetiously about an implied 'big claim' exclusion in CGL policies, refer-
ring to the perceived tendency of commercial insurers to deny any substantial claim by asserting
what policyholders regard as questionable policy defenses").
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THE AUDACITY OF IGNORING HOPE:
HOW THE EXISTING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
LEADS TO UNREMEDIED RIGHTS
ABSTRACT
This Comment uses Kerns v. Bader as a lens to examine how the
qualified immunity analysis can lead to constitutional rights without a
remedy. That gap between the right and its remedy affects the articula-
tion of important constitutional rights, and ultimately the right itself. In
the absence of guidance about what it means for a right to be clearly es-
tablished, courts face difficulty in even declaring official conduct as un-
constitutional. Over time, as more instances of official conduct go with-
out being declared unconstitutional, the contours of our rights become
constricted. That absence of guidance also means the caprice of a judge
can decide whether a right was clearly established, requiring an arbitrary
degree of factual specificity in making that judgment, and ultimately
leaves the protections afforded by important rights unpredictable. In ad-
dition, discretionary sequencing in the qualified immunity analysis-
deciding cases on the qualified immunity prong while leaving the consti-
tutional merits unaddressed-means the law never becomes clearly es-
tablished, the law never gets articulated, never develops, and rights artic-
ulation stalls. As the articulation of our rights slows, those rights are in-
creasingly left without a remedy for their violation.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a military veteran.' You are honorably discharged
and return home from Afghanistan2 to try to resume a normal life. You
live in an ordinary neighborhood, in fact right on the eighteenth hole of a
golf course. You are at home one night with your parents and your girl-
friend, and while they are all inside sleeping, you have gone outside to
work in your garage and driveway.4 You are listening to music as you
work on rearranging and organizing the storage area in the garage and
side of the house.5 A police helicopter is hovering overhead somewhere
in the neighborhood, although you have no idea why it is there.6 Then,
suddenly, you hear a loud popping noise.7 You look up and see the heli-
copter start to wobble, and hear it make a whining pitch as it nosedives,
crashing in a backyard on the golf course less than a mile away from
where you are standing.8
You are a former military helicopter mechanic,9 and so you imme-
diately drop what you are doing. You leave the garage door open, the
music on, and the items you were organizing still scattered about the
garage and driveway and rush to the scene of the crash.'o When you get
there, you help by instructing the on-scene police officers about how to
open the helicopter doors to pull the occupants from the wreckage."
Once the injured passengers have been removed from the crashed heli-
copter, you turn your attention to the other officers and begin to relay to
them the events you just witnessed. 2 Attempting to aid the police offic-
ers in their investigation, you tell them you heard a shot and that you
think it came from near your home.
By the time you return home from all this, you learn that during the
course of investigating your tip about the shot you heard, three police
officers entered your home without a warrant while you were still at the
crash site.14 The officers searched your home only briefly, but they woke
up your girlfriend and confronted her in the living room while brandish-
1. The facts retold throughout this "Introduction" come from the facts of Kerns v. Bader, 663
F.3d 1173,1178 (10th Cir. 2011).
2. Carolyn Carlson, Copter Suspect Had Sniper Skills, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Albuquerque,
N.M.) (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.abqjoumal.com/news/metro/381480metro08-17-05.htm.
3. Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs (Kerns II), 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (D.N.M. 2012).
4. Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs (Kerns 1), 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010),
rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
5. Id. at 1200.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 1201.
8. See id.
9. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1178.




14. See Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1177.
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ing their guns. They did not enter your parents' bedroom because your
girlfriend told the police they were sleeping.16
Later, you are arrested and spend nearly nine months in jail, only to
be released when the prosecutor determines that the Government did not
actually have enough information to charge you with anything.17 It then
becomes clear to you that you were immediately a suspect in the police's
eyes. The police officers, instead of thanking you for rushing to the scene
and for trying to help them with the investigation, suspected you were
involved. They wanted to arrest you. They wanted to put you in jail.
You want to be vindicated. The police targeted you for a crime you
did not commit and entered your home without a warrant that night. You
want to be vindicated for having been put in jail for nine months for do-
ing nothing except trying to help. In short, you want to be compensated
for the violation of your constitutional rights.
But your quest for a remedy quickly encounters an obstacle. The
police officers claim that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred be-
cause exigent circumstances justified their entry into your home.18 You
go to court where a federal district judge agrees with you. But on appeal
in the Tenth Circuit, a panel of federal judges finds that the officers' ex-
planation of a perceived emergency does, in fact, justify their entry, and
you now have no recourse at all.19
Moreover, you come to find out that even if the appellate court had
found a Fourth Amendment violation, you still would likely have no
remedy because it requires you to overcome the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity. To do so, you must show that the law was "clearly
established," 20 which requires your attorney to engage in a "scavenger
hunt"2' to find a case that is factually similar to yours.22 But, both unfor-
tunately and unsurprisingly for you, there has never been any litigation
on the factual scenario of a police helicopter being gunned down in a
residential neighborhood leading to a warrantless search of a witness's
home. And the really twisted part? If this exact same thing happens
again, you-or whoever the next party to suffer the same harm turns out
21to be-still will not have an avenue for recovery.
15. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04.
16. Id at 1204.
17. See Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1180.
18. Seeid.at 1181.
19. See id. at 1182 (reversing only on the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity
analysis, indicating no disagreement with the lower court's determination that a constitutional viola-
tion occurred).
20. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
609 (1999); infra text accompanying notes 40-55.
21. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
22. See Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1192-93 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
23. Although this depiction might seem to cut in favor of the plaintiffrs version of the facts,
that perspective is the appropriate standard to use when making the determination about whether to
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This series of events actually happened to Jason Kerns. After the
helicopter crash, Kerns brought a § 1983 claim against the three police
officers who entered his home without a search warrant, claiming that
they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.24 All three of the defendant officers moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of qualified immunity, claiming that an exigent cir-
cumstance justified their entry. 2 5 The trial court found a constitutional
violation and denied summary judgment on qualified immunity.26 The
officers appealed.2 7 On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit declined
to affirm the constitutional ruling and remanded the case for rehearing on
the qualified immunity question.
This Comment advances two primary arguments regarding the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Kerns v. Bader.2 8 First, it agrees with the dis-
senting judge that the Tenth Circuit inappropriately decided an interlocu-
tory appeal of a lower court's denial of qualified immunity. Specifically,
the court erred by deciding questions of fact that affected whether exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless entry of a private resi-
dence.2 9 Second, the Comment argues that the court created an insur-
mountable hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome the qualified immunity
defense.30 That is, it indicated that the plaintiff would have to find a case
so factually similar that it would be virtually impossible for the plaintiff
to do so.3'
The Comment then turns to the consequences of the court's deci-
sion. The Tenth Circuit vacated the denial of qualified immunity, yet
failed to address the merits of Kerns's Fourth Amendment claim. The
decision therefore not only left Kerns without a remedy but also failed to
clarify the law so that future plaintiffs who suffered similar constitutional
harms could recover.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the evolution of qualified
immunity doctrine. Specifically, it examines the notice requirement, the
award summary judgment on qualified immunity. See, e.g., Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th
Cir. 1994).
24. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1180. Kerns also brought § 1983 claims under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments relating to the police scrutiny and privacy invasion of his medical records.
Police, without a warrant, obtained those records. Despite many cases cited by the dissenting judge,
the majority held that the privacy right was not clearly established. Kerns also brought § 1983 claims
of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against several other officers and a
ballistic forensics expert. Although these claims illustrate the complicated jurisprudence surrounding
qualified immunity and the clearly established requirement, they are largely unnecessary to the
analysis of this Comment. Therefore, the Comment will focus only on the Fourth Amendment issue
raised regarding the warrantless entry of Kerns's home.
25. Id. at 1180-81.
26. See id. at 1180.
27. Id.
28. 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
29. Id at 1191 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
30. Id at 1192-93.
31. See id.
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issue of whether the constitutional merits should be considered before the
qualified immunity defense, and the clearly established standard used to
establish and overcome a qualified immunity defense. Part H addresses
the Fourth Amendment issue: whether exigent circumstances and proba-
ble cause justified the search of Kerns's home. Additionally, this Part
discusses how ignoring principles from prior cases leaves those individu-
als whose constitutional rights have been violated with no remedy and
explains that this constricts the development of the right itself. Part III
discusses the qualified immunity appeal in Kerns and the Tenth Circuit's
decision to remand the lower court's denial of summary judgment for the
officers. It first addresses the threshold concern of the appropriateness of
doing so on interlocutory appeal while avoiding decision on the constitu-
tional merits of the case. Second, Part III addresses the broader relation-
ship between rights and remedies; it uses Kerns as an example of how
the remedy afforded for violations of our constitutional rights shapes the
contours of those rights at stake and how the absence of a remedy leads
to the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights in general, particularly in
situations where courts can rely on the qualified immunity analysis to
avoid decision on the constitutional issue. Part IV proposes a solution to
the gap that exists between rights and remedies that is perpetuated by
courts addressing the clearly established prong of a qualified immunity
analysis without also addressing the constitutional merits. The "Kerns
solution" ensures that the law is articulated and remedies are afforded to
future victims for the violations of their rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code allows individuals to sue
for money damages when a government official acting "under color of
law" violates their constitutional rights.3 2 Although it is not itself a sub-
stantive right, § 1983 provides an avenue for individuals to recover for
constitutional harms inflicted "under color of law" and is a mechanism
for getting into court to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Consti-
tution by suing the offending official for money damages.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available to govern-
ment actors facing monetary liability in § 1983 claims.34 Qualified im-
munity protects government actors who violated an individual's constitu-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or caus-
es to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress....").
33. See id.; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-76, 181-82, 184, 187 (1961) (dis-
cussing the history of § 1983 and the meaning of "under color of law").
34. E.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 815 (1982).
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tional rights but who did so in a "reasonable" manner, meaning that the
official could not have been expected to know that her conduct was un-
constitutional.3 5 To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff
needs to prove two elements: (1) that a constitutional violation actually
occurred, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
harm such that a reasonable officer would know that what she was doing
violated that right.36
Three principal rationales underlie the qualified immunity defense.
First, we do not want to over-deter police officers from taking action for
fear of lawsuits. 3 7 Second, courts want to afford leeway to government
actors who are required to use discretion and make decisions in tense or
rapidly evolving situations. Third, qualified immunity allows courts to
articulate constitutional law without subjecting officers to retroactive
liability.39
A. Evolution of Qualified Immunity: Notice
Courts used to consider an officer's subjective intent in determining
the availability of the qualified immunity defense.4 0 In Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald,4' the Supreme Court eliminated the subjective intent prong of the
qualified immunity inquiry, primarily to make cases easier to decide on a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment and thus dispense
with lengthy, fact-intensive trials for unmeritorious claims.42
As part of overcoming a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff
must succeed on the clearly established prong of the analysis by showing
that the official was on notice that his conduct violated a constitutional
right. The Supreme Court held in Anderson v. Creighton43 that the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been clearly established
in a particular and relevant way so that a reasonable official would un-
35. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The
qualified immunity doctrine does expand to slightly more than just protecting officers who reasona-
bly violate constitutional rights from liability, but for the purposes of this Comment, the important
concept is that the doctrine protects officers who "reasonably" violate constitutional rights.
36. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 55 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999).
37. E.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ("[T]he public interest may be better served by action taken
'with independence and without fear of consequences."' (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967))); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
38. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
39. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Furthermore, qualified immunity avoids requiring officers to spend-
ing time in court and conserves resources that might otherwise be spent on lawsuits were it not for
qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
40. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556-57 (holding that the good faith and probable cause standard for
the defense to false arrest and imprisonment was applicable to § 1983 claims).
41. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
42. Id at 815-16; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (stating that the immunity is from suit,
not just from monetary liability).
43. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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derstand that he is violating a constitutional right.4 4  In Brosseau v.
Haugen,4 5 the Supreme Court emphasized that whether a right was clear-
ly established depended on the facts of the case and held that the right
must be particularized in order to meet the requirement.4
However, in Hope v. Pelzer,47 the Supreme Court, in reversing a
lower court's grant of qualified immunity, said that the standard of find-
ing "materially similar"48 facts was a "rigid gloss on the qualified im-
munity standard" and was not necessary to ensure that officers are put on
notice that their conduct is unconstitutional. 4 9 The Court further stated
that "general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving
fair and clear warning"50 and that "a general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has
not previously been held unlawful." 5 1 Aside from that, the Supreme
Court has given little clarification on what is suitable to qualify as clearly
established for the purposes of a qualified immunity analysis.
B. Evolution of Qualified Immunity: Sequencing
In Wilson v. Layne,52 the Supreme Court recognized a two-part in-
quiry for qualified immunity analyses and suggested a proper sequence
for that inquiry. 53 A court must first determine whether there was a viola-
tion of a constitutional right.54 If so, a court must then determine if the
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.55
44. Id. at 640 ("[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly
established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.").
45. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
46. Id. at 198-99, 201.
47. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
48. Id. at 739 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (1Ith Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
51. Id. (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270-71) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Hope thus shifted the qualified immunity
analysis from a scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts toward the more relevant
inquiry of whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was unconstitution-
al. As this Court held even prior to Hope, qualified immunity will not be granted if government
defendants fail to make 'reasonable applications of the prevailing law to their own circumstances."'
(quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001))).
52. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
53. Id. at 609 ("A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether
the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all ..... (quoting Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
54. See id. ("Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity
question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the
officers and the general public.").
55. Id.
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In Saucier v. Katz,56 the Court made the Wilson sequencing ap-
proach mandatory, holding that courts had to approach the qualified im-
munity analysis in the proper order, addressing the constitutional issue
before going on to address the clearly established, or qualified immunity,
prong." When addressing the first prong, whether an officer's conduct
violated a constitutional right, courts were instructed to consider the facts
in the light most favorable to the party alleging the injury. 8 In addressing
the second prong, whether the right was clearly established, the Court
thought it critical to articulating the law that this be analyzed in light of
the specifics of the case, not in a broad or general context." This inquiry
also was meant to "advance understanding of the law and to allow offic-
ers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified immunity is applicable.', 0
The rationales for following this sequence are as follows: "First, it
clarifies the law so that police officers may avoid future violations if
their conduct is held unconstitutional." 61 Additionally, courts are more
willing to articulate new constitutional law principles without subjecting
officers to liability for seemingly reasonable actions taken in uncertain
legal situations or under tense or uncertain circumstances.62 Following
this sequence also "ensures that, in the future, a similarly-wronged plain-
tiff would be able to recover if she had, in fact, suffered a violation of her
constitutional rights."6 If courts were to decide the clearly established
prong first, without litigating the merits of the constitutional issue, then
the same § 1983 claims could be brought repeatedly and never actually
become clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity. An-
swering the clearly established question first would allow officers to take
multiple bites at the "constitutionally forbidden fruit," and leave future
plaintiffs with no remedy for similar recurring constitutional violations. 4
The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of articulating consti-
tutional principles in Wilson, stating that "[d]eciding the constitutional
question before addressing the qualified immunity question also pro-
56. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).




61. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 668 (2009).
62. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
63. Leong, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656-57 n.8 (10th Cir. 1987); John
M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil
Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 430 (1999) ("When a court bypasses the
merits of the pleaded constitutional claim in the circumstances just described, it not only effectively
awards the defendant officers one 'liability-free' violation of the Constitution (as it must under the
doctrine of qualified immunity), but it also, by declining to 'clearly establish' the undermined right,
paves the way for 'multiple bites of a constitutionally forbidden fruit."' (quoting Garcia, 817 F.2d at
656-57 n.8)).
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motes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of
both the officers and the general public."65
Conversely, the critics of sequencing have pointed out that sequenc-
ing fails to "adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding un-
necessary decision of constitutional questions." 66 In some cases, a se-
quenced-based decision can insulate that decision from appellate review,
even if the constitutional ruling is incorrect.67 If a defendant is found to
have violated the Constitution but prevails on qualified immunity, then
"[a]s a prevailing party, the defendant cannot appeal the constitutional
ruling, even if it believes the ruling is incorrect and the consequences of
that ruling are unfavorable for both that defendant and others who are
similarly situated." 68
Commentators have also expressed practical concerns with manda-
tory sequencing. Specifically, courts will be forced to decide complicated
constitutional issues unnecessarily, wasting judicial resources when it is
clear that a defendant will prevail on qualified immunity.6 9 Similarly,
there are concerns that deciding constitutional issues on underdeveloped
factual records and under busy conditions will lead courts to the wrong
answer, thus articulating bad (constitutional) law. 70 Finally, the immunity
afforded to defendants is often characterized as freedom from suit, not
just freedom from liability.7' Mandatory sequencing has the potential to
result in officers being forced to endure lengthy litigation on the constitu-
tional issue, only later to be found entitled to qualified immunity.7 2
Ultimately, mandatory sequencing was short-lived. In Pearson v.
Callahan,7 3 the Supreme Court acknowledged the criticisms of mandato-
ry sequencing despite having made it compulsory only eight years earli-
er.7 4 In doing so, the Court overruled the mandatory nature of the Saucier
65. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
66. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); see also Leong, supra note 61, at 676-77 (pointing out that the avoid-
ance principle is rooted in separation of powers and largely related to concerns of altering statutory
laws from the bench, a concern inapplicable in the qualified immunity context). Further, I would
argue that although constitutional questions should often be avoided in other areas of law, it simply
does not make sense to adhere to the avoidance principle when the issue at hand is actually a consti-
tutional issue. This is tantamount, in my opinion, to ignoring the basis of the entire litigation and the
underlying interest of articulating the law.
67. Morse, 551 U.S. at 431; Brosseau v. Haugen 543 U.S. 194, 202 (2004) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) ("[Sequencing] can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulted
from review. . . ."); see also Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1020-21 (2004).
68. Leong, supra note 61, at 678; see also Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1020-21.
69. E.g., Brosseau, 543 U.S at 201-02 (citing Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1025) ("[W]hen courts'
dockets are crowded, [sequencing] makes little administrative sense .... ).
70. E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring); Cnty. of Sacra-
mento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 858-59 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Leong, supra note
61, at 681 n.73.
71. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
72. Id.
73. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
74. Id. at 234-35.
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sequence and announced that although the two-part inquiry survived and
may still often be appropriate, it was thenceforth permissive. 5 In direct-
ing lower courts when the sequence was appropriate, the Supreme Court
gave remarkably ineffectual guidance by instructing judges to simply
"exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand."76
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
AND THE AUDACITY OF IGNORING HOPE
In Kerns, the Tenth Circuit remanded the trial court's denial of
summary judgment on qualified immunity for the three officers who en-
tered Kerns's home with no warrant.77 The Tenth Circuit's determination
on the qualified immunity issue essentially expressed its view that the
officers had an objectively reasonable belief that an exigent circumstance
existed, although it held that the lower court did not address the issue
with sufficient depth. 7 8 Because the Tenth Circuit remanded the case on
the clearly established prong, it did not address the Fourth Amendment
question. But the law was clear that a Fourth Amendment violation oc-
curred. As the dissent pointed out, "Some cases ... require a more par-
ticularized inquiry. This is not one of them.... The Officers had neither
a warrant nor probable cause. If the circumstances they encountered did
not support a reasonable belief [in an exigency, the entry] violated clear-
ly established Fourth Amendment law."79 The Kerns court should not
have remanded the case. It should have affirmed the lower court's ruling
or rejected the interlocutory appeal altogether because both were rooted
in factual evaluations.
The absence of Supreme Court guidance about the clearly estab-
lished standard makes it difficult for judges to declare an action unconsti-
tutional. That difficulty is because of the uncertainty about how specifi-
cally precedent applies in determining what amounts to a constitutional
violation. This uncertainty about what serves as binding precedent for
constitutional violations enables courts to ignore the constitutional ques-
tion altogether, which affects the articulation of constitutional rights. By
remanding Kerns to the lower court, the Tenth Circuit not only denied
Kerns a remedy for the violation of his right but also left the law unclear,
ensuring that the next similarly situated plaintiff would also be left with-
out a remedy.
Kerns raises two principal issues regarding the violation of one's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, which I
75. Id at 236.
76. Id.
77. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2011).
78. Seeid.atll81-83.
79. Id. at 1192 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
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will discuss in turn in subparts A and B. First, the officers had no objec-
tively reasonable basis to believe that an exigent circumstance existed to
justify their warrantless entry of Kerns's home. Furthermore, the deter-
mination of any such belief being objectively reasonable was fact de-
pendent and therefore a question for a jury. Second, even if the police
officers could prove an objectively reasonable belief in an exigency, their
warrantless entry and search of Kerns's home was unreasonable. Even in
exigent circumstances, police still need probable cause to search a home
without a warrant, and the officers in Kerns were unable to establish
probable cause. Finally, in subpart C, I will examine the effect that the
context of litigation has on articulating rights, specifically how litigation
in either a criminal or a civil context can affect the available remedy for
violations of rights and how the relationship between the litigation con-
text and the available remedies can affect the underlying right itself. I
will examine these issues with an eye toward the underlying rationales of
qualified immunity, the specificity required by the court in making the
clearly established determination, and the relationship between constitu-
tional rights and the remedies afforded for their violation.
A. Objectively Reasonable Belief in an Exigency
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures.80 Warrantless searches are presumptively unrea-
sonable and thus presumptively unconstitutional.8' To justify as constitu-
tional the warrantless entry into a home, officers need to prove that one
of the established exceptions, such as consent or exigent circumstances,
-82applies.
In United States v. Najar,83 the Tenth Circuit, following the Su-
preme Court's announcement in Brigham City v. Stuart,84 put forth the
two-part test for determining whether an exigent circumstance exists to
justify the warrantless entry of a home.85 First, "officers [must] have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to
protect the lives or safety of themselves or others."8 6 Second, the manner
and scope of the search must be reasonable.87 In the context of the Kerns
decision, only the first prong is controversial.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
81. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980).
82. E.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 578-81, 583; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57
(1967); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 712-13, 715, 717, 721 (10th Cir. 2006).
83. 451 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2006).
84. 547 U.S. 398, 405-07 (2006).
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Applying that test to Kerns, the issue was whether the officers who
entered Kerns's home without a warrant had an objectively reasonable
basis to believe there was an immediate need to protect the lives or safety
of themselves or others. If the officers had a reasonable belief, then the
warrantless entry was justified and no constitutional violation occurred.
If the officers did not have a reasonable belief, then the entry was not
justified and Kems's Fourth Amendment right was violated. The deter-
mination of that objectively reasonable belief rests squarely on the as-
sessment of the facts of the case. Any exigency that the police perceived
was not objectively reasonable because (1) the officers had the oppor-
tunity to ask Kems about the condition of his home (thus, there was no
immediate threat), and (2) the circumstances justifying the exigency were
factually in dispute (and therefore, by definition, not objective).
Recall that in Kerns there was a police helicopter downed by a gun-
shot." Kems was the only person to claim that the sound he heard came
from near his home.89 But he said that he heard a "loud pop sound,"90 not
shots. He explained that the sound just as likely could have been a car
backfiring.9' None of Kerns's nearby neighbors confirmed hearing a
noise.92 In fact, most of his neighbors were unaware that the helicopter
crash had occurred at all.93
The officers argued that their warrantless entry was justified under
an exigency exception.94 They claimed that the condition of Kerns's
driveway and home provided an "objectively reasonable basis to believe
there [was] an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves
or others . . .. Specifically, the police asserted exigent circumstances
existed because a door was left open, music was left on inside the home
(which may or may not have stopped playing at some point), a window
was broken (which was actually merely damaged), boxes were left scat-
tered about the driveway in an untidy manner, and no one answered the
door.96
But before entering, the police at Kerns's home were in contact with
the officer at the crash site who was with Kerns. In fact, the police were
in contact with Kems via the officer at the scene the entire time-even
asking follow-up questions about where specifically Kerns thought he
88. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011).
89. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
90. Id at 1200.
91. Id at 1201.
92. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1178.
93. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. 1176, 1204 (D.N.M. 2012).
94. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1181.
95. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).
96. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1177; Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-03.
97. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. at 1200.
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heard the shot come from, where he was standing, etc.98 The police at
Kerns's home could have easily and quickly radioed to the crash site to
ask Kerns if anyone was home, or if the door being open alarmed Kerns,
or if Kerns had left music on.99 Or they could have simply asked Kerns
for consent to enter his home. The officers' purported belief in an imme-
diate need to protect themselves or others by entering Kerns's home
seems unreasonable given these facts.
Fourth Amendment doctrine is very clear: warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable.100 To overcome that presumption, police
officers must have probable cause and justify the search pursuant to one
of the categorical exceptions, such as an exigency.10 As the dissenting
judge in Kerns pointed out, "If the circumstances [the officers] encoun-
tered did not support a reasonable belief that danger to someone was
imminent, then" they violated Kerns's Fourth Amendment right.10 2
Fourth Amendment doctrine regarding exigent circumstances states
that in the absence of a warrant, the police need probable cause and an
objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to
protect the safety of themselves or others.' 03 With respect to Kerns, the
determination of whether an exigency existed depends on whether objec-
tively reasonable officers outside of Kerns's home would have believed
there was an immediate need to enter the home to protect the safety of
themselves or others.'0 Only if that belief were found reasonable, would
the warrantless entry be constitutionally justified. At best, that exigency
is a question of fact most suitable for a jury given the disputed facts re-
garding the officers' alleged justification for the warrantless search. At
worst, the exigency simply did not exist.
But there are even more specific statements of law regarding when a
warrantless entry is constitutionally justified under an exigency excep-
tion. In United States v. Martinez,'0 5 the Tenth Circuit held that officers
violated Mr. Martinez's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his
home with no warrant and could not establish a reasonable belief in an
98. Kerns, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
99. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. at 1187 ("Johnston did not speak directly with J. Kerns, but
spoke through other law enforcement officers, and, using this technique, Johnston clarified J. Kerns'
perceptions concerning the directionality of the noise J. Kerns heard.").
100. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980).
101. E.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 578-81, 583; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57
(1967); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 712-13, 715, 717, 721 (10th Cir. 2006).
102. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1192 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
103. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006); Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89;
Najar, 451 F.3d at 718.
104. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1193 ("[T]he majority's statement of the issue it would have the dis-
trict court address suffers from other flaws. The majority's reference to the Officers' 'belief that
exigent circumstances existed should not deter the district court on remand from correctly focusing
on whether a reasonable officer would have believed that exigent circumstances existed (an issue
which, as I have said, must in this case be resolved by the jury).").
105. 643 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2011).
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exigent circumstance. 106 In Martinez, the officers, responding to a 911
call,
knocked on the front door[,] . . . received no response[,] ... inspected
the perimeter of the house[,] . . . saw no signs of forced entry[,] ...
nor heard anyone inside. The officers then ... found a closed but un-
locked sliding glass door into the house. Through the glass, they
could see some electronics boxes near the door and . . . the house
looked disheveled....
The officers entered through the unlocked door .... 107
Martinez is a case from the same circuit, involved officers from the
same county as those in Kerns, and was decided only five months before
Kerns. But Martinez reached a different conclusion about the constitu-
tional violation. As it relates to articulating rights, the contrast between
the two cases shows that what facts amount to a constitutional violation
is anything but concrete and fails to make the law predictable or clear for
anyone. 0 8 That opacity also makes courts' determination about the con-
stitutional violation more difficult. 109 Without a national standard to fol-
low, courts vary both in what they deem a constitutional violation and
what is adequately clearly established law sufficient to give an officer
"fair and clear warning" that his conduct was unconstitutional."1 0
Warrantless searches violate clearly established Fourth Amendment
law "unless the police can show that it falls within one . . . carefully de-
fined set of exceptions based on the presence of 'exigent circumstanc-
es."i" Given that "[t]he government bears the burden of proving the
exigency exception"'1 2 and that "[t]hat burden is especially heavy when
the exception must justify the warrantless entry of a home,""l3 it seems
unreasonable that the Government could to prevail at the summary
judgment stage, particularly in light of the factual dispute raised by Mr.
106. Id. at 1293-94.
107. Id. at 1294-95.
108. And recall Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), where the Court stated, "Deciding the
constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in
the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public." Id.
at 609; see also infra text accompanying notes 172-95 (noting how the context of articulation may
help to explain the different results).
109. If the law were clearly established, the Kerns court could have relied on prior decisions to
find a constitutional violation. Because the law is unclear, the determination of whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred is made more difficult.
110. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
Ill. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) ("[E]xceptions to the warrant requirement are 'few in number and have
been carefully delineated."' (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318
(1972))); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582-86 (1980).
112. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Welsh, 466 U.S. at
750 ("[T]he burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless . .. entries.").
113. Najar, 451 F.3d at 717.
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Kerns.l 14 The presumption of unreasonableness regarding warrantless
searches also explains, as the Kerns dissent points out, why the lower
court did not devote a great deal of its analysis to the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment law regarding warrantless entries into a private
residence was clearly established; it was obvious." 5
Although the Government bears the burden of demonstrating exi-
gent circumstances, 1 6 in the interest of not over-deterring police from
making split-second judgments in favor of public safety, courts afford
deference to police in reviewing those split-second judgments. But even
affording police that deference and conceding the point that this was a
tense and rapidly developing situation, the entry into Kerns's home was
outside that cushion of discretion. Further, the question of whether the
situation supported a reasonable belief of an imminent threat so as to
justify the warrantless entry is one that was rooted in evaluations of fact.
And, as the district court held, that question was one for a jury."
Affirming the constitutional violation in Kerns would not have had
the effect of over-deterring police from acting in the interest of public
safety. Even had the qualified immunity ruling been affirmed, the Gov-
ernment would likely have indemnified" 8 the officers in Kerns, so the
penalties would have been levied against the County of Bemalillo, not
against the officers themselves." 9 Given that this is the same county
sheriffs department as in Martinez,120 and that those police officers un-
der remarkably similar circumstances entered private homes without
warrants, it is not unreasonable to think that additional deterrent
measures against the county would be warranted. The Tenth Circuit's
Martinez decision and the district court's opinion in Kerns, both finding
a constitutional violation, also suggest that deterring that behavior is de-
sirable. 12 1
114. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) ("[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal
one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of
violation of clearly established law." (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985)
(internal quotation mark omitted)); id ("[A] qualified immunity ruling ... is ... a legal issue that
can be decided with reference only to undisputed facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of
the case."' (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 n.10) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
115. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
116. Najar, 451 F.3d at 717; see also Welsh, 466 U.S at 750.
117. The assessment of whether officers had a reasonable belief is different from cases like, for
example, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), where the exigency is one that the officers
actually observed. Id. at 400-01. There, officers could hear yelling from inside the home, observed
an individual punch someone, and saw the victim bleeding. Id. That situation reflects an objective
exigency determination because of a danger to someone inside the home that was actually observed
by officers. Id. at 401-03.
118. SeeN.M.STAT.ANN. §41-4-4(2012).
119. See Leong, supra note 61, at 668 n.1.
120. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2011).
121. Id. at 1299-1300 ("The sanctity of the home is too important to be violated by the mere
possibility that someone inside is in need of aid-such a 'possibility' is ever-present. It is for this
reason that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are 'subject only to a few
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The Kerns court should have affirmed the constitutional ruling. Alt-
hough Martinez was decided five months before Kerns, the search in
Kerns actually happened prior to that in Martinez, so the officers in
Kerns could not have been aware at that time.122 But as it relates to the
constitutional merits of Kerns, the Tenth Circuit decided the cases within
the same year. And in light of Martinez, the court missed the opportunity
to articulate constitutional law in Kerns. Given the remarkably similar
facts in Kerns and Martinez, it should have been easy for the Kerns court
to at least affirm the constitutional violation, even if it were to remand
the qualified immunity holding, as it did.
In Kerns, the site of the helicopter crash can be more appropriately
characterized as the locus of a tense and rapidly developing situation
than can Kerns's home. At the crash site, several witnesses reported
hearing a shot that had come from the immediate area.123 In contrast,
there were no substantiated reports of a shot (or noise) from near Kerns's
home 24 other than from Kerns himself, who claimed to have heard a
noise that "could have been engine backfire or a rifle report."l 25 The cir-
cumstances outside Kerns's home were relatively benign when compared
to the facts of other Tenth Circuit cases where a reasonable belief in an
exigency was found to exist.126 The circumstances in Kerns do not seem
to add up to a basis for a reasonable belief in an imminent threat inside
Kerns's home that would constitutionally justify the warrantless entry.
The officers could have reasoned that because Kerns was the one to
report the noise, he could be the shooter and thus there could have been
people injured in his home. The problem with this justification is that it
starts to look as if the police were suspicious of Kerns and entered his
home with an investigatory purpose and only relied on the exigency ex-
ception in hindsight as a pretext for entering without a warrant.127
Furthermore, the police in Kerns had ample opportunity to establish
a more ironclad exception to the warrant requirement: consent. Not even
attempting to get Kerns's consent when he was conversing with an of-
ficer at the crash site less than half a mile from his home seems unrea-
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978))).
122. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011); Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1294.
123. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
124. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1178.
125. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
126. See infra note 144 (collecting the Tenth Circuit's exigency cases).
127. Warrantless entry is not justified by an investigatory purpose. If the only justification the
police had was a suspicion of Kerns, then the investigatory entry of his home is a plain violation of
the Fourth Amendment and one that is clearly established. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
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sonable.12 8 Moreover, that continuous contact with Kerns undermines the
argument that the officers believed an imminent threat existed inside the
home. If the officers were operating under that belief, why not alert or
ask Kerns about it?129
For their part, the officers asserted that it is a "well settled"o30 prin-
ciple that "officers can reasonably search for victims upon reports of
gunfire."l31 Citing Michigan v. Fisher,132 the officers pointed out that
they do not need "ironclad proof' of a life-threatening injury to invoke
the emergency aid exception.' 33 However, even affording police wide
deference, the situation in Kerns and the warrantless entry seem to be
outside the margin of error within which reasonable constitutional viola-
tions fall, even in light of Fisher.
Not only was there no "ironclad proof' of an imminent, life-
threatening danger in Kerns's home, which police concededly do not
always need, there was hardly any objective reason to suspect people
inside the home were in grave danger or were a threat to the police. And,
even if there had been a reason to suspect a grave danger, why not radio
the officer at the crash site and ask Kerns about the conditions at the
home, or for consent to enter? Although police should be given plenty of
leeway, the reasoning the police officers relied on in Kerns to justify
their warrantless entry does not add up to an objectively reasonable fear
for safety so much as it does to an investigation of someone the police
thought was suspicious, which is a clear constitutional violation.134
128. The failure to get Kerns's consent when he was conversing with an officer at the crash site
could itself be considered a Fourth Amendment violation because the Fourth Amendment protects
against "unreasonable searches." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d. 1176, 1200 (D.N.M. 2012) ("The Court lent weight to the
Kerns' argument that, 'if there was concern for the safety of people possibly inside the Kerns' home,
Bader, Thompson, and Carter could have learned if there were people in the Kerns' home directly
from J. Kerns, with whom Johnston was in radio contact,' and noted that the officers' actions once
inside the home undercut their explanation for preceding without a warrant or consent." (quoting
Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 2009 WL 3672877, at *9 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2009))).
130. Id at 1197 (quoting City Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Their Motion for
Summary Judgment Requesting Dismissal of Counts 1, X, and Xiii of Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint at 10, Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.N.M. 2010) (No. CIV 07-771 JB/ACT), 2009
WL 4993511, at *10).
131. Id
132. 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (per curiam).
133. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. In Fisher, the facts more strongly indicated a real
emergency inside the house. There, police responding to a disturbance call were directed to a specif-
ic house "where a man was going crazy," according to witnesses. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45. The scene
outside the house was chaotic: several smashed windows-both the house and cars outside-a
damaged fence on the property, and blood on the outside of the house. Id at 45-46. Furthermore, the
officers, who could see Fisher inside the house "screaming and throwing things," observed that he
was cut and bleeding, and when they asked if he needed medical attention, he began cursing at them
and eventually pointed a gun at one of the officers. Id. at 46-47. The Kerns case is a far cry from
Brigham City, though. In Brigham City, as with Fisher, the officers were able to make a determina-
tion that an emergency existed because of a danger to someone inside the home that was actually
observed. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.
134. Although somewhat far-fetched, I concede that it is possible the police officers may have
believed Kerns could have just gone on a rampage, killed his family, shot down the helicopter, and
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In any event, although over-deterring police is a genuine concern,
and courts should not haphazardly second-guess police decisions made in
dangerous situations, 3 1 the police here had ample opportunity to assess
an ostensibly nonthreatening situation and to ask Kerns about the un-
locked door, the damaged window, and the music, before entering his
home. Unlike most other Tenth Circuit cases where an exigency was
determined to exist,'36 in Kerns there was no imminent threat apparent
from outside Kerns's home, 137 no reports had singled out his home as a
threat or as suspicious, 38 no movement was detected inside the home, 139
nothing was known about the residents,14 0 and there were no obvious
signs of a crime or injury having taken place there.141 The objective facts
regarding the condition outside Kerns's home and the conduct of the
officers before entering make it seem likely that the officers' justification
of being worried about the safety of those inside the home was a pretext.
It seems just as likely that the officers were suspicious of Kerns and only
after entering his home and getting caught with their hands in the cookie
jar by Kerns's girlfriend, did they try to justify their warrantless entry
made with investigatory motives by claiming exigent circumstances.
Throughout litigation, Kerns's arguments focused mostly on distin-
guishing his case from those cases where an exigency was found to have
existed. Kerns focused less on finding cases with somewhat similar facts
where the holding was that no exigency existed. However, it is question-
then feigned as a good Samaritan to hide his crimes (helping police at the crash site and disclosing
that he only heard the gunshot). But although that may have created a reason for the officers to be
suspicious of Kerns, it still in itself does not demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that there
was an imminent threat to themselves or others. Particularly in the absence of any verifying evi-
dence, it amounts to a mere police suspicion.
135. E.g., Rybum v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 991-92 (2012) ("[Jludges should be cautious about
second-guessing a police officer's assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a
particular situation.").
136. See infra note 144 (collecting the Tenth Circuit's exigency cases).
137. See United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that warrantless
entry was justified under exigency exception where the defendant, suspected of bank robbery, fired
gunshots through a window at police).
138. See United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding an
exigency justified a warrantless entry where police responded to multiple 911 calls reporting gun-
shots in an apartment identified by a tenant as the source of shots, witnesses stated that the occupants
were known to have guns, and the gun owners' cars were parked outside the apartment).
139. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 720 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that warrantless
entry was justified under exigency exception where a 911 call was silent, call-back attempts went
unanswered, police responding had the 911 operator call and police could hear the phone ringing
inside thus confirming the call came from that residence, and police could see and hear someone
inside the home who, when he eventually answered the door, denied having called 911).
140. See United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
exigency justified arrest inside a home pursuant to a search warrant where police knew that two
target-residents were drug dealers, gang members, and known to carry firearms).
141. See Michigan v. Fisher, 548 U.S. 30, 45 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that an exigency
justified warrantless entry where police, responding to a disturbance, were told by witnesses that a
man "was going crazy," there were broken windows on the home and broken glass on the ground,
blood on the exterior of the home, and the officers could see the resident inside throwing things and
yelling).
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able that it would have mattered.14 2 Most of the controlling Tenth Circuit
cases dealing with whether an exigency exists 4 3 require more than was
present in Kerns to find that one did.'" In contrast to these cases, in
which the exigency usually arose in part because the police were alerted
to a threat in an identified residence and were uncertain as to the wherea-
bouts of the suspect or resident of the home, Kerns was nearby with a
police officer, was aiding the police in the crash investigation, and could
have been contacted.145 Even if the officers were suspicious of Kerns and
142. See United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1293-95 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding no
exigency when officers, responding to a 911 call, could not locate or contact the resident, received
no answer upon knocking on the door, the house looked disheveled, boxes were scattered around,
and a door was unlocked).
143. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 617-18 (1999) (holding in part that to clearly
establish a law requires controlling precedent in that circuit or by the Supreme Court, or a consensus
of persuasive authorities). Because it, too, is rather vaguely defined, I will ignore the consensus arm
of this test throughout this Comment.
144. See Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d at 1224 (holding an exigency justified a warrantless entry
where police responded to multiple 911 calls reporting gunshots in an apartment identified by a
tenant as the source of shots, witnesses stated that the occupants were known to have guns, and the
gun owners' cars were parked outside the apartment); Najar, 451 F.3d at 717-18, 720 (collecting
sources and holding that warrantless entry was justified under exigency exception where a 911 call
was silent, call-back attempts went unanswered, police responding had the 911 operator call and
police could hear the phone ringing inside thus confirming the call came from that residence, and
police could see and hear someone inside the home who, when he eventually answered the door,
denied having called 911); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
an exigency justified the warrantless entry into an apartment after ordering everyone out, including
defendant who had brandished a weapon, to search for anyone who may have been harmed or in-
jured); United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288-90 (holding that a warrantless entry was justi-
fied under exigency exception where officers observed defendant buying materials to manufacture
methamphetamines and, after smelling methamphetamine being cooked, had reasonable belief that
the officer and public safety were threatened by a potential methamphetamine lab explosion); United
States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding an exigency justified no-knock
entry where police knew location of defendant's residence, defendant was thought to carry a gun,
and thus posed a threat to officers' physical safety); United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1285
(10th Cir. 2000) (holding an exigency justified arrest in home pursuant to search warrant where
police knew that two target-residents were drug dealers, gang members, and known to carry fire-
arms); United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 970-71 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the warrantless
entry of motel room was justified under exigency exception where investigation of suspect estab-
lished probable cause and combination of factors, including safety and destruction of evidence);
United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 622 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding a warrantless entry was justified
by "presence of a legitimate and significant threat to the health and safety of the arrestee" who was
with officers); United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the totality of
circumstances demonstrated an exigency relating to officer safety that justified a warrantless search
where agents investigating a suspected smuggling operation saw marijuana in plain view through the
window of a parked airplane); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that warrantless entry was justified under exigency exception where the defendant, suspected of bank
robbery, fired gunshots through a window at police). But see Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1293-95
(finding no exigency when officers, responding to a 911 call, could not locate or contact the resident,
received no answer upon knocking on the door, the house looked disheveled, boxes were scattered
around, and a door was unlocked); United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding no exigency existed where officers had no reasonable belief that safety of officers or of
defendant's wife was at risk, defendant was communicating with officers, and defendant had no
known reputation for violence); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 538 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that no exigent circumstances existed where a door of a commercial building was open and officers
claimed entry for protection of property to justify warrantless entry).
145. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
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reasoned he was the shooter, he was with police already and did not pose
an immediate threat that would justify the officers' warrantless entry.
The established principle that warrantless searches require probable
cause and a clear, objective basis for belief that an exigency exists should
have led the Kerns court to affirm the Fourth Amendment violation. Exi-
gency law is clear,14 6 so the important question in determining the consti-
tutional violation was whether the officers' belief was objectively rea-
sonable. And that question of whether the belief in an exigency was ob-
jectively reasonable was based in facts and therefore more appropriate
for a jury.147 It certainly does not meet the standard for summary judg-
ment, particularly given that the movant could not show that there was
no dispute as to material facts.14 8 These facts were material to the deter-
mination of whether an objectively reasonable belief in an exigency ex-
isted, and therefore to whether a constitutional violation occurred. Alt-
hough many qualified immunity cases are appropriately decided at sum-
mary judgment, Kerns is not one of them. In Kerns, the determination of
the constitutional violation itself turned on whether a reasonable belief in
an exigency justified the warrantless entry.
In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that whether exigent circum-
stances support warrantless searches requires an examination of the "in-
formation possessed by the searching officials." 49 Notwithstanding the
factually disputed information known to the police who entered Kerns's
home, the police were armed with the knowledge that.Kerns could be
contacted via radio. This also arguably should have led the Kerns court
to affirm the constitutional ruling. Especially in light of Martinez,so
where contact with the homeowner was a point of discussion surrounding
a reasonable belief in an exigency, failure to contact Kerns, when it was
known by the officers that they could have done so without any delay,
amounts to a violation of Kerns's Fourth Amendment right. Because the
right in this context will not have been established, the result of failing to
affirm the constitutional ruling leaves Kerns, and the next similarly situ-
ated plaintiff, without a remedy for the violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment right.
B. Probable Cause
In addition to demonstrating an objectively reasonable belief in an
exigency, defendants must prove they had probable cause. Thus, even if
146. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-06 (2006); United States v. Najar, 451
F.3d 710, 718 20 (10th Cir. 2006).
147. See generally Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Farmer v. Colo. & S. Ry. Co.,
723 F.2d 766, 768 (10th Cir. 1983) ("An appellate court should not overturn a trial court's finding of
fact unless it is definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.").
148. See infra text accompanying notes 215-29.
149. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
150. See United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002).
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the police officers are able to demonstrate an objectively reasonable be-
lief in an exigency, "officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus
exigent circumstances in order to make lawful entry into a home."' 5 1 And
even as mushy as the standard is, the officers in Kerns could not establish
probable cause on the facts.
Although it is understandable that the officers would be amped dur-
ing a tense and chaotic situation following the shooting of a police heli-
copter and eager to find and arrest the shooter, situations like that should
not justify diminishing the constitutional protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. If anything, that is precisely the situation when it is
most important to uphold and reinforce those protections to deter under-
standably excited and potentially rancorous police officers from over-
reaching their bounds and violating the constitutional rights of private
citizens.
Officers Bader, Thompson, and Carter were at the Kerns residence
with Officer Johnston.15 2 Officer Johnston was the only one of the four
who did not enter the home.15 3 These officers, while unable to articulate
specific facts to establish probable cause leading to their warrantless en-
try, alluded to "feel[ing]" the need to get in the house to make sure no
one was hurt.15 4 Affording officers leeway is an important rationale of
qualified immunity. But that latitude must be balanced somehow against
the type of intrusion that follows in order to preserve the individual con-
stitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment, particularly when the
subject of the search is a place as sacred as a home.15 5 The requirement
of probable cause provides that balance and equilibrates the interests of
the police in protecting public safety with the interests of individuals to
be free from unreasonable searches.
Even as opaque as the probable cause standard is, it is hard to find
enough to establish probable cause on the facts of Kerns.156 Here, "[t]he
officers did not report seeing any movement inside the Kerns' home" and
"[o]ther than the broken window, [Officer] Bader did not find any evi-
151. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002); see also Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402;
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980); Najar, 451 F.3d at 718.
152. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
153. Id.
154. See infra note 163.
155. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreason-
able governmental intrusion.' With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no." (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 573 ("The physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.").
156. Establishing probable cause as it relates the warrantless entry seems difficult here. How-
ever, the probable cause that the police asserted for Kerns's arrest warrant (a separate issue in Kerns)
seems reasonable based on the unchallenged information included in the warrant affidavit. See Kems
v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1187-90 (10th Cir. 2011).
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dence revealing where a shooter may have been standing."' 5 7 These ob-
servations should have indicated that no shooter was ever present there
because "Bader is a trained human tracker" and thus should have been
able to make a determination about recent foot traffic in or out of the
home.'
The small hole broken through the window was one of the primary
justifications for the officer's assertion that an exigency existed.'59 But
the window was actually only broken through a single pane of a double-
paned window, and "a golf ball striking the Kerns' window would not
have been out of the ordinary, because the Kerns' backyard borders the
eighteenth hole of the Paradise Hills golf course."160 It is also plainly
unreasonable to conclude that the second pane of glass could have
stopped a bullet (was it magic glass?). And if it was a bullet that made
the hole in the outer pane, but was thwarted by the second pane, where
was the bullet?
In addition to there being no evidence of any person responsible for
the shooting, "many officers at the Kerns' home were searching for 'shell
casings, guns, [and] people,' but no such evidence was ever found
there."61 Johnston, one of the officers present at Kerns's home stated
that he "did not think that the shooter would be found at the scene, be-
cause of the time lag between the helicopter crash and his arrival at the
Kerns' home."l 62
In fact, both Officers Bader and Johnston later conceded that they
could not come up with an articulable reason that led them to believe
someone in the home was injured or in danger.163 Thus, these officers
157. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1187 (D.N.M. Aug. 2012).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1187-88.
160. Id. at 1187.
161. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sergeant Robert Johnston's deposition).
162. Id. at 1189-90. That "time lag" also points to the exigency having ended. See Flippo v.
West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1999) (concluding that when the exigency ends, so does any
justification for warrantless entry); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1978) (rejecting a
"murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement and holding that when the exigency ends, so
does the justification for warrantless entry).
163. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 n.20 ("Kerns pointfed] to Johnston's statement, in
response to a question whether he could articulate what led him to believe that someone may have
been hurt inside the house, that, '[a]t this point in time, no, sir.' Later in his deposition, however,
Johnston state[d]: 'When we got to the Kerns residents [sic] and the door was open, the lights were
on, the music was playing loud, it was late at night, early in the morning, nobody was answering the
door, for whatever reason, and the fact that a shooting had taken place of a helicopter, unknown if
anybody else had been shot in the interim prior to, after, whatever that yes, I felt at that lime we
needed to gel in that house to make sure there was nobod' injured inside that house."' (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Sergeant Robert Johnston's deposition)); id. ("In response to a
question whether [Officer Bader] could articulate any objective facts that made him think someone
had taken refuge inside of the house, Bader said 'no.' Earlier in his deposition, however, Bader had
stated: 'So now we are thinking well, the door is unlocked, we haven't found the offender, now
nobody is coming to the door. There may be somebody hurt or maybe somebody being held hostage.
We really don't know what's going on yet and that's not good. I mean, this is as far as we know, and
we don't have the information to tell us otherwise, this is basically the scene of a crime. This is
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could not even meet an articulable suspicion standard, a standard below
that of probable cause.'1" It appears that no probable cause existed given
that the officers at Kerns's home did not have enough evidence to sug-
gest that a crime had occurred there or that an immediate danger existed
inside the home. Furthermore, two of the officers admitted to not having
enough evidence to meet an even lower standard of suspicion. The offic-
ers who entered the home were presumably either acting on a hunch or
were motivated by an investigatory purpose, neither of which is constitu-
tional.
It looks more like the police aspired to investigate Kerns, entered
his home to do so, and worked backwards to justify their warrantless
entry pretextually only after Kerns's girlfriend caught them inside. For
his part, Kerns asserted (seemingly correctly) that the officers entered his
home because they considered the home a crime scene connected to the
helicopter shooting and were beginning to investigate it.'65 This assertion
is consistent with the testimony given by Officer Bader that "this is basi-
cally the scene of a crime. This is where somebody shot down a helicop-
ter."l66 However, the Fourth Amendment law is clear that "the serious-
ness of the offense under investigation [does not] itself create[] exigent
circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a
warrantless search."1 6 7
In the absence of probable cause and an objective exigency, the.
warrantless entry of a private home is unreasonable and therefore uncon-
stitutional.'68 No objective exigency and no probable cause add up to a
violation of Kerns's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches.
C. Context's Effect on Articulating Rights
The Tenth Circuit seemed to disregard the statements made by Of-
ficers Bader and Johnston-two of the officers at Kerns's home-that
they could not articulate a reason as to why they believed someone in the
home was injured or in immediate need of help. The court also did not
seem to afford deference' 6 9 to the lower court's ruling or to consider
many of the facts in the "light most favorable to the" plaintiff, as it was
where somebody shot down a helicopter. That's a big deal, and to have these people now not able to
come to the door to contact us is extremely troubling."' (emphasis added) (quoting Officer Drew
Bader's deposition)).
164. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
165. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
166. Id. at 1190 n.20 (quoting Sergeant Robert Johnston's deposition).
167. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394.
168. E.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002).
169. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006).
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required to do.170 Why did the Kerns court think these statements were
not important?
One explanation is that the court did not believe that these particular
statements were important to their determination given the entirety of the
statements made by the officers during their depositions. Or perhaps the
court's decision here is representative of the general trend in Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search and seizure jurisprudence to move
away from the strict warrant requirement and towards a balancing of
police interests against individual privacy interests.' 7 ' But if this were the
reasoning, and if the court had assessed the justification of the warrant-
less entry under the general reasonableness standard, the court likely
would have found the officers' justification unreasonable.
Another possible reason that the court disregarded the officers' own
admissions is that the context in which claims are brought and litigated
affects how judges think about Fourth Amendment protections.172 Most
Fourth Amendment claims are brought in criminal proceedings and are
made in an attempt to exclude evidence obtained as the result of an al-
legedly unreasonable search.173 Professor Leong has suggested that the
exclusionary remedy is one that judges see as a "massive remedy" and a
"get-out-of-jail-free card," and that they are therefore reluctant to grant
defendants-who have already been all but proven to have been in pos-
session of contraband by the very nature of their appearance in an exclu-
sionary hearing-the benefit of excluding the evidence. 174 That aversion
to granting the exclusionary remedy in most Fourth Amendment claims
leads judges to "distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was
not really violated,"' and thereby constrict the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. That judicial focus on Fourth Amendment claims in the
criminal context, then, leads judges to become accustomed to the practice
of deciding cases in a rights-constrictive manner, rather than a rights-
expansive approach. 176
170. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001), abrogatedon other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
171. The trend in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of moving from a strict warrant require-
ment toward a general reasonableness balancing approach is beyond the scope of this Comment, but
see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857,
894 nn.155-58 (1999) (collecting sources).
172. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 418-21 (2012) (discussing how the
context in which litigation is brought affects the articulation of rights). "Context" is used here to
"refer to a given set of remedial, factual, and procedural circumstances," for example, criminal or
civil proceedings. Id. at 407.
173. Id. at 430.
174. Id. at 430-31 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing the effect of single-context litigation through the lens of the available
remedies).
175. Id at 431 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 799 (1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
176. Id. at 431-32.
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As it relates to Kerns, the Tenth Circuit possibly reasoned that be-
cause no evidence was obtained as the result of the unreasonable search
and the standard remedy for unreasonable searches is to exclude the evi-
dence obtained, Kerns really suffered no tangible injury. It would follow
that as a result of the standard exclusionary remedy not being applicable
in this case, Kerns's constitutional injury likewise was not cognizable as
a Fourth Amendment claim. If a judge routinely rules on Fourth
Amendment claims against unsavory criminal defendants who have been
caught with contraband and seek to exclude unreasonably obtained evi-
dence, then what could compel a judge used to that routine to grant mon-
etary damages to a plaintiff who ostensibly suffered no harm at all?
Interestingly, in Martinez, the Tenth Circuit only five months before
Kerns decided an exigency case of warrantless entry with similar officer
justifications to those made in Kerns. The court held that "[b]ecause the
officers lacked a reasonable basis for believing an individual inside Mr.
Martinez's home was in need of immediate aid or assistance, we agree
with the district court's determination that the warrantless search of Mr.
Martinez's home was a violatici of the Fourth Amendment."177
Martinez was an appeal by the Government from a district court's
grant of a motion to suppress.' 7 ' There, the officers who entered the
home with no warrant claimed a belief in an exigency when after knock-
ing on the door with no response, they "inspected the perimeter of the
house" 7 9 and approached an "unlocked sliding glass door [through
which] they could see some electronics boxes near the door and they
noticed that the house looked disheveled." 80 They then entered the home
and "spent approximately five minutes inside."' 8'
The facts in Kerns are extraordinarily similar. Recall in Kerns that
the officers entered the home with no warrant, claiming a belief in an
exigent circumstance when, after knocking on the door with no response,
they inspected the perimeter of the house.' 82 Upon inspection, the offic-
ers noticed the generally disheveled condition outside the home: boxes in
the driveway and garage, a broken (damaged) window, no lights on, and
177. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011).
178. Id. at 1293.
179. Id. at 1294.
180. Id. at 1295.
181. Id.; see also id. at 1296 ("The government contends the officers' warrantless search was
justified by exigent circumstances because the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that
someone inside the house needed immediate aid or was in danger. It emphasizes four facts to support
its position: (1) the static-only 911 call from the residence; (2) the 'disheveled' appearance of the
house; (3) the unlocked door on the backside second floor of the house; and (4) the electronics boxes
just inside the unlocked door.").
182. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1202-03 (D.N.M. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).
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music playing. 8 3 The officers in Kerns also entered the home through an
unlocked door and spent only about five minutes inside the home.18 4
The most notable factual difference between Kerns and Martinez
with respect to the belief in an exigency is that in Martinez, the "Berna-
lillo County Emergency Communication Center received a 911 call from
Mr. Martinez's residence. The 911 dispatcher who received the call
heard only static on the line."' 8 1 In Kerns, the plaintiff was actually with
the police and in contact with the other officers who were at his home.18 6
The other notable difference between Kerns and Martinez is that Mar-
tinez was litigated in the criminal context, regarding a suppression mo-
tion; Kerns was litigated in a civil context, in a § 1983 action.
A 911 call being placed from the home and the police thereafter not
being able to reach the owner of the home would sensibly seem to weigh
in favor of the court finding an objectively reasonable belief in an exi-
gency. But the Tenth Circuit, in Martinez, ultimately agreed with the
district court holding that the officers were unable to show a basis for an
objectively reasonable belief in an exigent circumstance. 8 7 Even noting
that "'reasonable belief is a lower standard than probable cause[,] ...
the district court was explaining that the evidence was neutral and did
not support an objectively reasonable belief there was any emergency in
the house."' 8 8 The Martinez court also noted the deference to be afforded
in reviewing the district court's ruling on factual circumstances sur-
rounding an exigency' 89 and that "[t]he burden of proof was on the gov-
ernment to establish that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless
search, and this 'burden is especially heavy when the exception must
justify the warrantless entry of a home."' 90 The Martinez court conclud-
ed:
The sanctity of the home is too important to be violated by the
mere possibility that someone inside is in need of aid-such a "pos-
sibility" is ever-present. It is for this reason that exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."l91
What explains the different decisions in Kerns and Martinez? The
simple explanation is that the judges found the evidence more compel-
183. Id; see also Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1777 ("[The officers] soon noticed that something seemed
amiss when they reached Mr. Kerns's house: a door was ajar, music was playing, no lights were
on.")
184. Kerns /, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04.
185. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2011). Remarkably, this case
took place in the same county as did Kerns.
186. Kerns I, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
187. Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1293-94.
188. Id. at 1299.
189. Id. at 1296.
190. Id at 1299 (quoting United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006)).
191. Id. at 1299-1300 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
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ling in one direction than I did. But another explanation is that the two
cases reveal that the context in which the constitutional right is litigated
affects what remedy is available, and the available remedies, in turn,
affect how courts ultimately define the scope of the right.
The striking similarities suggest that perhaps the available remedy
affected the respective courts' definition of the contours of the right at
issue.192 In Martinez, even considering the 911 call and the officers' ina-
bility to locate the homeowner, the court found that no reasonable belief
in an exigency existed to justify entry into the home.1 93 Therefore, in
Martinez, the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search was
suppressed. 194 In Kerns, however, the remedy of exclusion was not appli-
cable because no evidence was obtained as a result of the similarly brief,
similarly warrantless search.'9 Thus, akin to how an aversion to the ex-
clusionary remedy leads judges to reason that no Fourth Amendment
right was actually violated, the concept here is that if the standard reme-
dy cannot be applied, then the right itself must not have been violated in
any meaningful way.
III. RIGHTS, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
AND THE REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION THEORY
Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is de-
fect of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will
do.
-Llewellyn, The Bramble Bushl96
[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a le-
gal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.
-Marbury v. Madisonl97
Daryl Levinson's "remedial equilibration"l9 8 model is an appropri-
ate way to think about what it means to have a right, and how the actual,
192. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 171, at 885 ("The defining feature is the threat of undesir-
able remedial consequences motivating courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those
consequences. At the extreme, where no viable remedy is at hand, courts may define the right as
nonexistent."); see also Leong, supra note 172, at 409 ("[T]he availability and scope of particular
remedies affects the substantive development of constitutional rights.").
193. Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1295-96.
194. Id. at 1300.
195. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1187 (D.N.M. 2012).
196. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 88 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008) (1930).
197. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1783)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Levinson, supra note 171, at 858. Contrast the remedial equilibration theory with the
"rights essentialism" model, which assumes a "pure constitutional value" that is distinct from, and is
even "corrupted by being forced into[,] a remedial apparatus" as part of an operational function of
the real world, id., and is a really abstract Allegory ofthe Cave-type of way to think about rights.
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tangible remedy for the violation of that right is what defines the con-
tours of the right itself. Professor Levinson posits that rights and reme-
dies are ultimately inseparable from one another, that they are "inextri-
cably intertwined. Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very exist-
ence."' 99 As it relates to Jason Kerns, "the absence of any remedy at all,
render[s his Fourth Amendment] right essentially worthless"2 00 and any
protection afforded by it, means nothing.2 0 1
By allowing for a no-remedy situation, such as in Kerns, the court is
allowing the Fourth Amendment to be diluted. Although the Supreme
Court has elucidated several categorical exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement,202 Fourth Amendment doctrine is clear that police cannot en-
ter one's home without a warrant.2 03 If a warrantless search does not fall
within one of those categorical exceptions, it violates the Fourth
Amendment.204 The importance of a right is directly related to the afford-
ed remedy. That relationship means that in cases like Kerns, the Fourth
Amendment gradually becomes less of a guaranteed protection for indi-
viduals and simply one more trivial hassle that police officers sometimes
have to deal with after the fact.
In this Part, I will address three issues related to the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Kerns to reverse the lower court's denial of qualified im-
munity. First, this Part addresses the threshold procedural concern of an
appellate court deciding the fact-based exigency matter of whether an
objectively reasonable basis for belief in an imminent threat existed to
justify the officers' warrantless entry. Second, it addresses what the
clearly established requirement means in the absence of any guidance
from the Supreme Court and how that lack of guidance affects the rela-
tionship between constitutional rights and the remedies afforded for their
violations. Third, this Part addresses the issue of sequencing in a quali-
199. Id.
200. Id. at 888.
201. Although the actual entry into Kerns's home is a fairly benign harm, the principle applies
nonetheless. For a far more egregious illustration of a right without corresponding remedy, see
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). There, a man spent eighteen years in prison after
Brady violations-withholding exculpatory evidence-by a prosecutor who was held to be entitled
to absolute immunity for the intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence at Connick's trial. Id.
at 1355-56. For his nearly two decades in prison, enduring who knows what sorts of atrocities, and
missing out on a significant period of his free adult life, literally being deprived of his liberty-and
in many senses of the word, his life-Connick received a remedy of absolutely nothing because of
absolute prosecutorial immunity and the difficulty in proving municipal liability. Id. at 1356-58.
202. E.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987) (plain view exception); Welsh v. Wis-
consin, 466 U.S. 740, 742 (1984) (community caretaking exception); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 394 (1978) (exigent circumstances exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 295-96
(1967) (fleeing suspect exception).
203. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (holding it was "clear that any physi-
cal invasion of the structure of the home, 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was too much" (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
204. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-88 (1980);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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fled immunity analysis and how a court's decision on the clearly estab-
lished prong without a decision on the constitutional merits affects both
the articulation of constitutional principles and the effect thereof on the
relationship between rights and remedies.
A. Cross-eyed and Procedureless
Facts are never what they seem to be, but appellate courts' standard
when reviewing questions of fact is limited to clear error.205 Although
"[t]he existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed question of law and
fact,"206 facts come with points of view. As a threshold matter then, did
the Tenth Circuit, in Kerns, even have proper jurisdiction to consider the
district court's holding on the issue of a reasonable belief in an exigency?
The lower court denied summary judgment because the issue was so
20factually dependent that it was a jury question.207 However, the Tenth
Circuit "do[es] not have jurisdiction to review the district court's factual
findings, including its finding that a genuine dispute of fact existed." 208
Moreover, "government officials cannot appeal pretrial denial of quali-
fied immunity to the extent the district court's order decides nothing
more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular
conduct occurred." 20 9 In Kerns, the district court denied summary judg-
ment on the qualified immunity issue, holding that "a jury could find that
there was no imminent threat that would justify the Officers' entry into
the Plaintiffs' home." 2t 0 As the dissenting judge in Kerns noted:
The question is not a difficult one in my view, and so I disagree with
the majority's decision to remand the matter to the district court to
rule again on this strictly legal question. The Officers had neither a
warrant nor probable cause. If the circumstances they encountered
did not support a reasonable belief that danger to someone was im-
minent, then the armed, nighttime entry into the home violated clear-
ly established Fourth Amendment law.211
The question of law to decide in Kerns was whether the law was
212**clear regarding exigent circumstances; it was. The critical inquiry was
whether those facts supported a reasonable belief in exigent circumstanc-
205. See generally Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Manning v. United States, 146
F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[An appellate] court must accept the district court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous."); Farmer v. Colo. & S. Ry. Co., 723 F.2d 766, 768 (10th Cir.
1983) ("An appellate court should not overturn a trial court's finding of fact unless it is definitely
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.").
206. United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992).
207. Manning, 146 F.3d at 812.
208. Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998).
209. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516
U.S. 299, 312-13 (1996); Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313 (1995).
210. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1191 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1192.
212. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006); United States v. Najar, 451
F.3d 710, 717-18 (10th Cir. 2006).
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es. That determination of whether there was an objectively reasonable
belief in exigent circumstances, however, was a question of characteriz-
ing facts and that should have been put forth for a jury to decide.
Notably, in an opinion authored by the same judge who wrote
Kerns, the Tenth Circuit recently held that it is the
district court's exclusive job to determine which facts a jury could
reasonably find [and we are not to consider] . . . questions about what
facts a jury might reasonably find ... in appeals from the denial of
qualified immunity at summary judgment. . . . So, for example, if a
district court concludes that a reasonable jury could find certain spec-
ified facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court has indicated
we usually must take them as true-and do so even if our own de no-
vo review of the record might suggest otherwise as a matter of law. 213
In other words, whether a reasonable officer would have perceived
that an imminent threat of danger existed that would justify the warrant-
less entry and search of Kerns's home was a question of fact better suited
for a jury, particularly because that was the district court's determination.
In Martinez, working by hindsight and deferring to the district court's
ruling, the Tenth Circuit noted that its review "entails a determination
whether the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous, view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's find-
,1214ings.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Jones,2 15 the Supreme Court distinguished
reviewable summary judgment determinations from unreviewable ones,
holding that interlocutory appeals are not appropriate where the disputed
factual issue may affect the qualified immunity determination.2 16 But,
under Shroff v. Spellman,2 17 a recent Tenth Circuit case, interlocutory
appeals may still be appropriate if the factual dispute is immaterial and
would not affect the qualified immunity determination.
In Kerns, the facts the officers asserted regarding the existence of an
exigent circumstance were in dispute. That determination of a reasonable
belief in an exigency rested in large part upon
213. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010).
214. United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Najar, 451 F.3d
at 717) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
216. Id. at 313 ("We now consider the appealability of a portion of a district court's summary
judgment order that, though entered in a 'qualified immunity' case, determines only a question of
'evidence sufficiency,' i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial. This kind
of order, we conclude, is not appealable. That is, the District Court's determination that the summary
judgment record in this case raised a genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners' involvement in the
alleged beating of respondent was not a 'final decision' within the meaning of the relevant statute.");
see also Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985).
217. 604F.3d1179,1186,1188(10thCir.2010).
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something seem[ing] amiss when they reached Mr. Kerns's house: a
door was ajar, music was playing, no lights were on. Things took an
even darker turn when the officers noticed a broken window. A sil-
ver-dollar-sized hole punctured a window of the house, with shatter-
ing concentrically outward. This, the police thought, might be the re-
sult of a gunshot-perhaps by the same sniper who had just fired on
the police. 218
However, Kerns disputed several of those facts, including that the
door was open219 and that Kerns described the noise he heard as a gun-
shot.220 While still waiting outside Kerns's home, the officers could not
agree even among themselves about whether the music was shut off at
some point.2 2 1 Furthermore, the "silver-dollar-sized hole" puncturing the
window actually only punctured a single pane of glass and may have
been more appropriately characterized as a "golf-ball-sized hole" given
that the damaged window was facing a golf course.222 As the dissent
pointed out, "[T]he majority seems to have strayed at times from viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as we are constrained to
do in the posture of this appeal."223 Finally, despite the second pane hav-
ing stopped whatever it was that punctured the first pane of glass, no
bullet was found.224
Thus, Shroff precludes review because these factual issues were
disputed and sufficiently material, meaning that the interlocutory appeal
was inappropriately undertaken.22 5 Even had the facts not been "disput-
ed" in the typical sense, the factual dispute was really, Do these facts
support "an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate
need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others"? 226 Put anoth-
er way, this was not a question of law; it was a question of fact. And, "it
is ... questions [of law]-and not questions about what facts a jury
might reasonably find-that we may consider in appeals from the denial
of qualified immunity at summary judgment." 2 27 Specifically, Kerns cen-
tered not on whether the law was clear but on how the facts could be
218. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011).
219. Kerns 1, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200, 1203 (D.N.M. 2010) ("Johnston's report alleges that
the garage door was open when Johnston and his SWAT team got to the Plaintiffs' residence. J.
Kerns, however, asserts that the garage door was closed when he left his home to go to the crash
[s]ite." (citations omitted)), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub non. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173
(10th Cir. 2011).
220. Id. at 1283 n.6 ("While the police consistently assert that J. Kerns told them that he heard
a gun shot, J. Kerns is equally insistent that he referred to the sound as a popping noise and stated
only that it could have been a rifle report when the officers pressed him for more detail.").
221. Id. at 1203 ("According to Johnston, ... the music coming from the residence played the
entire time.... Bader observed that the music that had been coming from the Plaintiffs' residence
turned off, which raised concerns . . . ." (citations omitted)).
222. Id. at 1202.
223. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1191 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
224. Kerns II, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1187 (D.N.M. 2012).
225. Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2010).
226. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).
227. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010).
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characterized to support an objective belief in an emergency or not. To
make that determination, characterizations of facts absolutely had to take
place.
Particular facts were the foundation for the officers alleged exigen-
cy assessment. These facts served as the basis for the Kerns dissent, the
lower court's determination that it was a jury question, and the Tenth
Circuit's reversal of the lower court's denial of summary judgment in the
officers' favor on the qualified immunity appeal.228 The disputed factual
issues clearly affected the qualified immunity determination, if not en-
tirely dispositive themselves Therefore, the Kerns case should not have
even survived to reach a decision on interlocutory appeal under the John-
son standard for unreviewable summary judgment determinations.229
B. Unclearly "Clearly Established"
Hope teaches that "general statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving fair and clear warning" to police officers that their
conduct is unconstitutional. 23 0 It follows that general statements regard-
ing when an exigency exists should have been sufficient to give the of-
ficers in Kerns fair warning about the constitutionality of their conduct.
Because "the Supreme Court has never given a fully cogent definition of
what it means for a right to be 'clearly established[,]' [t]he result is an
expansion of subjective judicial discretion and a decrease in the overall
uniformity of qualified immunity rulings."23 1
The Kerns majority accepted the interlocutory appeal but left unde-
cided the clearly established question because it felt it was "without the
benefit of a full analysis from the district court" and because "briefing on
appeal [was] less than entirely satisfactory." 23 2 However, "the majority is
incorrect to say that the district judge did not address the second prong of
the qualified immunity analysis" 2 3 3 sufficiently because "both aspects of
the qualified immunity test were placed in play by the parties before the
district court." 23 4 The majority even acknowledged that both parties did
indeed address the clearly established question in their briefs.235 Address-
228. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1191 (Holloway, J., dissenting) ("[The officers'] argument rests on
rejection of the district court's holding that the jury must decide questions of fact pertaining to
whether a reasonable officer would have perceived an immediate need to protect himself or others
under the circumstances. And as noted, that holding is not reviewable in this interlocutory appeal.").
229. Id. ("[Pursuant to Johnson, w]e do not have jurisdiction to review that holding in this
interlocutory appeal.").
230. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
231. John C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298-99
(2012).
232. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1182 (majority opinion).
233. Id. at 1192 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 1181 (majority opinion).
235. Id. at 1181 ("And even if they did somehow violate the Fourth Amendment, the officers
added, they did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law. In his opposition to summary
judgment, Mr. Kerns understood both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to be in play and
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ing the district court's perceived brevity, the dissent pointed out "that the
district court's concise treatment of the issue is completely unsurpris-
ing .... Some cases do indeed require a more particularized inquiry.
This is not one of them. . . . '[G]eneral statements of the law are not in-
herently incapable of giving fair and clear warning."'
2 3 6
By avoiding ruling on the constitutional merits while remanding the
denial of summary judgment, the Kerns decision begins to construct a
substantive change in Fourth Amendment protections from "the right ...
to be [free from] unreasonable searches" 237 to "' [t]he right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures only if such conduct is clearly estab-
lished at the time of the violation.' This amounts to ... instead of using
objective reasonableness as a guide, officers need only worry about what
has been clearly established" 23 8 in a manner particular enough to satisfy
the specific court hearing the case. Thus, the Kerns decision not only
leaves a right without remedy but also potentially provides an incentive
for unconstitutional police conduct. Ironically, it does so by (clearly)
establishing that so long as police officers can identify a unique fact, they
can achieve any objective without fear of liability by pointing to that
unique fact to characterize the situation as one that is not yet clearly es-
tablished. In effect, all police now need to do to become immune from
liability for unconstitutional conduct is say: Despite evidence to the con-
trary, it was unclear to us at the time, based on this or that excruciatingly
unique factual nuance, that the Fourth Amendment prohibits that.
The Supreme Court's failure to give any meaningful guidance about
what can serve as particular enough to clearly establish a right in order to
make the qualified immunity determination has led to an unpredictable 23 9
burden of proof for plaintiffs attempting to overcome a qualified im-
munity defense. It has also led to an unpredictable availability of reme-
dies for violations of Fourth Amendment rights.2 40 This unpredictability
results, at least in some cases, in the articulation of Fourth Amendment
doctrine that is rights-constrictive. 24' The lack of guidance about the
clearly established requirement leaves the availability of a remedy up to
the caprice of a judge who may or may not require a high degree of fac-
tual similarity.242 And, as discussed in the next subpart, judges tend to be
proceeded to explain .. . why our precedent clearly established that their conduct violated those
rights." (citation omitted)).
236. Id. at 1192 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
238. David B. Owens, Comment, Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on
Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 580 (2010).
239. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 272, 278 (2009).
240. See Williams, supra note 231 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never given a fully cogent
definition of what it means for a right to be 'clearly established.' The result is an expansion of sub-
jective judicial discretion and a decrease in the overall uniformity of qualified immunity rulings.").
241. See Leong, supra note 172, at 432-33.
242. One of the other issues raised by Kems-which is particularly illustrative of this point but
largely unnecessary to the analysis of this Comment-was the privacy protection of his medical
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reluctant to recognize a violation of a right where they are reticent to
afford a remedy. This reluctance also leads to an articulation of constitu-
tional law that is constrictive of constitutional protections. 24 3
The decision in Kerns not only is contrary to the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment (particularly given that it was Kerns's home that was
searched) but also leaves room for all police officers who conduct unrea-
sonable searches of a home to rely on any unique fact to provide them
with an escape hatch from liability for their unconstitutional conduct.
The Kerns decision is not an adherence to Hope. Warrantless searches
are unreasonable 244 and violate the Fourth Amendment unless they meet
the objective exigency exception.245 Without such a justification, police
officers violate the Fourth Amendment and should be held liable for do-
ing so. If no remedy is afforded for their violation, what is the point of
declaring the existence of rights at all? After all, what good is a right-a
constitutional guarantee, no less-if there is no recovery when a gov-
ernment actor violates it?
With no Supreme Court guidance about what it means for a right to
be clearly established, courts are left to determine whether the law was
clear on the unique facts of the case in front of them. This idiosyncratic
determination starts to make the qualified immunity analysis look almost
subjective, leaving courts to determine if the right in question was clearly
established in the opinion of that particular judge. This seems rather
analogous to the fact-intensive good faith inquiry abandoned in Harlow.
Furthermore, the articulation of constitutional law and principles be-
comes erratic and idiosyncratic to the specific situation presented to that
court. Without a baseline meaning for "clearly established," the determi-
nation of such leaves future decisions unpredictable and inconsistent.2 46
The Kerns court followed up its decision in Martinez by muddying
the law and leaving Jason Kerns without a remedy for the violation of his
Fourth Amendment right. That lack of remedy is something courts
should allow to happen only one time, in the interest of articulating the
law.2 47 But the goal of law articulation was not accomplished here. The
records, which the police officers also obtained without a warrant. Addressing both the merits and
the qualified immunity issue, the court held that the law entitling medical records to privacy protec-
tion was not clearly established enough. The dissent cited nearly a dozen cases dating back to 1977
to illustrate that the privacy interest in medical records is constitutionally protected and has been
clearly ruled as such in both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d
1173, 1198-1200 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
243. See infra text accompanying notes 262-67.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
245. See cases cited supra note 103.
246. And, "promot[ing] clarity in the legal standards for official conduct [is a benefit to] both
the officers and the general public." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
247. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 62 (noting one rationale of qualified immunity is that it allows courts to articulate constitu-
tional law without subjecting officers to retroactive liability).
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Kerns decision not only trivializes Kerns's Fourth Amendment right but
also adds to the watering down of Fourth Amendment rights in general.
To overcome a qualified immunity defense, should courts require
plaintiffs to engage in a "scavenger hunt for cases with precisely the
same facts"? 248 For example, to show that the right was clearly estab-
lished, should the Kerns plaintiff be responsible for finding cases where a
police helicopter was shot down, only one person in the immediate area
claimed to have heard a shot or a car backfiring but no neighbors con-
firmed hearing the noise, the door of a house was left open, there was
music on inside the house, and a window of a home on the eighteenth
hole of a golf course had a single pane of a double-paned window bro-
ken? Or should courts respect the lesson from Hope that "general state-
ments of the law" 249 (e.g., that "police, absent a warrant, need probable
cause and an objectively reasonable belief in an exigency to enter a
home") are enough to put police officers on notice that their conduct is
unconstitutional? 250 The Kerns court ignored the principle from Hope
that a general statement should suffice, and inappropriately appropriated
from the jury the ability to determine whether an objectively reasonable
belief in an exigency existed. It also demonstrated how divergent "clear-
ly established" standards can be-even within the same court and the
same year.
By remanding the district court's denial of summary judgment on
qualified immunity, the Kerns court ignored the principle from Hope
about general statements of law and required Kerns to engage in the sort
of factual "scavenger hunt" that Pierce warned about. 251 By ignoring
Hope, and because Kerns understandably could not find a case with the
exact same facts and in the same context-despite Martinez being ex-
ceedingly close-the court remanded the denial of qualified immunity.
That decision left not only Jason Kerns but also any similarly situated
plaintiff in the future with no remedy for the violation of his Fourth
Amendment right.
By taking the route it did and, in effect, holding on interlocutory
appeal that the law was not clearly established, the court ignored the les-
son from Hope that a right need only to be defined clearly enough to give
the officers "fair and clear" warning that their conduct violates the
Fourth Amendment. Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have
articulated as unconstitutional the warrantless entry of a private home
absent probable cause and an objectively reasonable exigency. At a min-
248. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
249. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
271 (1997)).
250. This leans towards being a fact-specific determination and one that is better suited for a
jury than for a judge on summary judgment, except that the justifications offered by the police were
arguably plainly unreasonable.
251. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1298.
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imum, the Kerns court missed an opportunity to articulate the law and
advance constitutional principles.
The law has already established the categorical exigencies that al-
low for warrantless searches to be upheld as constitutional. The law is
also clear that officers need an objectively reasonable belief in an immi-
nent threat to qualify for the exigency exception to the warrant require-
252ment. By examining the minutia of the facts of this case (a job usually
reserved for a jury) instead of simply asking itself whether this falls with-
in one of the clear exigency categories, the court has carved out an ex-
ception to the exception and leaves the issue of warrantless searches less
clear than it was before Kerns. Thus, the next time a warrantless search
happens, the offending officers can simply rely on this decision to de-
clare that the law was not clearly established enough.
C. Sequencing Issues
In addition to highlighting how the clearly established determina-
tion can lead to rights without remedies, the Kerns decision also demon-
strates that same ill effect as a result of permissive Saucier sequencing.253
Even though the constitutional issue was acknowledged, it was not de-
cided at the circuit court level. This means the law is actually less clear,
and one more constitutional violation of this exact kind will have to oc-
cur before it can even potentially become clearly established. Not hold-
ing police liable for reasonable mistakes is an underlying rationale of
qualified immunity. In the interest of that policy rationale, courts should
allow for only a single violation to take place and then articulate the law
accordingly without subjecting officers to liability. 25 4
But the situation here is different. By not addressing the constitu-
tional issue and remanding the case to a lower court for final decision,
the Kerns court has ensured that this exact same constitutional violation
can occur without consequence at a minimum one more time. And the
reality is that the one-more-violation estimate is the best-case scenario.
Because even if the very same constitutional violation does occur, it only
becomes clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity if it
reaches the Tenth Circuit for decision.2 55 And even then, it only becomes
clearly established if the decision somehow survives under both Martinez
252. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006); see also cases cited supra
note 103.
253. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234-35 (2009).
254. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); see also Garcia ex rel. Garcia v.
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 n.8 (10th Cir. 1987) (.'[O]fticials might believe they 'have one bite of the
apple.[]' But if courts cannot prospectively articulate constitutional standards, there looms the even
more unpalatable possibility of multiple bites of a constitutionally forbidden fruit." (quoting Com-
ment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity
Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 926 (1984))).
255. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 617-18 (1999) (holding in part that to clearly
establish a law requires controlling precedent in that circuit or by the Supreme Court, or a consensus
of persuasive authorities).
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and Kerns, the prospect of which seems impossible. Furthermore, the
judge hearing the case would then have to choose to address the constitu-
tional merits, instead of only whether the law was clearly established.
The result is that officers are likely to get many bites at the "constitution-
ally forbidden fruit" before the law becomes clear enough to forbid it.
That unremedied right is supposed to be allowed to happen only to
the immediate plaintiff, in the interest of not chilling police behavior.25 6
But by not addressing the constitutional issue, the court left the right to
be free from unreasonable searches in the absence of an exigency unes-
tablished.257 And by not establishing the officers' conduct as a constitu-
tional violation, the Kerns court left the harm to the immediately plaintiff
unremedied and left the right without a corresponding remedy for future
plaintiffs.
To be fair, the Supreme Court has given little guidance about when
to follow the permissive Saucier sequence and when it is appropriate for
a lower court to bypass the constitutional question and proceed directly
to the clearly established prong. Because the Kerns court did not declare
the officers' conduct a constitutional violation, or definitively not a con-
stitutional violation, the law is yet (or, still) not clearly established,
which means that that harm can continue repeating without a remedy.
And "what courts do, as opposed to what they say, is the effective
regulator for the scope of a given right." 25 8 A right is defined by its rem-
edy; or at least one can tell how important the court thinks a particular
right is by the remedy afforded when it has been violated. And "even if a
court says a lot about the value of a right, the manner in which it vindi-
cates that right is really what determines its value." 2 59 Put simply: with-
out a tangible remedy for its violation, no right can genuinely be said to
exist.260
The result in Kerns is especially troubling because it has ensured the
absence of a corresponding remedy for future plaintiffs. Furthermore, the
court even conceded that a right had been violated but found that the
right (or exigency, really) was not clearly established enough. 26 1 Alt-
hough, admittedly, the court did not make explicit the assertion that the
right had been violated, it appears clear that the court believed it had
256. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815; Garcia, 817 F.2d at 656-57 n.8.
257. And if the court, as it seems to do be doing here, requires such a high level of factual
specificity, the court should therefore be taking every opportunity to articulate the law under every
factual circumstance imaginable. This consistent articulation would balance the specificity require-
ment seemingly imposed in Kerns and help give the law definitive contours, while allowing police
and citizens to predict the law and conform their behavior accordingly.
258. See Owens, supra note 238, at 564.
259. Id. at 564-65.
260. See Levinson, supra note 171, at 894.
261. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[T]hat no constitutional
violation took place . .. isn't so clear in this case.").
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been violated. The Kerns court admitted it was not manifest that no con-
stitutional violation took place. It did not disturb or remand the lower
court's ruling on the constitutional prong; it only remanded on the clearly
established prong of the analysis.
Along with the decision in Martinez, it seems likely that the Kerns
court would agree that Kerns's right had been violated. Knowing it
would rely on the clearly established prong to remand the case, there are
several possible explanations for the court's failure to address the consti-
tutional issue. One possible explanation is the cognitive dissonance theo-
ry.262 "[J]udges are deeply uncomfortable with the notion of acknowledg-
ing a violation yet denying relief. Cognitive psychology research sup-
ports this notion: judges are reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional
violation where they subsequently intend to grant qualified immunity
because such a result induces a state of psychological discomfort known
as cognitive dissonance." 2 63 Perhaps the court simply did not feel com-
fortable explicitly declaring that a right had been violated and then re-
manding the case back to a lower court for the ultimate determination
because, as it knew, the law cannot be articulated at a level high enough
to become clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity.264
Similarly, not sequencing affects rights articulation as well. By de-
ciding first that a law is not clearly established, judges addressing the
constitutional question are less likely to find a violation of the right. 2 65
This reticence creates rights-constrictive law articulation because know-
ing that a plaintiff cannot recover for the harm makes it difficult for a
judge to say that a right has been violated in the first place. Therefore,
the articulation of the right at issue gets less protective based on the una-
vailability of the remedy.266 This illustrates how the articulation of im-
portant constitutional rights is shaped by the availability of the remedy,
or at least by the willingness of courts to grant that remedy. It also illus-
trates how sequencing-or not following the Saucier sequence-affects
the articulation of constitutional rights in general.
Whatever the reason for not addressing the underlying constitution-
al claim, the decision in Kerns amounts to an implicit acquiescence by
the court to affording no remedy for the right at issue. The Tenth Circuit
had to have been aware that Kerns's Fourth Amendment right would be
left unarticulated and without a remedy for its violation. By not discuss-
262. See Leong, supra note 61, at 670-71, 702-06, 708 (discussing the cognitive dissonance
theory as an explanation for judges articulating rights by way of remedies).
263. Id. at 670.
264. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 617-18 (1999); see also Cortez v. McCauley,
478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[For a right to be clearly established, 'there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from
other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains."' (quoting Medina v. City of
Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992)).
265. See Owens, supra note 238, at 582.
266. See id.
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ing the right and not explicitly declaring that a violation occurred or did
not occur, the Kerns court left the right to be free from unreasonable
searches-of one's home no less-below the threshold for the clearly
established standard. The Kerns decision has arguably made the right
even less clearly established because the decision could be claimed at
this point to be in controversy with Martinez. At a minimum, the effect
of not sequencing in Kerns will result in the same remedy-less constitu-
tional violation in at least one more instance.
Although the concept of qualified immunity accepts this result once
in order to further articulation of the law, the idea is to make the law
more clear so that an unremedied constitutional violation does not hap-
pen repeatedly.267 The Kerns court is, in effect, kicking the can down the
road, waiting for the next Kerns case to make a decision about the right
at stake instead of taking the opportunity to articulate constitutional law
now. And, unfortunately, while that can is being kicked down the road,
those future plaintiffs suffering similar constitutional harms will be left
without any avenue for recovery.
That avoidance exemplifies a court willfully allowing for a violation
of the exact same constitutional right to go unremedied in the future. By
leaving the law unarticulated, the Kerns court has, with its eyes wide
open, guaranteed that, at the bare minimum, one more violation of the
exact same kind can occur and the plaintiff in that case too will be left
with no remedy, especially because the law will not be clearly estab-
lished for the purposes of qualified immunity even if the constitutional
issue is decided in Kerns's favor upon remand in the district court (ahem,
again). Leaving the law unarticulated means that another case with a
similar constitutional violation not only has to occur but also has to reach
the Tenth Circuit before the right can be articulated meaningfully. 268 And
in a repeat of Kerns's case that actually makes it up to the Tenth Circuit,
it would not yet have been decided by a court with sufficient authority.
So, the importance that the Kerns court places on this right is in question
and Fourth Amendment law articulation stalls, leaving unpredictable
protections. This prospect is especially disheartening because Kerns was
a prime opportunity for a federal court to articulate Fourth Amendment
law in the civil context, as opposed to the typical criminal context, and to
provide some balance to the articulation of Fourth Amendment law at
large.
Courts should not leave constitutional rights without a remedy for
violations thereof. Constitutional rights are arguably of greater im-
portance than rights deriving from other sources, as demonstrated by
their having been enshrined in the country's founding document as guar-
267. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
268. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614-15, 617-18).
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antees.269 When a violation is identified, particularly by a federal court,
that court should be obligated to take it seriously and to take action to
ensure that the immediate case is the only time it is heard but not reme-
died. By addressing the qualified immunity analysis in an order opposite
the Saucier sequence, courts are able to recognize constitutional viola-
tions but decide the case on the clearly established prong without ad-
dressing the constitutional harm at all. This leaves the law unarticulated
and unclear for the purposes of qualified immunity moving forward.
Thus the right at issue does not become clearly established for subse-
quent cases and subsequent victims will similarly be left with no remedy
for the violations of their constitutional rights. This stalling in constitu-
tional rights articulation leaves individuals suffering constitutional harms
at the hands of government actors without a corresponding remedy. The
absence of remedy, in turn, defines the right, which means this cycle is
self-perpetuating and leads to less protections stemming from constitu-
tional rights.
IV. AND JUSTICE FOR ALL
When courts are faced with a "Kerns situation"-where a right ex-
ists and has been violated but it is clear that the harmed individual will be
left without a remedy or where the law could be blackened regarding that
right-there are several possible solutions. To make that determination,
in line with the underlying qualified immunity rationales, the question
courts should consider is the following: When the person in this case is
left with no remedy, is it possible that the next person could also be left
with no remedy?
To address this issue, I propose the admittedly novel Kerns solution.
In this solution, appellate courts would be required to decide the constitu-
tional issue. Consequently, the law would be articulated to ensure that
another similar harm does not take place without an available remedy for
the (subsequently) harmed individual. The Kerns solution is similar to
the mandated Saucier sequence, except that it would not be mandatory in
all cases, only in those cases in the Kerns situation. The Kerns solution
would be a balancing test outlined by factors to be weighed. One particu-
larly strong showing on a given factor could make up for a relatively
weak showing on another. The factors outlining the proposed Kerns solu-
tion and an obligatory decision on the constitutional question are as fol-
lows:
1. Will the immediate plaintiff be left without a remedy for a
constitutional harm? Under this factor, the rationales under-
lying qualified immunity would allow for the harm to take
place once without a remedy. But if the immediate plaintiff
269. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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is left without a remedy, then it is likely that the next one
will draw the shortest straw as well.270
2. Is this a harm that has the potential to be repeated? Stated
another way: if the constitutional question is left un-
addressed here, would that potentially result in another in-
dividual being left with no remedy for a constitutional vio-
lation in the future? For example, if the issue were so factu-
ally anomalous that it is exceptionally unlikely the harm
could repeat, this factor would not be met. But, if in the eye
of the beholder there is seemingly any chance at all that the
harm could repeat, then the appellate courts should be re-
quired under this proposed Kerns solution test to address
the constitutional question for the purposes of clearly estab-
lishing the law.
3. Is this case sufficiently developed for this court to articulate
a meaningful legal principle? Put another way, would there
be a risk of making the law less clear, either as a result of
failing to address the constitutional issue, as in Kerns, or
because the factual record is insufficient to articulate a de-
cent legal principle? This factor is designed to ensure that
the facts surrounding the constitutional merits are reasona-
bly developed so that the law that does get articulated is
useful and consequential. In those cases where there is need
for additional factual development, the "procedural trigger"
solution, described below, should be incorporated into this
step.
Another possible solution, either as a stand-alone solution or in
combination with the third factor of the Kerns solution, is the procedural
trigger solution. Under this solution, if a case needed to be remanded
(a) for development of the factual record in order to articulate the legal
principle correctly or (b) as in Kerns, on the qualified immunity prong
and was ultimately decided in a lower court on the constitutional merits
where the level of authority would not sufficiently establish constitution-
al law, it would automatically trigger a demarcated procedural kick,
sending the case back up to a circuit court to affirm the ruling at the level
sufficient to clearly establish the law for future cases. This solution will
ensure a well-developed factual record on the constitutional issue be-
cause the case would necessarily have gone through the trial phase on
that issue and the parties would be aware of the need to brief it. It would
270. Note that the law could be articulated here in either direction. The test would be truncated
at this point if it were determined that the immediate plaintiff suffered no constitutionally cognizable
harm. At least then, however, if the law were articulated such that a constitutional violation were not
recognized, there would be no underlying constitutional harm in the next case, and the Kerns solu-
tion would have served its purpose of articulating the law.
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also allow a federal court-one arguably more experienced in constitu-
tional issues-to oversee the issue and the ensuing articulation of rights.
This solution would also ensure that in all cases where a constitutional
right was at issue-whether a right was found to exist or not-that right
would thereafter be clearly established for the purposes of a remedy be-
ing available in the future.
In the interest of articulating useful constitutional principles, and for
cases in which the record is truly insufficient to do so, the procedural
trigger solution should be embraced within the third step of the Kerns
solution for more in-depth factual development at the trial level. In the
procedural trigger solution, those cases bearing on important constitu-
tional issues but not developed enough to make good law would be re-
manded for rehearing on the constitutional merits. Such cases then would
automatically be kicked back up to the circuit level for a recognition of
the right, thereby establishing the law clearly at the necessary circuit
level.
One anticipated counterargument to the Kerns solution is that the
record on appeal may not be factually developed enough. In those cases,
the concern is that courts would be prone to getting the constitutional
question wrong, articulating bad law. But this factual development con-
cern is already extant to a lesser degree in all appellate cases. If the solu-
tion proposed here were to be adopted, the procedural trigger solution
accounts for it, necessitates rehearing at trial, and accounts for clearly
establishing rights at the circuit level. Diluting constitutional rights and
their corresponding remedies for the sake of not re-briefing issues or
remanding as part of this solution seems like a precarious ransom when
constitutional rights are at stake.
Another possible solution is reinstating the mandatory Saucier se-
quencing, but making one of two narrow exceptions to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The first possibility is to allow for an immediate ap-
peal (before addressing the clearly established prong) on the constitu-
tional issue for those parties who lose on that prong. This exception
would allow for the non-prevailing party to appeal the constitutional is-
sue while maintaining the incentive for parties to litigate it before even
reaching the clearly established prong.27 1 Conversely, an exception could
be made to allow for an interlocutory appeal after both prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis have been decided for those parties who
prevail only on the qualified immunity question.
Finally, another solution that has been previously suggested is to
"provid[e] more specific guidance to lower courts regarding when se-
271. Thanks to Nick Poppe for suggesting this variation during one of many excellent discus-
sions.
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quencing is and is not appropriate."272 The Kerns solution provides just
that guidance and ensures that plaintiffs suffering constitutional harms
are not left without a remedy.
CONCLUSION
"Absence of a remedy is absence of a right." 273 Maintaining the in-
tegrity of constitutional rights relies on the real world vindication of
those rights when a violation has occurred. When constitutional rights
are at stake, courts should be careful to ensure that those rights are
strengthened instead of diluted. Rights are strengthened when remedies
are afforded that provide a tangible, corresponding resolution for their
violation.
When courts are given ineffectual guidelines about what it means
for a right to be clearly established, or about when to decide the constitu-
tional issues in a qualified immunity case, the integrity of our constitu-
tional rights is put in jeopardy because the result is the opportunity for
unremedied, albeit recognized, violations. By ignoring the lesson from
Hope that general statements of law are not inherently incapable of es-
tablishing a law, it gets more difficult to articulate constitutional rights
because those available remedies begin to dissolve in the absence of
rights articulation, specifically in the context of qualified immunity, and
often therefore under the Fourth Amendment at large. The result of leav-
ing rights unarticulated is a diminished availability of remedies for the
violations of those rights. Fewer and increasingly unreachable remedies
result in incomplete and increasingly unarticulated rights. And so the
cycle goes. Kerns is an example of this difficulty of rights articulation
and the disappointing effect on the underlying right.
Aaron Belzer*
272. Leong, supra note 61, at 671.
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UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER AND UNITED STATES V. STURM:
WHY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REGULATE
ALL INTERNET USE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
ABSTRACT
Technology is always evolving and at an ever-increasing rate. This
evolution leaves the law playing catch-up, with courts left to apply exist-
ing laws to new realities. The rapid growth and adoption of the Internet is
a prime example, leaving some courts and prosecutors at odds with
which laws Internet crimes should be tried under. . Should Internet use,
by itself, constitute interstate commerce, thereby invoking federal juris-
diction? This question is explored by reviewing two child pornography
cases decided by the Tenth Circuit: United States v. Schaefer and United
States v. Sturm, and the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In 2007, an admitted possessor of child pornography was acquitted
by the Tenth Circuit, which held that proof of child pornography materi-
als moving across state lines was required for a conviction under the fed-
eral child pornography laws. This ruling by the Tenth Circuit contradict-
ed several decisions from other federal circuits, which held that proof of
Internet use alone in connection with child pornography was enough for
a conviction. Seeking to clarify the intent of the child pornography laws,
Congress passed the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of
2007 (ECPPA). The ECPPA declared that use of the Internet to receive,
possess, and distribute child pornography fell under Congress's Com-
merce Clause powers.
Following the enactment of the ECPPA, the Tenth Circuit was again
asked to interpret the federal child pornography laws in United States v.
Sturm. Interpreting the same child pornography laws applicable in
Schaefer, the court overruled its Schaefer decision, ultimately leading to
a conviction in Sturm. These two inconsistent rulings reveal the difficul-
ties that courts have in interpreting existing laws to new technology. This
Comment urges Congress to act proactively, rather than reactively as it
did with the ECPPA, by declaring that Internet use constitutes interstate
commerce for all federal laws, and contends that such a declaration is
within Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
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INTRODUCTION
Confess to a crime and punishment follows-not always. Enter the
Tenth Circuit decisions of United States v. Schaefer' and United States v.
Sturm.2 In Schaefer, the defendant admitted to searching for child por-
nography on the Internet;3 however, the confession was not enough to
uphold a conviction.4 The Schaefer court held that the Government did
not carry its burden of proof because it failed to establish that porno-
graphic images had ever traveled across state lines. Congress responded
to the Schaefer decision by enacting the Effective Child Pornography
Prosecution Act of 2007 (ECPPA) to give federal prosecutors the full
reach of the Commerce Clause by amending the statute to read "in or
affecting commerce." 6 Following the ECPPA, the Tenth Circuit over-
turned its decision in Schaefer, holding that the term "visual depiction"
contained in federal child pornography statutes meant the "substantive
content" of the image contained on the tangible media.7 Although the
Sturm decision led to a conviction,' it was far from clear-cut.
1. 501 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
2. 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
3. Schaefer,501 F.3dat 1198.
4. Id. at 1207.
5. Id.
6. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 103, 122
Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C.).
7. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901. "Visual depiction," or the "substantive content" of the image,
means the thing that is portrayed within the file or photograph, and is only created once. For exam-
ple, say you take a picture of your new car using your digital camera. The moment you snap a pho-
tograph of your new car, you have created a visual depiction of your new car. Making a copy of this
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In passing the ECPPA, Congress clearly intended that anybody who
used the Internet in connection with child pornography be punished.9 Did
Congress go too far? Has the Internet become such an interstate activity
that the federal government should have free reign to prosecute all cy-
bercrime? This Comment argues that Congress has reacted appropriately
by equating Internet use to interstate commerce, and that this broader
commerce definition based on Internet usage should be applied to all
federal laws.
Although the cases of Schaefer and Sturm both involve crimes re-
lated to child pornography,' 0 this Comment will look beyond that con-
text. This Comment will use the decisions in Schaefer and Sturm as a
platform to discuss issues with regulating the Internet like traditional
methods of communication, in an effort to show that Congress's move to
declare use of the Internet as interstate commerce in the child pornogra-
phy statutes should be adopted in all federal laws. Part I of this Comment
will look at the development of the child pornography laws and why a
change was needed. Part II will analyze why treating all Internet use as
interstate commerce does not violate the Constitution, and why it falls
within the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Part III will discuss the benefits of adopting a policy that classifies Inter-
net use as interstate commerce. This Comment will conclude that a clear
mandate from Congress to adopt such a policy for all Internet use will
provide a straightforward answer to all courts and citizens, and such a
policy is the only way to effectively prosecute those criminals who use
the Internet as their weapon of choice.
I. EvoLuTiON OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS
A. A Brief History
The early child pornography statutes were enacted prior to the In-
ternet becoming a part of everyday life." In passing these early statutes,
Congress realized the dangers to society that child pornography present-
ed.12 Recognizing this, Congress sought to remedy the problem by pass-
photograph does not create a new visual depiction; it simply creates a copy of the visual depiction.
This visual depiction may be saved in a digital file on your camera or computer. Although the digital
file is the media that you can share with friends and family via e-mail, social networks, etc., the
substantive content of that digital file is the picture or image of your new car that you see when you
view the file on your camera or open the digital file on your computer screen.
8. United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012).
9. See id; see also David M. Frommell, Comment, Pedophiles, Politics, and the Balance of
Power: The Fallout from United States v. Schaefer and the Erosion of State Authority, 86 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1155, 1166(2009).
10. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 892; Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1197.
11. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1156-58 (discussing the history of the child pornography
statutes beginning with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 through
the first child pornography statute to address computer use in the Child Protection Act of 1988).
12. Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Distinct Words, Discrete Meanings: The Internet & Illicit
Interstate Commerce, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 7.
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ing legislation that would stop child pornography from spreading using
"instrumentalities of interstate ... commerce." By 1988, Congress saw
the dangerous potential that new technology, such as computers and the
Internet, could play in the spread of child pornography.14 As a result,
Congress amended the Child Protection Act of 1984 by prohibiting any
"knowing transportation, shipment, receipt or distribution of child por-
nography ... by any means, including by computer." 5 It is under this
version of the statute that we begin our review of the case law.
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Schaefer, many other circuits
were asked to interpret the language of the child pornography statutes.16
In each of these earlier cases, the interpretation by the federal courts of
appeals reached the same conclusion-Internet use constituted interstate
commerce. '7 The Schaefer court, however, decided to rule differently,' 8
arguably going against congressional intent.' 9
In Schaefer, the district court convicted the defendant for possession
of child pornography based in part on evidence that he had subscribed to
websites that contained images of child pornography.20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, reversed the district court's conviction, holding that the
Government failed to prove actual "movement across state lines."2' Re-
jecting the view of the other circuits, 22 the Tenth Circuit required clear
evidence that the images of child pornography possessed by Schaefer had
in fact "moved across state lines."23 The court reasoned that the plain
language of the statute supported its ruling.24 The Tenth Circuit's ruling,
however, allowed Schaefer to escape conviction, even though he had
13. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-438, at 5 (1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2252, 92
Stat. 7 (1978) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2259 (2012)) (regulating any "visual or print medium"
that depicts child pornography).
14. See Frommell, supra note 9, at 1158.
15. Id (citing Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53, 2423 (2012)).
16. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that use of the
Internet is sufficient evidence to show interstate activity); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223,
242 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence linking a[n] ... image to the Internet . . . can be
sufficient evidence of interstate transportation . . . ."); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742
(1st Cir. 1997) ("Transmission .. . by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving ... across state
lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.").
17. See cases cited supra note 16; see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1 64-65.
18. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled by United
States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
19. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14.
20. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
21. Id.
22. See cases cited supra note 16; see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1165.
23. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at I 198.
24. Id. at 1207 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and § 2252(a)(4)(B) require "movement
across state lines").
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confessed to searching for child pornography on the Internet.25 This out-
26come outraged Congress, prompting an immediate reaction.
The ECPPA made it clear that Congress intends all use of the Inter-
27net to constitute interstate commerce. Congress responded to the Tenth
Circuit's Schaefer decision in an effort to prevent a similar "misreading"
by a court in the future.28 Later, the Tenth Circuit was asked again to
interpret the child pornography statutes in United States v. Sturm.
In Sturm, the Tenth Circuit was required to interpret the child por-
nography statutes it had previously interpreted in Schaefer.2 9 As was the
defendant in Schaefer, the defendant in Sturm was charged with posses-
sion of child pornography based on pornographic images found on his
hard drive that had been saved while using the Internet.30 Unlike the
Schaefer court, however, this court was acting in the wake of the new
ECPPA, which made it clear that the Schaefer decision was at odds with
the intent of Congress. 3 1 Arguably succumbing to the wishes of Con-
gress, the Sturm court overruled its prior decision in Schaefer.32 In over-
ruling Schaefer, however, the Sturm court did not change its reading of
the statute requiring proof of actual movement across state lines.33 In-
stead, it found a different reading of "visual depiction," 34 allowing the
Tenth Circuit to reach the result Congress intended in a roundabout
way.35 This ruling meant that it is the image portrayed in the digital file
that must move across state lines, rather than the digital file itself.36 The
court even went on to suggest how the Government may prove this nec-
essary interstate element, on remand, by showing that the "substance of
25. Id. at I198.
26. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 ("[R]eversal of a conviction of a man who 'was found to be
in possession of child pornography' on trivial textual grounds... [was] 'a truly unfortunate and
wrongly decided decision."' (quoting Rep. John Conyers Jr., Democrat from Michigan)).
27. Act of Oct. 8, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(7), 122 Stat. 4001 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012)); see also Frommell, supra note 9.
28. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14.
29. See United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2012) (en bane).
30. Id. at 896.
31. Compare Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(7), 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) ("The transmission of
child pornography using the Internet constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.") (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012)), with United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1207 (2007)
(holding that evidence of Internet use was insufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirement of inter-
state commerce).
32. See Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901.
33. Id. at 897.
34. Id. at 900.
35. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing Congress's dissatisfaction with the Tenth
Circuit's strict textual interpretation, contradicting the intent of Congress).
36. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 900 (construing "the term visual depiction to mean the substantive
content of an image"). To further explain the ruling by the court, imagine taking a photograph of
your car in front of your Denver, Colorado house. The photographed car was built at a factory in
Detroit, Michigan. At some point, the car traveled from the factory in Detroit to your house in Den-
ver. Under the Sturm ruling, the physical photograph that you can hold in your hand depicting the
car does not need to travel across state lines. The interstate jurisdictional requirement is met because
the car you photographed was built in a different state and at some point traversed state lines to
arrive in your driveway.
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an image of child pornography was made in a state and/or country other
than the one in which the defendant resides."3 7 The Tenth Circuit's ruling
accomplished two things. First, the court satisfied Congress. 8 Second,
the court remained committed to Schaefer's strict textual interpretation
of the statute by requiring actual interstate movement,39 thereby enabling
the court to continue rejecting the reasoning of the other federal cir-
40cuits-that Internet use constitutes interstate commerce.
B. Why the Previous Framework Was Not Working
The inconsistency the Tenth Circuit exhibited in its interpretation of
an identical statute in Schaefer and Sturm demonstrates a need for
change in how Congress addresses the relationship between law and
technology. Until the Schaefer decision, Congress was pleased with the
interpretations provided by the courts.4 1 Although some scholars have
criticized Congress for not acting sooner,42 there was no need for Con-
gress to act when the decisions were following the intent of Congress.43
The decisions by the Tenth Circuit should not come as a surprise, how-
ever, because courts have long struggled to apply the laws in our new
technological age."
In 1996, the Sixth Circuit was the first to apply obscenity standards
to the Internet.4 5 The standards applied by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Thomas were established by the Supreme Court in 1973,46 long
before the mainstream adoption of the Internet. 4 7 In Thomas, the Sixth
Circuit attempted to determine what "community standards" it should
apply when Internet users access pornography from different jurisdic-
tions.48 The court ultimately held that "varying community standards"
37. Id. at 901-02.
38. See Sturm, 673 F.3d at 1277 (affirming conviction after remand); see also Sukenik, supra
note 12, at 14 (discussing the negative reaction to the Schaefer decision by members of Congress).
39. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901 ("[T]he Government is ... required to prove that the visual depic-
tion 'has been' . . . transported in interstate . .. commerce at any point in time." (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2)(B) (2012)); United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The gov-
ernment needed to prove that the images ... moved between states."), overruled by United States v.
Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
40. See Frommell, supra note 9, at 1164 ("[T]he First, Fifth, and Third Circuits . . . embrace
the inference that mere Internet use involves interstate commerce . . . .").
41. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 13 ("Having grown accustomed to the judicial interpreta-
tion furnished by the majority circuits, Congress did not previously have occasion or incentive to
consider whether its statutory drafting failed to account for advances in modern technology.").
42. See id at 31 (noting that Congress decided not to broaden statutory language to clearly
explain congressional intent over the course of several statutory amendments).
43. Id. at 13.
44. Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle over the First Amendment: Can the
Law Really Protect Children from Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 141, 155 (2003).
45. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996).
46. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 151 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
47. NSF and the Birth of the Internet-1990s, NAT'L SC. FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/news/specialreports/nsf-net/textonly/90sjsp (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
48. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710-12.
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may apply, which can result in a more conservative standard.49 It remains
unclear, however, whether this idea of community standards is suited for
the Internet due to its pervasiveness.so
The confusion among the courts extends beyond pre-Internet stat-
utes.5 ' In 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act
(CPPA).52 Unlike earlier versions of child pornography statutes, the
CPPA targeted the exploitation of minors that is facilitated by new tech-
nology.53 The CPPA attempted to prohibit the use of technology to create
"virtual child pornography." 54 Even in the current age of everyday tech-
nology use, the courts again were unable to come to a common under-
standing. 5 In the end, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the circuit
split, finding that the law overstepped the protections of the First
Amendment.56
The cases of Schaefer and Sturm further demonstrate the difficulties
the courts have in applying the law in today's world of ever-increasing
technological innovation. Despite their best efforts, the courts have been
unable to consistently apply the law to new technology. 57 A member of
Congress echoed this concern, stating that "[w]e live in a world of very
quickly transforming technology[, and t]he courts sometimes have diffi-
culty keeping up with that."58 This leaves the law unsettled, requiring one
of two things: allowing the courts to continue to stretch existing laws to
new realities or demanding that Congress take action. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's decisions in Schaefer and Sturm demonstrate that leaving courts to
apply outdated laws to new technology is not the best solution in the long
term.59 These inconsistent decisions leave congressional action as the
49. Seeid.at711.
50. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 155-57.
51. Id. at 171.
52. Onmibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252, 2252A, 2256 (2012)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231
F.3d 912, 915 (4th Cir. 2000); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61,
65 (1st Cir. 1999).
56. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
57. Compare cases cited supra note 16 (holding in each case that use of the Internet alone was
sufficient to show interstate movement), with United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891, 892 (10th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (holding that the Government met its burden of proof by showing "the substantive
content of the images" traveled in interstate commerce), and United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d
1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that proof of Internet use does not prove interstate commerce);
see also Goldstein, supra note 44, at 173 (noting the circuit split interpreting the CPPA); Frommell,
supra note 9, at 1164-65 (discussing the circuit split interpreting child pornography jurisdictional
requirements).
58. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rep. Christopher Can-
non, Republican from Utah).
59. See Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901 (overturning Schaefer in the wake of congressional action
amending child pornography statutes).
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only method available to establish clear law to be applied in today's
technology-driven world.
II. WHY CLASSIFYING INTERNET USE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
Congress's decision to expand federal jurisdiction through the
ECPPA is firmly rooted in the Commerce Clause powers. Commerce
Clause jurisprudence can be traced as far back as 1824. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,60 Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for Congress's
commerce power, stating that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it
is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."6' Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause has a history of expanding
with the way business is conducted.6 2 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,63 the Supreme Court held that the right of employees to organize
was a labor practice affecting commerce. 4 In doing so, the Court broke
free from the more limited reach that Congress's commerce power previ-
ously had.65 The Jones & Laughlin decision established the idea that
intrastate activities may affect interstate commerce, thereby recognizing
the power of Congress to regulate local business activities based on the
effect it may have on the national economy. More recently, the Su-
preme Court has clarified the commerce power and its application with
67 6its decisions in United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and
Gonzales v. Raich.69 A review of this modem Commerce Clause juris-
prudence will show that the congressional mandate-Internet use consti-
tutes interstate commerce-is supported by the Constitution.70
A. The Federal Government's Powers Under the Commerce Clause
1. Lopez Lays the Groundwork
In Lopez, the Rehnquist-led Court reviewed a century of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence to establish "three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate." 7 1 The first category is the "channels of interstate
60. 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824).
61. Id. at 189-90.
62. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
63. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
64. Id. at 43.
65. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
66. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
67. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
68. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
70. See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9 (noting the new child
pornography statute "equates Internet use with interstate commerce").
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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commerce."7 2 "Channel" is defined as a waterway, or more precisely, a
"groove through which a stream flows." 7 3 Applying this definition to
interstate commerce, one can logically conclude that a channel of inter-
state commerce is a path, route, or course that commerce may flow or
move through. This application aligns with Supreme Court precedent.74
The second category is the "instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce."75 An "instrumentality" is defined as "a thing used to achieve an
end or purpose."76 The Lopez Court clarified that application of an in-
strumentality to interstate commerce included things used in interstate
commerce, "or persons or things in interstate commerce."7 7 The authority
to regulate instrumentalities under the Commerce Clause extends to in-
trastate activities.
The third category includes those activities that "substantially affect
interstate commerce." 79 The "substantially affects" category applies pri-
marily to those activities that are economic in nature.80 The Lopez Court
identified four factors to determine if an activity substantially affects
interstate commerce: (1) is the statute regulating economic activity? (2)
does the statute have a jurisdictional element limiting its reach to inter-
state commerce? (3) is there legislative history linking the statute to in-
terstate commerce? and (4) is the relationship between the regulated ac-
tivity and interstate commerce "attenuated"?8' Like instrumentalities, the
substantially affects test permits regulation of intrastate activities.82 The
Court went on to explain that although the power to regulate the first two
categories is clear, the power to regulate those activities that fall under
the third category may be murky.
Having established these three categories, the Lopez Court then
turned to the case at hand involving the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
72. Id.
73. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 264 (9th ed. 2009).
74. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 ("[Tihe authority of Congress to keep the channels of inter-
state commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer
open to question." (alteration in original) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
75. Id.
76. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 870.
77. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
78. Id. (providing examples such as "destruction of an aircraft, or . .. thefts from interstate
shipments" (alteration in original)).
79. Id. at 558-59.
80. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we need not adopt a categor-
ical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases,
thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
81. Id. at 610-12; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 561-62.
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 ("[The Court has] upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts





1990.84 Indicating that the Act could only be supported by the third cate-
gory, the Court proceeded to review the Act against the four previously
noted factors to determine if the Act regulated activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce. 86 The Court concluded that the Act failed
under the third category because it "ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce'
- 87or any sort of economic" activity.
2. Lopez Applied in Morrison
The Morrison Court addressed whether the Violence Against Wom-
en Act (VAWA) fell within the third Lopez category.88 VAWA was a
federal law that provided civil remedies to women who were victims of
gender-motivated violence. 89 VAWA, like the statute at issue in Lopez,
was a criminal statute containing no element related to commerce or
economics. 90 Though not ruling out the possibility, the Court concluded
that such, a "noneconomic" statute does not allow for federal regulation
of a purely intrastate activity.9' Thus, as did the Lopez Court, the Morri-
son Court found that the statute lacked the required connection to inter-
state commerce.92
3. Lopez Applied in Raich
In Raich, the Supreme Court was again asked to determine whether
Congress had the power to regulate seemingly non-commercial activity
under the Commerce Clause.93 Raich considered the effects of home-
grown medical marijuana for personal possession and use under the Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA), and whether the CSA was a valid applica-
tion of the Commerce Clause. 94 Finding significant support from Wick-
ard v. Filburn,95 the Court ruled that there was sufficient connection be-
84. Id. at 551 (making it illegal to possess a gun in a school zone).
85. Id. at 559.
86. Id. at 559, 561-62.
87. Id. at 561.
88. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (reviewing whether VAWA regulat-
ed an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).
89. Id. at 601-02.
90. Id. at 613.
91. Id. ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in
nature.").
92. Id. at 617-18.
93. See United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) ("The Court of Appeals distinguished
prior Circuit cases . .. by focusing on what it deemed to be the 'separate and distinct class of activi-
ties' at issue in this case: the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for
personal medical purposes. . . ." (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
94. Id. at 15.
95. 317 U.S. I 11(1942).
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tween the interstate regulation of marijuana and the homegrown marijua-
96na that the defendant was using.
As was the statute in Wickard, the CSA was enacted to control the
interstate market of controlled substances, such as marijuana.9 7 Reason-
ing that purely intrastate wheat production and consumption would affect
the interstate market for wheat, the Wickard Court concluded that Con-
gress had a "rational basis" for regulating intrastate wheat activity.98
Here, the Raich Court came to the same conclusion, stating that "failure
to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would
leave a gaping hole in the CSA."99
These cases establish the current scope and reach of what may be
regulated under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the cases demon-
strate that the federal government may regulate purely intrastate activity
so long as the thing being regulated has an economic effect on interstate
commerce. As will be explained below, the Internet has come to play a
vital role in personal and commercial economic activity, thereby lending
itself to be fully regulatedunder the Commerce Clause.
B. The Commerce Power Applied to the Internet Under Lopez
To understand how the commerce power applies to the Internet, we
first must determine which category it falls under. As summarized above,
the Lopez Court established three areas of interstate commerce that Con-
gress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: channels, instrumentali-
ties, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The In-
ternet arguably falls within all three Lopez categories: channels, instru-
mentalities, and substantial effect. Although only one category is needed
to enable Congress to regulate, an activity must fall outside all three cat-
egories to escape Congress's commerce power. 00 These categories, and
their application to the Internet, will be examined below.
1. The Internet as a Channel
A channel of interstate commerce is a path, route, or course that
commerce may flow or move through.' 0 ' Traditional examples of inter-
state commerce channels are rivers, highways, and railways.' 02 If yOu go
96. Raich, 545 U.S. at 32-33.
97. Id. at 18-19 ("Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act [in Wickard| was designed 'to
control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surplus-
es. . .' and consequently control the market price, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the
supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets." (second
alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115)).
98. Id. at 19.
99. Id at 22.
100. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
101. See supra Part 1lAl..
102. Nathaniel H. Clark, Comment, Tangled in a Web: The Difficulty of Regulating Intrastate
Internet Transmissions Under the Interstate Commer.e Clause, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 947, 954
(2009).
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to your local electronics retail store and purchase a television, you have
participated in interstate commerce because prior to you purchasing the
television, it was manufactured and delivered to your local electronics
retail store, most likely by highway. Although your purchase of the tele-
vision was entirely intrastate, it traveled through a channel of interstate
commerce, the highway, to reach you.
Much like the path of the television in the example above, the Inter-
net is a channel of interstate commerce, one that continues to grow in
popularity.10 3 The Internet allows you to connect with people and busi-
nesses worldwide. Each transmission you send or receive over the Inter-
net is transported through various computer networks to reach its intend-
ed destination.'" Although there are many non-commercial, personal
uses of the Internet, more people than ever are turning to the Internet to
conduct business.'0o One example of this is Internet shopping, or e-
commerce. E-commerce is the business of buying and selling goods or
services via the Internet.'0 6 The goods being purchased may include a
television or a software product that is sent to you electronically. In ei-
ther case, you have used the Internet as a channel of interstate commerce.
2. The Internet as an Instrumentality
As established in Lopez, an instrumentality is something used in in-
terstate commerce "or persons or things in interstate commerce.' 0 7 The
Supreme Court has previously stated that "railroads, highways, and
bridges constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce."' These
examples seem to describe some of the channels just discussed. But it is
important to note that a channel can be an instrumentality, and vice ver-
sa.109
The Internet meets the definition of instrumentality as does a high-
way, railroad, or bridge, being both a channel and instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce. We can use each of these as a tool to traverse state
and national boundaries, but each one is also a path that commerce tray-
103. Internet World Stats-Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNETWORLDSTATS.COM,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Jan. 17, 2013) (citing world growth of
Internet use at 566.4% between 2000 and 2012).
104. See generally United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining
the process of routing Internet traffic); Clark, supra note 102, at 952-53 (explaining the process for
intrastate Internet transmissions).
105. Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, The Internet is 20% of Economic Growth, BUS. INSIDER
INTELLIGENCE (May 24, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mckinsey-report-internet-
economy-2011-5?op=1 (noting the Internet represents over 20% of economic growth during the last
five years).
106. Rifat Azam, E-Commerce Taxation and Cyberspace Law: The Integrative Adaptation
Model, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 14 (2007).
107. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
108. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995).
109. See MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (concluding that the "Internet is an instrumentality and
channel of interstate commerce"); see also 15 C.J.S. COMMERCE § 110 (2012) ("The Internet is
generally an instrumentality and a channel of interstate commerce.").
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els through. The Internet meets this dual classification because of the
Internet's nature as being both the thing we use to buy a DVD, and the
network of channels that the payment information we use to purchase the
DVD travels through.
Identifying the Internet as an instrumentality of interstate commerce
in this manner is not a novel concept. 0 Contrary to the views of some,"'
numerous courts have established that the Internet is an instrumentality
112of interstate commerce,l with some going so far as to say that finding
something more "intertwined" with interstate commerce would be "diffi-
cult."' '3 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly declared that the
Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, several cases de-
cided by the Court concerning other interstate facilities support the prop-
osition that the Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce.14 In
addition to the courts, many scholars have supported the idea that the
Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce." 5 Thus, it seems
evident that the Internet meets the definition of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce.
3. Use of the Internet Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
The substantially affects test focuses on economic activity." 6 As the
Morrison Court put it, "While we need not adopt a categorical rule
against aggregating ... noneconomic activity..., thus far in our Na-
tion's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of in-
trastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.""'7 If the
activity is shown to substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress
may regulate such activity even if it is purely local in nature." 8 We now
turn to the factors discussed in Lopez to determine if the Internet substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.
110. See sources cited supra note 109.
111. See Clark, supra note 102, at 958-59 (identifying a computer or mobile device as the
instrumentality used to access the Internet).
112. United States v. Faris, 583 F.3d 756, 759 (1lth Cir. 2009); Utah Lighthouse Ministry v.
Found. for Apologetic Info. & Res., 527 F.3d 1045, 1054 (10th Cir. 2008); MacEwan, 445 F.3d at
245.
113. MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245.
114. Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of
the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889, 904 n. 102 (1998) (citing Fed. Power
Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 94 (1965) (holding the transmission of electricity is sub-
ject to commerce power); Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 427 (1963)
(holding that radio station broadcasts over state lines constitute interstate commerce)).
115. See Frances E. Zollers et al., Fighting Internet Fraud: Old Scams, Old Laws, New Con-
text, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 169, 181 (2002); Bassinger, supra note 114, at 926; Greg Y.
Sato, Note, Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace?, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 699, 716
(1998).
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
118. See supra note 82.
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To reiterate, the Lopez Court identified four factors to help deter-
mine if an activity substantially affects interstate commerce: (1) is the
statute regulating economic activity? (2) does the statute have a jurisdic-
tional element limiting its reach to interstate commerce? (3) is there leg-
islative history linking the statute to interstate commerce? and (4) is the
relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce "at-
tenuated"?' 19 I will apply these factors to the ECPPA to better illustrate
how the Internet substantially affects interstate commerce.
First, is the ECPPA regulating economic activity? The ECPPA was
enacted to combat the receipt, possession, and distribution of child por-
nography. 120 As early as 2005, the child pornography industry was esti-
mated to be a $3 billion per year industry.12 1 In 2006, worldwide pornog-
raphy revenues reached $97.06 billion.122 That same year, revenues for
Internet pornography in the United States reached $2.84 billion, or
21.3% of the entire United States pornography market.123 Additionally,
about 20% of all Internet pornography involves children.124 These figures
make it very clear that child pornography is a thriving economic indus-
try. But can these figures serve as the basis for holding that the ECPPA is
actually regulating economic activity? To answer this question, compare
the ECPPA with the statute in Lopez that dealt with the "possession of a
gun in a local school zone." 2 5 The Lopez statute did not deal with the
receipt or distribution of a gun, whereas the ECPPA expressly mentions
receipt and distribution of child pornography.' 26 By mentioning receipt
and distribution, the ECPPA is connected to an activity that "through
repetition" may substantially affect interstate commerce.12 7 Possession of
anything alone, without considering its movement, provides no "tie to
interstate commerce." 2 8 This difference, although small, provides the
"economic activity that might . . . substantially affect . . . interstate com-
merce" and does not require courts "to pile inference upon inference" as
did the statute in Lopez.12 9 For these reasons, the ECPPA regulates an
economic activity.
119. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012), amended by Child Protection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
206, 126 Stat. 1490 (2012) (codified throughout 42 U.S.C.).
121. Statistics on Pornography, Sexual Addiction and Online Perpetrators,
SAFEFAMILIES.ORG, http://www.safefamilies.org/sf5tats.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter
Statistics on Pornography].
122. Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, TOPTENREVIEWS.COM, http://internet-
filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pomography-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
123. Id.
124. Statistics on Pornography, supra note 121.
125. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
126. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2012) (making it illegal "for any individual to ...
possess a firearm i[n] a school zone"), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (2012) ("Any person who ...
receives or distributes . . . any child pornography .... shall be punished. . .
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Second, does the ECPPA have a jurisdictional element limiting it to
interstate commerce? The ECPPA prohibits the use of "any means or
facility of interstate commerce" or "in or affecting interstate" commerce
in connection with child pornography. 130 These elements effectively limit
the reach of the ECPPA by excluding the intrastate possession and deliv-
ery of child pornography because the Act requires child pornography to
have a relationship with interstate commerce.' 3 1 This is unlike the statute
in Lopez that sought to regulate any possession of a gun in a school zone,
regardless of any connection to interstate commerce.132 Therefore, the
ECPPA is limited to the receipt, possession, and distribution of child
pornography that has an "explicit connection with" interstate com-
merce.133
Third, is there legislative history linking the ECPPA to interstate
commerce? Prior to passing the ECPPA, Congress established that child
pornography was "estimated to be a multibillion dollar industry."l 34 Fur-
thermore, Congress realized the danger that the Internet presented in
making child pornography easily accessible, and even commented that
"[tlhe Lnternet is . . . a method of distributing goods and services across
State lines." 35 Congress concluded that "transmission of child pornogra-
phy using the. Internet constitutes transportation in interstate com-
merce." 36 Having shown that the child pornography industry is worth
billions of dollars, and that use of the Internet is a known method of de-
livering child pornography, one can conclude that there is a connection
between the ECPPA and interstate commerce.
Fourth, to what degree is the relationship between regulated activity
and interstate commerce attenuated? This question almost requires a lim-
it to be articulated on the reach of the federal power under the statute. 37
The ECPPA has provided for limited reach by expressly stating that use
of the Internet constitutes interstate commerce.' 38 Using the Internet to
obtain and search for child pornography would fall under the ECPPA,
whereas would-be criminals that receive, possess, or distribute images of
child pornography through purely local sources would not be liable under
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2012); see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1166-67.
131. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (discussing the failure of the statute in Lopez to have a juris-
dictional element because possession of a firearm alone does not have a "nexus to interstate com-
merce," and without it there is no "limit [to] its reach").
132. Id. at 561-62.
133. See id. at 562 (discussing why the statute in Lopez failed under the Commerce Clause).
"Unlike the statute in Bass, [the statute in Lopez] has no express jurisdictional element which might
limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. (emphasis added).
134. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(l), 122
Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.).
135. Id. § 102(6).
136. Id. § 102(7).
137. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (discussing the ramifications if
the Court were to follow the "but-for causal chain" presented by the Government).
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the ECPPA.139 Therefore, a clear separation between federal and state
prosecution exists under the ECPPA.
The Internet has an almost infinite number of uses, and this analysis
of the ECPPA was just one example of how the Internet may be used in a
manner that substantially affects interstate commerce. The Internet can
be found in many areas of commercial activity.140 Whether that commer-
cial activity is local in nature or not, it does not change the fact that your
use affects commerce internationally.141 And as Wickard plainly estab-
lished decades ago, "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is
plenary" and if "activities intrastate ... so affect interstate commerce"
then "the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities."l 4 2
C. Internet Use Is Interstate Commerce
Understanding how the Internet fits into the Lopez categories, we
can now turn to the amount of power Congress has to regulate its use. It
is well-settled law that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce
Clause, enabling Congress to regulate both interstate and intrastate ac-
tivities. 14 3 This plenary power includes the ability to regulate both chan-
nels and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.144 Hav-
ing established that the Internet is a channel,14 5 an instrumentality,146 and
that use of the Internet substantially affects interstate commerce,14 7 it is
unequivocal that the Internet is inherently interstate in nature and thus
may be regulated by Congress to the fullest extent of its Commerce
Clause powers.148
Although the Internet has previously been recognized as being suf-
ficient for exercising federal regulation,14 9 skepticism still exists as to
whether mere use of the Internet constitutes interstate commerce.1o As
139. By limiting the reach of the ECPPA to the Internet, a person who snapped pictures of his
or her neighbor's minor daughter engaged in sexual conduct would not be liable under the ECPPA if
those pictures were kept or distributed locally without the assistance of the Internet but may be liable
under state laws.
140. See generally Steve Schifferes, How the Internet Transformed Business, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2006, 11:53 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5235332.stm (noting the history of
the Internet and its broad penetration into business).
141. See id.
142. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
143. Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids Are Online: The Internet, the Commerce Clause,
and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 244 (2011) ("Congress's
Commerce Clause authority . . . includes the power to reach purely intrastate conduct.").
144. Compare id at 245 ("[C]ongressional power to regulate the channels ... of commerce
includes ... purely local [activities]." (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11 th
Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (explaining the com-
merce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce").
145. See supra Part II.B.1.
146. See supra Part II.B.2.
147. See supra Part II.B.3.
148. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
149. 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 9:12 (2012) ("[V]irtually all uses of Inter-
net and Internet-related services have an interstate component . . .
150. See Clark, supra note 102, at 959-60.
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this Part explains, it is hard to think of the Internet as being anything but
interstate. After all, the Internet is known as the "information superhigh-
way," 5 ' a "spiderweb-like" network of computers that facilitates com-
munication and business worldwide.15 2
III. THE BENEFITS OF CLASSIFYING INTERNET USE
AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In passing the ECPPA, Congress sent a clear message: "[U]sing the
Internet constitutes ... interstate commerce."15 3 The mandate, though not
without its critics, 154 ensures that mistakes in applying the law to the In-
ternet will no longer lead to questionable decisions in child pornography
cases.'5 5 This mandate, however, should not be limited to child pornog-
raphy laws. Instead, it should be adopted in all federal statutes because
many federal statutes suffer from the same problem child pornography
laws faced before Congress enacted the ECPPA-When is interstate
commerce triggered? For example, take the recent Second Circuit case of
United States v. Aleynikov.15 6 Aleynikov was a programmer employed by
Goldman Sachs.15 7 While at Goldman Sachs, he developed a software
product to facilitate high-speed trading of securities and commodities. '1
Aleynikov later left Goldman Sachs for a position at a different firm, but
before leaving, he took the trading platform's source code with him to
his new employer.159 Aleynikov was later charged with stealing the trad-
ing platform under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), among
other things.'60 The EEA prohibits the conversion of another's trade se-
cret "that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or
placed in interstate ... commerce."' 6 ' The Second Circuit, focusing on
this interstate commerce element, decided that the source code did not
constitute a product "produced for or placed in interstate ... com-
merce."l 62 The court based its reasoning on the fact that Congress had
used limiting language and did not "purport to exercise the full scope of
151. Jeffrey Kahn, Building and Rescuing the Information Superhighway, LBL RES. REV.,
Summer 1993, at 10, 10.
152. Id. at I1.
153. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9.
154. See Clark, supra note 102, passim; see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1172-73.
155. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (noting Congress's reaction to the Schaefer decision).
156. 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
157. Id.at73.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 74.
160. Id at 73-75 (noting other charges under the National Stolen Property Act and under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
161. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 1832(a), 110 Stat. 3488 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012)).
162. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 73 (quoting Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
294, § 1832(a), 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012))) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
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[its] congressional authority" under the Commerce Clause.163 Agreeing
with the majority's explanation, Judge Calabresi questioned if the court
had given effect to Congress's intent and requested Congress to revisit
the statute to make its intention clear.'1 On December 20, 2012, Judge
Calabresi's request was answered when an amendment to the EEA was
enacted to include any "product or service used in or intended for use in"
interstate commerce,16 5 providing perhaps the answer to Judge Calabre-
si's question of Congress's actual intent under the EEA.16 6 Although the
Aleynikov decision did not deal directly with whether the trading plat-
form itself had entered interstate commerce, the court was still grappling
with whether the interstate commerce element of the EEA was satis-
fled.' 67 As Aleynikov illustrates, regardless of what cybercrime statute is
at issue, the idea remains the same: Congress needs to make it clear that
Internet use constitutes interstate commerce and do so before another
"alleged misreading" of a cybercrime statute takes place. 68
I have identified two benefits provided by Congress's mandate in
the ECPPA that Internet use constitutes interstate commerce. First, it will
provide clear instruction to the courts, yielding more predictable results.
Second, it will bring certainty to the laws, resulting in prosecutions that
are more effective. Although the discussion of these benefits below is in
the context of child pornography, the benefits could be experienced in all
federal cases if the mandate-Internet use constitutes interstate com-
merce-were adopted in all federal laws.
A. Clear Instruction for the Courts
The language in the prior child pornography statutes left the courts
to interpret the scope of its reach. 69 To interpret the statute, courts fo-
cused on the jurisdictional language contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)
and § 2252(a)(4)(B), specifically whether child pornography "has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce ... by any means including by computer."o70 Despite the seeming-
ly clear intent of this statute,171 the language prompted confusion among
the courts-When does Internet child pornography constitute interstate
163. Id at 81.
164. Id at 83 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
165. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, S. Res. 3642, 112th Cong. (enacted).
166. See Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 83 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 79-83 (majority opinion).
168. See id. at 83 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (questioning whether the court reached the deci-
sion Congress intended); see also Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 ("Congress ... criticiz[ed] ... the
[Schaefer] court's alleged misreading of legislative intent.").
169. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1163-66 (discussing the split among the federal courts of
appeals).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2012); see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1159.
171. See Frommell, supra note 9, at 1163-64 (showing a consensus among the federal courts of
appeals in equating Internet use with interstate commerce).
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commerce?1 72 To address this question, Congress enacted a new version
of the statute, removing any hint of guesswork.1 3
The new statute, in relevant part, reads "any person who . . . re-
ceives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or us-
ing any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce shipped or
transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer."l7 4 By amending the language as it did, Congress
made it clear to the courts that it intended the statute to reach the full
extent of Congress's Commerce Clause power.'17  Using traditional
Commerce Clause buzzwords such as "any means or facility" and "in or
affecting,"' 76 Congress answered the call from the Tenth Circuit in
Schaefer demanding more precise language. 177
In demanding specific language, the Tenth Circuit seemingly relied
exclusively upon the strictest of textual interpretations, giving no
weight to any of the other established canons of statutory interpreta-
tion. 17 9 The court's reliance on this textual interpretation resulted in the
Tenth Circuit handing down a decision that even a concurring member of
the court admitted was incorrect.'80 Although some of the blame should
be placed on the prosecution,18' the majority of the blame rests with the
court, which ultimately made the decision, going against the other cir-
cuits to overturn a conviction that should have been upheld. 82
Five years later in Sturm, the Tenth Circuit was again asked to in-
terpret the child pornography laws it had interpreted in Schaefer.1 83 Un-
like Schaefer, however, the Sturm court ruled in favor of the Government
by redefining the term "visual depiction" in the statute to mean the "sub-
stantive content of an image." 8 4 Prior to Sturm, courts focused on the
172. See id. at 1166 (discussing the split in the federal courts of appeals following the Schaefer
decision).
173. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9 ("The updated legis-
lation unambiguously equates Internet use with interstate commerce . . .
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2012).
175. See id; see also Frommell, supra note 9.
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Congress's use
of the 'in commerce' language, as opposed to phrasing such as 'affecting commerce' or a 'facility of
interstate commerce,' signals its decision to limit federal jurisdiction . . . ."), overruled by United
States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
178. See id; see also Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 ("Congress moved quickly . .. , criticizing
... the textual-interpretation methodology .... ).
179. See Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretative Methodologies, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1972-78 (2007) (discussing some of the common methods of statutory
interpretation).
180. See Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1207 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) ("I have no doubt the images
traveled across state and national borders.").
181. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1161-62 (discussing the failures of the prosecution).
182. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1204-05 (majority opinion).
183. United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
184. Id. at 901.
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digital file or tangible media itself that contained the image, not the sub-
stance of the image it contained.'8 ' By redefining "visual depiction," the
Tenth Circuit was able to stick to its interpretation in Schaefer requiring
proof of actual interstate movement by holding that the "substantive con-
tent of an image" must move in interstate commerce.' 86 This interpreta-
tion by the court resulted in the outcome Congress intended,18 7 albeit in a
way that is arguably not how Congress intended. 8
The Tenth Circuit's inconsistency in interpreting the same statute is
prima facie evidence that a congressional mandate was needed. Congress
delivered the needed clarity in the ECPPA, leaving no doubt how the
courts should read the new law.189 This mandate benefits the courts and
the public by adding predictability in the outcome of cases dealing with
child pornography and the Internet.
B. Prosecutions that Are More Effective
Prosecutorial success should be measured by its effectiveness in
carrying out the legislative intent that Congress had when passing a spe-
cific law.' 90 This is, after all, how our government is supposed to work-
giving effect to a law based on the intent of our democratically elected
members of Congress.' 9 ' The intent of child pornography laws has re-
mained the same over the years: punish those individuals who receive,
possess, or distribute child pornography.192 Prior to Schaefer, to obtain a
conviction under the child pornography laws, the Government needed
only to show that the defendant used the Internet to obtain child pornog-
raphy. 93 Relying on this common theme from other courts,' 94 the Gov-
ernment presented evidence in Schaefer to prove that the defendant used
the Internet to obtain child pornography.195 Unbeknownst to the Gov-
185. See, e.g., Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1205 ("[T]he government needed to prove the visual
images ... moved across state lines."); see also supra note 7.
186. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901.
187. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing the disgust of Congress over the decision in
Schaefer).
188. See id. (commenting that Congress intended Internet use to constitute interstate com-
merce).
189. Id. at 15.
190. See id. at 14 (quoting several members of Congress who criticized the decision in
Schaefer because the court's interpretation went against alleged legislative intent).
191. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
("If a court ... ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that inten-
tion is the law and must be given effect.").
192. See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2012),
amended by Child Protection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-206, 126 Stat. 1490 (codified throughout
42 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1156-58 (discussing the history and expansion of
federal child pornography laws and the common goal of punishing those who deal in child pornog-
raphy).
193. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1164-65.
194. See cases cited supra note 16.
195. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The government main-
tains that this evidence was sufficient to establish the interstate commerce element because it permit-
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ernment, however, the Schaefer court would require proof that the imag-
es actually moved between states to uphold a conviction.196 Following
the Schaefer decision, the Government had to consider the relevant juris-
diction to determine the amount of evidence required to prove the inter-
state component of the child pornography laws. 197 Congress's mandate in
the ECPPA-equating Internet use with interstate commerce-
established a clear standard for proving interstate commerce, removing a
key hurdle to effective prosecution. 198
In United States v. Carroll,'99 the First Circuit interpreted the juris-
dictional requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).20 0 To secure a conviction
under this child pornography statute, the Government needed to show
that the defendant "knew or had reason to know" that the child pornogra-
phy "would be transported in interstate commerce." 2 0 1 The Government
relied on the testimony of the victim indicating that the defendant intend-
ed to upload images to a computer and "distribute them on the Inter-
net." 202 The court said that such transmission "by means of the Internet"
203
would satisfy the statutory interstate commerce requirement.
The Fifth Circuit followed the First Circuit's lead and came to a
204similar conclusion in United States v. Runyan. Runyan was indicted on
four separate charges.2 0 5 The first charge was based on the same provi-
sion at issue in Carroll, whereas the remaining three were under a differ-
ent section of the child pornography laws, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 206 The
Runyan court agreed with the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 ad-
vanced by the First Circuit. 207 Turning to the charges under § 2252A, the
Government offered Runyan's confession as proof that the images of
208child pornography were in interstate commerce.28 Runyan admitted that
the images of child pornography he possessed came from the Internet.209
ted a reasonable fact-finder to determine that the images of child pornography . . were obtained
from the Internet."), overruled by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
196. Id ("[I]t was not enough for the government to prove that the child-pornography images
... were obtained from the Internet. The government needed to prove that the images ... moved
between states.").
197. Frommell, supra note 9.
198. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 15.
199. 105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997).
200. Id at 741-42.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 742.
203. Id.
204. 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002).
205. Id. at 238.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 239 ("We join the First Circuit in holding that '[t]ransmission of photographs by
means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes
transportation in interstate commerce' for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 .") (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir.1997)).
208. Id. at 241.
209. Id.
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Finding that this confession was sufficient to link the images to the Inter-
net, the court upheld Runyan's conviction.2 10
Finally, in United States v. MacEwan ,21 the Third Circuit came to a
similar verdict.2 12 MacEwan was charged with receiving child pornogra-
phy under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B).2 13 After seizing MacEwan's
computers, the Government found over 250 images of child pornography
along with links to child pornography websites in his Internet history.2 14
The Government attempted to prove that these images were in interstate
commerce from expert testimony that "summarized the flow of data over
the Internet."2 15 This testimony noted the mere possibility that transmis-
sion of data over the Internet could cross state lines.216 The Third Circuit
concluded that because of the "very interstate nature of the Internet,"
proof of Internet use to download images of child pornography was
enough to show the images had "traveled in interstate commerce." 217
Following these decisions, the burden on the Government was clear:
show the child pornography images were linked to the Internet and the
interstate commerce requirement will be satisfied.2 18 However, the Tenth
Circuit rejected this notion in Schaefer, abandoning nonbinding, persua-
sive precedent.2 19 Despite a showing by the Government in Schaefer that
the defendant had "subscribe[d] to websites containing images of child
pornography" and that child pornography images were found on his
computer,220 the Tenth Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient
proof of interstate commerce, instead requiring evidence that the images
of child pornography actually moved "across state lines." 221 This incon-
sistent burden of proof requirement not only resulted in an acquittal in
210. Id at 242-43.
211. 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
212. Id at 239.
213. Id
214. Id. at 240.
215. Id. at 241.
216. See id. at 241-42.
217. Id. at 244.
218. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 9 ("The majority of circuits ... held that evidence of Internet
use alone satisfied the jurisdictional requirement in the statute.").
219. Compare United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
actual movement across state lines is required), overruled by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891
(10th Cir. 2012) (en banc), with MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 244 (holding that use of the Internet is suffi-
cient evidence to show interstate activity), and United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 242 (5th Cir.
2002) ("[Clircumstantial evidence linking a[n] ... image to the Internet . . . can be sufficient evi-
dence of interstate transportation . . , ."), and United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir.
1997) ("Transmission ... by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving . . . across state lines and
thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.").
220. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
221. Id. at 1201.
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Schaefer222 but also highlighted potential difficulties in prosecuting crim-
- - 223mals in the Internet age.
Congress's mandate that Internet use constitutes interstate com-
merce eases the difficulty in prosecuting child pornography crimes in-
volving the Internet. 224 This will ultimately result in prosecutions that are
more effective because the burden of proof is clear.22 5 Additionally,
prosecutorial efficiency will improve because proving Internet use is far
easier than explaining the intricacies of how data moves over the Inter-
net.226 After all, it is the guilt or innocence of a party that should be of
primary concern, not deciphering expert testimony about the particular
path a specific image or data file followed through the elaborate world-
wide network of the Internet.
CONCLUSION
In Schaefer, a man who admitted to searching for child pornography
was set free because a court made a decision with blinders on. Taking
quick action, Congress amended the statute to ensure similar, shortsight-
ed decisions would not occur in the future. The Tenth Circuit, realizing
its mistake, overturned Schaefer, and with it found a new way to interpret
the law. But its Sturm decision ended up being just another example of
the dangers involved in allowing courts the opportunity to use their statu-
tory interpretation canon of choice.
The congressional mandate in the Effective Child Pornography
Prosecution Act of 2007 stating that "using the Internet constitutes trans-
portation in interstate commerce" should be extended to all federal laws.
It allows for predictability in the courts and more consistent prosecutions
of alleged criminals. This mandate is not outside the powers granted to
the federal government by the Constitution. The Internet is an inherently
interstate mode of communication and method to transport data. Let's
222. Id. at 1207.
223. Id. ("The development and growth of the Internet . . . complicates the statutory analysis in
this case.")
224. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 15 ("Congress's legislation ... clariffied] the appropriate
juriAictional standard to be applied . . .
225. See id.
226. See generally United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 241 (explaining the process of
routing Internet traffic); Clark, supra note 102, at 952-53 (explaining the process for intrastate
Intk -net transmissions).
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enter the twenty-first century by declaring all Internet use as interstate
commerce.
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THE DANGER OF THE "ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS"
REQUIREMENT OF THE ADA: WHY THE INTERACTIVE
PROCESS SHOULD BE MANDATED
ABSTRACT
The 1990 passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was met with resistance from both courts and employers. This resistance
took the form of a screening mechanism that restrictively interpreted the
definition of "disability." To rectify the narrowed interpretation of disa-
bility, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act
of 2008 (ADAAA), which expanded the definition. Although the
ADAAA has increased the number of individuals covered by the ADA,
the other elements of a plaintiffs prima facie claim for employment dis-
crimination under Title I of the ADA remain the same. Because most
pre-ADAAA disability discrimination litigation concerned whether an
individual had a disability, jurisprudence about the other elements of a
prima facie claim is relatively undeveloped. This lack ofjurisprudence as
well as continued judicial resistance to the ADA raises concerns about
the emergence of a new screening mechanism available to courts: the
"essential functions" requirement of the ADA, which mandates that an
employee be able to perform the essential functions of her job. If the
essential functions requirement were used as a gatekeeper, it would un-
dermine the goals of the ADA. To prevent such abuse, a certain kind of
interactive employer-employee mediation process should be mandated.
Additionally, an employer should be independently liable for failure to
participate in the interactive process.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), plaintiffs bringing disability-based employment discrimi-
nation claims under the ADA faced a disproportionate number of sum-
mary judgments. The disability rights movement, which helped to enact
the ADA, saw the need to amend the ADA because it was not fulfilling
the goals it was meant to achieve--to end the paternalism of, and to fos-
ter integration into everyday life for, people with disabilities.2 The pur-
pose of the ADA Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was to broaden the
definition of disability because the definition in the original ADA was
somewhat ambiguous, and consequently courts were able to narrow it
significantly in their interpretation of the ADA. Because the ADAAA
did expand the definition of "disability," other elements of a plaintiffs
prima facie claim for disability discrimination under the ADA remained
the same, including the requirement that an individual be "qualified"
(i.e., able to perform) with or without reasonable accommodations, the
"essential functions" of a job.4 The requirement that the employee be
able to perform the essential functions of a job could become an attrac-
tive gatekeeper for courts to continue to block potential plaintiffs from
bringing or prevailing in employment discrimination suits under the
1. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Examining the Correlation Between Disability and Poverty:
A Comment from a Critical Race Feminist Perspective-Helping the Joneses to Keep Up!, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 655, 656-57 (2005) ("[O]nly 2.7% of plaintiffs prevailed in Title I ADA
filed cases, as opposed to 17.2% of plaintiffs in nonemployment ADA cases." (footnote omitted)).
2. Throughout this Comment, I use the phrase "people with disabilities" or "individuals with
disabilities" because politically active Americans with disabilities think that these phrases are more
reverent and less degrading than "the disabled." SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2010).
3. See Hillary K. Valderrama, Comment, Is the ADAAA a "Quick Fix" or Are We out of the
Frying Pan and into the Fire?: How Requiring Parties to Participate in the Interactive Process Can
Effect Congressional Intent Under the ADAAA, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 175, 199-200 (2010).
4. See id. at 204.
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ADA. The recent Tenth Circuit case of EEOC v. Picture People, Inc.5
shows how this requirement could be used as a screening mechanism.
This Comment argues that the use of the essential functions re-
quirement as a screening mechanism would be especially dangerous for
the goals of the disability rights movement. Continually dismissing cases
because the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her job
would reinforce the stereotypes the ADA was enacted to combat: that
people with disabilities are less worthy than are able-bodied individuals
and thus should not be integrated into the world or seen as fully capable
persons.6 To combat the use of the essential functions requirement as a
possible screening mechanism, this Comment suggests that a particular
kind of interactive employer-employee mediation process be mandated
by the ADA.
To contextualize the language of the ADA and the ADAAA, Part I
of this Comment provides a brief background of the ADA's enactment
and its subsequent amendments. Part II shows how the essential func-
tions requirement could be used to block potential plaintiffs from bring-
ing or prevailing in employment discrimination suits under the ADA as
was done in EEOC v. Picture People, Inc. Part III argues that the use of
the essential functions requirement as a screening mechanism would be
especially damaging to the goals of disability rights advocates. Moreo-
ver, this Comment argues that an interactive employer-employee media-
tion process focusing on the essential functions of a job should be man-
dated to keep the essential functions requirement from becoming such a
screening mechanism.
I. BACKGROUND
To help contextualize the ADA and its subsequent amendments,
subpart A explains the goals of the disability rights movement. Subpart B
explains the uniqueness of the original ADA as it encompassed aspects
of both a civil rights statute and welfare legislation.7 Subpart C explains
why and what kind of backlash the original ADA received, and sub-
part D introduces the ADAAA--the legislative response to the ADA
backlash. Finally, subpart E explains why it is important to look to post-
ADAAA disability discrimination litigation to determine whether and
what kind of screening mechanisms could be used by the courts.
A. Goals of the Disability Rights Movement
The ADA, signed into law on July 26, 1990, by President George
H.W. Bush, was heralded as a remarkable step toward rectifyring the dis-
5. 684 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2012).
6. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 52.
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crimination faced by millions of Americans with disabilities.9 The pur-
pose of the ADA was "to assure equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for [individuals
with disabilities]." 10 The ADA's articulation of this goal was largely the
result of the efforts of advocates in the disability rights movement, which
began in the 1970s. 11 Truly understanding the goals and hoes of the
ADA requires first examining the forces behind its enactment. ot
Throughout the disability rights movement, the advocates champi-
oned two major theoretical concepts: anti-paternalism and the social
model of disability.13 The first concept, anti-paternalism, was lifted from
two articles written by Jacobus tenBroek in 1966.14 Professor tenBroek
argued that society's common perceptions and stereotypes about people
with disabilities, much more than any physical impairment itself, creates
substantial limitations on people with disabilities to interact with the
world.' 5 These limitations manifest as a "custodial attitude [that] is typi-
cally expressed in policies of segregation and shelter, of special treat-
ment and separate institutions.,,16 To combat this, tenBroek argued that
disability law should focus on integration.17 His recommendation largely
influenced the goals of the disability rights movement, as seen by the
movement's challenge to society's common response of pitying people
with disabilities.18 Advocates wanted people with disabilities to be seen
as autonomous individuals capable of conducting their own lives. 19
The second concept behind the disability rights movement, the so-
cial model of disability, challenged the typical medical definition of the
word "disability."20 The social model theorizes that the norms of society
determine who is and who is not disabled.21 Viewing people with disabil-
ities as different from the majority has created a world that caters to the
9. Grant T. Collins & Penelope J. Phillips, Overview of Reasonable Accommodation and the
Shifting Emphasis from Who Is Disabled to Who Can Work, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 469, 473 (2011);
Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Should Courts Consider Mitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917, 918 (1998).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012).
11. See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1409 (1999); see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 2.
12. Eichhorn, supra note 11.
13. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
14. See id. at 2, 4.
15. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966).
16. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 809, 816 (1966).
17. tenBroek, supra note 15, at 843.
18. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
19. See id.
20. See Eichhorn, supra note 11, at 1414-15.
21. See id.
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majority and ignores the needs of people with disabilities.22 Disability
results from the various barriers that society constructs-physical, social,
and attitudinal-which obstruct an individual's ability to truly partake in
society.23 For example, a person in a wheelchair experiences disability
because society has chosen to design buildings with steps and narrow
doorways instead of ramps and wider doorways, even though it would
not have been more expensive to construct the building in an accessible
way.24 Thus, a disability is not an innate condition; rather, it is a social
construction resulting from society's preference for the majority.25 By
challenging the common perception of disability as a problem that needs
to be cured or as a condition that requires pity or charity and instead pos-
iting that society itself perpetuates disabilities, the disability rights
movement hoped that "the proper response [to disability would be] one
that requires society to change its aspects that make some mental or
physical conditions disabling."2 6
The goals of the disability rights movement, and subsequently of the
ADA, reflect these two major concepts. 27 These goals stress integration
into society by effectuating change in societal attitudes.28 It is important
to disability rights advocates to accomplish these goals in a manner that
stresses the recognition of rights over charity.29 Thus, disability rights
advocates desired civil rights legislation as opposed to welfare legislation
to prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities. 30
B. The ADA as a Hybrid of a Civil Rights Statute and Welfare Legisla-
tion
The ADA recognized the disability rights advocates' desire for a
civil rights statute while acknowledging the unique circumstances of
individuals with disabilities. 31 In some instances, individuals with disa-
bilities need different treatment in order to be treated equally.32 There-
fore, unlike other civil rights statutes, the ADA is unique because it
22. See id.
23. Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419,428 (2011).
24. See Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability,
Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 181-84 (2002).
25. Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1415 ("Disabled people are not inherently disabled, but are
instead actively disabled by a discriminatory society.").
26. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
27. See id
28. Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1418 ("Among the chief goals of the movement, which con-
tinues today, are recognition of disabled people as full human beings and elimination of physical and
attitudinal barriers to their full participation in society." (footnote omitted)).
29. Id; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
30. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
31. See id. at 7-8; Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1419.
32. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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"does not simply require equal treatment of similarly situated individu-
als." 33 Instead, the ADA
[r]equir[es] both less and more. The ADA requires more because not
only does it require that individuals with disabilities be treated no
worse than nondisabled individuals with whom they are similarly sit-
uated, but, in certain contexts, it requires that they be treated differ-
ently, some might say better, to achieve equal footing. The ADA ar-
guably requires less because, if the disabled individual cannot do the
job, even with reasonable assistance, the employer is not obligated to
employ that individual. 34
The ADA was initially celebrated for its unique approach to com-
bating disability discrimination; however, the Act was met with substan-
tial backlash not only from employers35 but also from the judiciary. 36
This resistance stemmed from a fear that the ADA provided claimants
with preferential treatment, and it was often characterized as an affirma-
tive action statute.37 The judicial backlash manifested in a disproportion-
ate number of summary judgments for defendants due to claimants' fail-
ure to qualify as disabled under the ADA definition of "disability." 38 A
more detailed account of the nature and extent of the backlash is dis-
cussed below.
C Judicial Backlash
To establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under
the original ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified (with or without a reasona-
ble accommodation) to perform the essential functions of the position she
has or desires; and (3) the employer took an adverse employment action
against an employee with a disability because of her disability.39 The
definition of "disability" under the original ADA was as follows: "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an im-
pairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."40 In the
33. Collins & Phillips, supra note 9, at 471.
34. Id.
35. Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REv. 311, 315 (2009).
36. Id.; see also Collins & Phillips, supra note 9; Scott Johnson, The ADAAA: Congress
Breathes New Life into the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 J. KAN. B. Ass'N 22, 23 (2012).
37. Johnson, supra note 36 ("Many courts characterized it as an affirmative action program
for the disabled, rather than as an antidiscrimination statute. Even the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
referred to certain accommodations as 'preferences for individuals with disabilities."' (footnote
omitted) (quoting Travis, supra note 35, at 318)).
38. Valderrama, supra note 3, at 204.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ l2111-12112 (2012).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
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following two cases, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the ADA
definition of "disability."
In Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc.,41 the Supreme Court sub-
stantially narrowed the definition of "disability," making it more difficult
for claimants to overcome defendant employers' motions for summary
judgment.42 In an opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Sutton
Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit,43 holding that courts
should consider mitigating measures, such as an individual's medications
or treatments, when determining whether one has a disability for purpos-
es of the ADA. 44 Additionally, the Sutton Court's opinion highlighted the
demanding nature of fulfilling a "regarded as [disabled]" claim under the
ADA. 45 Under a regarded as disabled claim, a plaintiff must show not
only that the employer held a misconception about the plaintiffs im-
pairment but also that the employer believed that the plaintiffs impair-
ment substantially limited a major life activity.46
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,47 the
Supreme Court defined "major life activities" as "those activities that are
of central importance to daily life."48 To support this definition, the
Toyota Court declared that the ADA's definition of disability "need[s] to
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled," 49 further narrowing the definition of disability under the ADA.
D. Result of Sutton and Toyota: The Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act
Sutton and Toyota made it extremely difficult to prevail with an
employment discrimination claim under the ADA.5 0 Research showed
that only 2.7% of plaintiffs prevailed in employment discrimination cases
filed under the ADA, as opposed to 17.2% of plaintiffs in non-
employment ADA cases51 and 58.0% of plaintiffs in all federal civil cas-
es-an enormous disparity.52 The rulings in Sutton and Toyota left plain-
tiffs in a catch-22 situation in which they either were not "disabled
enough" to warrant protection under the Act or were "too disabled" to
qualify for the jobs they desired.53 One scholar noted that the "judicial
41. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
42. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 24.
43. Id.
44. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
45. Id. at 489.
46. Id.
47. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
48. Id. at 185.
49. Id. at 197.
50. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 25.
51. Wing, supra note 1, at 656.
52. Id. at 656-57.
53. Johnson, supra note 36, at 25-26; Valderrama, supra note 3, at 198.
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hostility to the ADA ran so deep that Congressional response seemed
inevitable." 54 Disability rights advocates persuaded "members of the
business community to negotiate a compromise bill to restore the ADA's
protected class to the scope originally intended by Congress, in exchange
for several provisions that precluded the potential expansion of rights and
coverage under other disputed sections of the original ADA."55 On Sep-
tember 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA. 56 The
ADAAA sought to correct the narrow interpretation of "disability" that
resulted from Sutton and Toyota.57
The ADAAA made several changes to the ADA. First, with regard
to mitigating measures, the ADAAA affirmatively states that they should
not be considered when determining if an individual has a disability.58
This provision directly addressed the Supreme Court's ruling in Sutton
that mitigating measures should be considered in assessing whether a
plaintiff has a disability.59 Second the ADAAA made proving a regarded
as disabled claim easier for employees, as the employee only has "to
show an adverse employment action was taken because the employer
'perceived' an impairment-which can be any condition with an ex-
pected duration of more than six months." 60 The plaintiff no longer must
show that her employer believed that the impairment substantially lim-
ited a major life activity.61 Third, in response to the Supreme Court's
definition of "major life activities" in Toyota, the ADAAA expanded
what constitutes a major life activity, including such things as "standing,
lifting, bending, reading and concentrating, along with performing man-
ual tasks, thinking, eating, sleeping and communicating."62 Additionally,
the ADAAA states that major life activities include "the operation of a
major bodily function."63 "Further broadening the coverage of the [A]ct,
the ADAAA makes clear that impairments that are episodic or in remis-
sion are still protected disabilities if they would substantially limit a ma-
jor life activity when active."64 Fourth, the ADAAA also states that the
term "substantially limits" should not mean "significantly restricted" as
some courts had held because that was "too high a standard." 65
54. Travis, supra note 35, at 319.
55. Id.
56. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 52.
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii) (2012).
59. Stephanie Wilson & E. David Krulewicz, Disabling the ADAAA, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2009, at
37, 39.
60. Id. at 38.
61. See id.
62. Wilson & Krulewicz, supra note 59, at 38 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
64. Wilson & Krulewicz, supra note 59, at 38 (citing 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(D)); see also
BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 53.
65. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-3554.
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One major component of the Act remained unchanged.66 To estab-
lish a prima facie claim for discrimination, a plaintiff must still prove
that she was qualified, either with or without reasonable accommoda-
67tions. A "qualified individual" is defined as "an individual who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 68
Thus, an individual must still show that she can perform the essential
functions of the position and that her accommodations were reasonable. 69
E. Litigation After the ADAAA Enactment
The ADAAA took effect on January 1, 2009,70 and it did not apply
retroactively.71 Therefore, the volume of litigation applying the new as-
pects of the ADAAA is relatively limited. Because cases prior to the
ADA dealt exclusively with the definition of "disability" and did not
develop the other elements of a prima facie case,72 it is important to look
at whether the ADAAA is receiving the same kind of backlash as did the
original ADA and whether a new screening mechanism has been erected
by the courts, resulting in a disproportionate number of summary judg-
ments for defendants. This prospect seems likely, considering the
ADAAA has been criticized for opening the floodgates of litigation by
expanding the definition of "disability."
II. EEOC V. PICTURE PEOPLE, INC.
In EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., the Tenth Circuit recently demon-
strated that an employee's ability to meet the essential functions of a job
could potentially be used as a gatekeeping mechanism for employment
discrimination claims brought under the ADAAA. An analysis of the
case and its potential impact on the future of disability discrimination
litigation under the ADAAA follows.
66. See Valderrama, supra note 3, at 204.
67. See id
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
69. See id
70. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-3554.
71. Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAAA, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 509, 514 (2011).
72. See Valderrama, supra note 3, at 204.
73. Amelia Michelle Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
331, 366 (2010) ("[T]he enactment of the ADAAA . . . '[could] open a 'Pandora's Box' of claims by
people who do not have a disability under any rational interpretation of that term.'" (second altera-
tion in original) (quoting Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Hearing on S. 1881 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions,
I10th Cong. 34 (2007) (statement of Camille A. Olson, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP))).
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A. Facts
The plaintiff, Jessica Chrysler, was an employee at Picture People,
Inc., a photography studio in Littleton, Colorado. 74 She was "profoundly
deaf," but she could communicate through "writing notes, gesturing,
pointing, and miming. She [could] also type, text message, and use body
language."75 Jessica could also use American Sign Language (ASL), but
according to Picture People, she could not read lips or speak many
words.76
Jessica was hired as a "performer" for the photography studio,
which entailed "customer intake, sales, portrait photography, and labora-
tory duties." 77 Another performer usually aided Jessica when she shot
photographs in the studio, but she was occasionally able to shoot by her-
self.78 On such occasions, Jessica would communicate with her photog-
raphy subjects, who were usually children, "by writing notes, gesturing,
and miming." 79
In November 2007, Master Photographer Libby Johnston was sent
to Picture People "to improve photography quality and sales in anticipa-
tion of the holidays., Jessica claimed that she requested an ASL inter-
preter for a training session held by Johnston, but Picture People was
unable to provide one. Johnston's evaluation of Jessica focused on Jes-
sica's communication skills, which Johnston maintained were "awkward,
cumbersome, and impractical."82 After conferring with Johnston, Picture
People's district manager recommended and Picture People agreed that
Jessica be "almost exclusively" relocated to the photography lab. 83
Jessica was relocated and her hours were cut, after which she re-
quested more hours.84 Jessica was denied more hours, and management
reported that she was "angry" and less productive at work. After the
2007 holiday season, Jessica remained an employee but was not allotted
work hours at the photography studio.86 She was officially terminated in
October 2008.87
74. EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 983-84 (10th Cir. 2012).
75. Id. at 983.
76. Id. at 983-84.








85. Id at 984-85.
86. Id. at 985.
87. Id.
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B. Procedural History
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued un-
der Title I of the ADA on Jessica's behalf, claiming employment dis-
crimination on the basis of a disability. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the employer.89 The district court determined
that Jessica could not meet a prima facie case for discrimination under
the ADAAA because she could not perform the essential functions of the
job with or without reasonable accommodations. 90
C. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's ruling de novo and
affirmed.91 The court stated the elements needed to show a prima facie
case for discrimination under the ADAAA-that the employee "(1) be a
disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job
held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by an employer or pro-
spective employer because of that disability." 92 The parties agreed that
Jessica was disabled, so the opinion hinged on the second element of
disability discrimination. 93
The issue concerned whether verbal communication skills constitut-
ed an essential function of the job of performer.94 The majority empha-
sized the need to first inquire as to whether the emplo er required all
performers to have strong verbal communication skills. If so, the court
must next inquire as to "whether verbal communication skills are funda-
mental to the performer position."96 This inquiry considers the following
factors:
(i) [t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or inter-
viewing applicants for the job;
(iii) [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) [t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform
the function;
(v) [t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
88. See id
89. Id
90. Id. at 983.
91. Id. at 983, 985.
92. Id. at 985.
93. Id
94. Id.
95. Id. at 985-86.
96. Id
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(vi) [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 97
The court concluded that Jessica was "unable to fully perform three
of the four duties of a performer."98 Although she could perform in the
lab, she did not possess the ability to proficiently register and recruit
customers, instruct children while taking their pictures, or sell photo
packages by addressing customer issues. Her limited abilities, the court
reasoned, were problematic, especially because Picture People allowed
only twenty minutes for each photo shoot. 00
Because the court determined that Jessica was unable to perform the
essential functions of the job, the court considered whether there were
reasonable accommodations that the employer could provide that would
enable her to perform those essential functions.lo0 The court defined rea-
sonable accommodations as
"[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the
manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability
who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position" or
"[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's em-
ployee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of em-
ployment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees
without disabilities."
The majority opinion first stated that a reasonable accommodation
could not consist of allowing Jessica to communicate non-verbally be-
cause it could not require an employer to eliminate an essential function
of the job.103 The majority opinion then stated that providing Jessica with
an ASL interpreter at staff meetings would not allow her to perform the
essential functions of her job because verbal communication needed to
occur during photo sessions.104 In light of these circumstances, the court
concluded that no reasonable accommodation could have allowed Jessica
to perform the essential functions of herjob.o10




101. Id. at 987.
102. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)-(iii) (2012)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 987-88.
105. Id. at 988.
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D. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Holloway offered a dissent that began by presenting a more
detailed account of the facts of the case.106 The dissent pointed out that
Picture People had hired Jessica knowing she was deaf and knowing the
duties of a performer.107
The dissent also noted that Jessica's start time had been delayed
three weeks because Picture People failed to provide an interpreter for
her training session.los The manager of the studio contacted Picture Peo-
ple's human resources department but was told that Picture People did
not provide those services in an e-mail stating that "hiring an interpreter
'to be around the studio while this employee is working ... seems like an
expense we would like to do without."" 0 9 Eventually, Jessica found her
. . .110
own interpreter to aid her during her job training session.
The dissent emphasized that Jessica had received highly favorable
reviews for her photography sessions with children and there was no
evidence that her sessions were unsuccessful. II In fact, just days after
her training session, Jessica had a photo shoot with a family who was so
pleased with her erformance, it purchased more photos than it had orig-
inally planned. Consequently, the family returned to the studio the
next month for another photo shoot with Jessica, but Picture People
falsely informed the family that Jessica was unavailable when, in fact,
Jessica was working in the lab at the time.113
The dissent noted that despite Jessica's positive performance, Pic-
ture People reassigned Jessica to the lab following a staff training session
for which she requested but was not provided an interpreter." 4 Follow-
ing this reassignment, Picture People cut her hours significantly.11s She
requested more hours and was promised an increase; eventually Picture
People cut her hours altogether.116 Finally, Picture People terminated
Jessica after months of waiting to see if she would get more hours. 17 On
top of everything, the dissent concluded, Picture Peo le reprimanded
Jessica when she complained about her hour reduction.
106. Id. at 992 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
107. Id
108. Id at 994.
109. Id. (alteration in original).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 992.
112. Id. at 994-95.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 995.
115. See id. at 996.
116. Id. at 996-97
117. Id. at 997.
118. Id. at 992-93.
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The dissent reasoned that summary judgment for the defendant em-
ployer was inappropriate. There was substantial evidence from which a
jury could decide that verbal communications skills were not an essential
function of the job but instead were a method used to perform an essen-
tial function of the job, which was communication in general.119 The
dissent stated that none of the descriptions of the job, either written by
Picture People before Jessica's employment or given from witnesses
during trial, stated that verbal communication was an essential function
of the job. 120Thus, there was enough evidence to preclude summary
judgment. 121
Additionally, the dissent disagreed with the court's holding that Jes-
sica's written communication and gestures were less effective than was
oral communication.122 Jessica received no negative feedback from cus-
tomers about her performance while photographing children.123 On the
contrary, Jessica showed that she could communicate effectively by re-
ceiving positive feedback about her performance.124 The dissent stated
that "[o]nly by ignoring this clear example of [Jessica's] ability to per-
form the essential functions of photo shooting and sales can the majority
find that 'nothing suggests' that she could do that which she had in fact
already done."' 2
Finally, the dissent remarked that the determination of whether
something is an essential function of a job is a question for the jury.126
The dissent emphasized that "[a] jury could determine that the Employ-
er's decisions were based on exactly the kind of stereotypes that the
ADA was enacted to combat." 27
III. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in EEOC v. Picture People, Inc. is illustrative
of the dangerous potential of judicial backlash towards the ADAAA in
the form of granting summary judgment for employer defendants on the
basis of employees lacking the ability to perform an essential job func-
tion. The essential functions requirement could be a new screening
mechanism courts employ to combat the "flood of litigation" the
ADAAA arguably unleashes.128 As the dissent in Picture People con-
veyed, the grant of summary judgment for the defendant was unwarrant-
119. Id. at 999.






126. Id. at 1000.
127. Id.
128. Joiner, supra note 73, at 336.
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ed.129 Even if summary judgment were warranted, the problems Jessica
experienced at her job highlight the failure or lack of an interactive pro-
cess through which the employer and employee discuss what the essen-
tial functions of the job will be and what, if any, reasonable accommoda-
tions the employee will need to perform the job's duties.
This Comment argues that a mandated interactive process should be
implemented as part of establishing a prima facie case for disability dis-
crimination. First, subpart A explains why judicial backlash to the origi-
nal ADA occurred, and predicts why a similar backlash in the form of
using the essential job functions requirement as a gatekeeper is a real
possibility. Second, subpart B discusses the dangers of using the essential
job functions requirement as gatekeeper because it would seriously un-
dermine the goals of the ADAAA. Subpart C explains the interactive
employer-employee mediation process and suggests that it should be
mandated for employers to participate in such a process with an employ-
ee if the employer knows or should know that the employee has a disa-
bility. If an employer does not participate in an interactive process, the
employee's claim should prevail. Finally, subpart D outlines what an
effective interactive process should look like.
A. Explaining the Judicial Backlash
Although the ADAAA was signed into law in September 2008, it
only applies to adverse employment actions taken after the effective date
of January 1, 2009.130 Therefore, the first cases interpreting the ADAAA
have taken some time to surface.131 Consequently, any meaningful trends
regarding the judicial reaction to the ADAAA are limited.132 Whether a
new screening mechanism will emerge remains to be seen; however,
there is reason to believe that a similar form of judicial backlash will
occur.133 Because ADA jurisprudence is wrought with ambiguities and
the ADAAA will likely result in more disability-based employment dis-
crimination litigation, it is also likely that judicial backlash will again
take the form of a screening mechanism to control the increased volume
of cases.134
A new gatekeeping mechanism could potentially develop via the
other prima facie elements of a plaintiffs employment discrimination
claim: the essential functions requirement and the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement.135 Because so many cases under the original ADA
129. Picture People, 684 F.3d at 1000.
130. Jana K. Terry, The ADA Amendment Acts Three Years After Passage: The EEOC's Final
Regulations and the First Court Decisions Emerge at Last, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 49,49.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Valderrama, supra note 3, at 202-03.
134. Id.
13'. See id. at 204.
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focused on whether a plaintiff had a disability, case law concerning
whether a plaintiff can perform the essential functions of a job, or wheth-
er a requested accommodation is reasonable, is less developed.136 Be-
cause these areas of law are less developed, courts still have latitude in
"end[ing] the inquiry at the coverage stage based on the plaintiffs quali-
fications (including whether she can perform essential job functions or
whether the accommodation was reasonable), achieving the same result
as the restrictive definition of disability."1 37
In any case, it is important to understand why courts would imple-
ment such a mechanism. Understanding the judicial backlash helps pre-
dict the form said mechanism could take and helps in the development of
a solution. There are several explanations for the judicial resistance to the
original ADA (and the consequent reaction of the restrictive definition of
disability).138 First, courts may have been reacting to the special nature
of the ADA as a blended civil rights and welfare statute.139 Other civil
rights statutes prohibit employers from discriminating against an em-
ployee based on that employee's protected status.140 The protected status,
such as race, gender, age, or religion, is generally irrelevant to an em-
ployee's ability to perform a job.141 The ADA concerns and protects
individuals whose disabilities may legitimately impact job performance
and requires that emplo vers accommodate those individuals at the em-
ployer's own expense. Thus, courts may have viewed claimants as
underserving, or even worse, as "really just lazy, malingerers, or whin-
ers.',143 Second, courts may have been reluctant to impose costs on em-
ployers. 144 After all, employers are not responsible for plaintiffs' disa-
bilities, and "it might thus seem unreasonable to require them to absorb
costs associated with these conditions."l 45
136. See id.
137. Id. (footnote omitted).
138. See Hickox, supra note 23, at 426-28.
139. See id. at 426-27 ("Some experts attribute ADA plaintiffs' lack of success in workplace
discrimination claims to a lack of acceptance of the ADA's protections among the courts, employers,
and other members of society, and an unwillingness to accept the disabled or 'the notion that the
ADA is about rights and equality."' (quoting Sharona Hoffman et al., The Definition of Disability in
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Successes and Shortcomings: Proceedings of the 2005
Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Sections on Employment Discrimination
Law; Labor Relations and Employment Law; and Law, Medicine and Health Care, 9 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 473, 494 (2005) (comments of Chai R. Feldblum))); see also Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 40 (2000);
Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 326-
27, (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, Settling the Matter].
140. See Hoffman, Settling the Matter, supra note 139, at 327.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Hickox, supra note 23, at 427.
144. Hoffman, Settling the Matter, supra note 139, at 327.
145. Id.
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On a theoretical level, courts' resistance to the ADA may have
stemmed from the prevailing medical definition of the word "disabil-
ity.,,146 As discussed in Part I.A, the medical model of disability treats
disability not as a social problem but as an individual medical problem
with only a medical solution. 147 Thus, courts may have viewed discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities as rational "'[because it re-
sults from] their own bodies' deficiencies,' unlike discrimination against
other groups," which results from animus. 148
The reason for the judicial backlash appears to be more than just an
unwillingness to impose costs on employers. Rather, the courts' main
concern about enforcing the ADA seems to be that individuals with disa-
bilities do not deserve protection because (1) their disabilities actually
can affect job performance and (2) they are not being discriminated
against in the typical sense, as there is not always animus behind adverse
employment actions.
Given these concerns, courts are likely to see the essential functions
requirement as an attractive candidate for a new screening mechanism. If
courts do use the essential functions requirement as a screening mecha-
nism, it would put the focus of litigation on the individual with a disabil-
ity's perceived shortcomings rather than on how employers can change
their practices to better integrate employees with disabilities into the
workplace. This focus on the individual with a disability would reflect
the courts' view that disabilities negatively affect job performance, and
that employers generally act rationally when they take adverse employ-
ment action against individuals with disabilities. Therefore, the reasoning
of the courts goes, it is unfair to place financial burdens on employers
because they act rationally and without animus.
B. Using the "Essential Functions" Requirement as a Gatekeeper Would
Undermine the Goals of the ADAAA
If the essential functions requirement were systematically used as a
screening device, the goals of disability rights advocates would be seri-
ously undermined. The chilling effect on the ability of disability discrim-
ination litigants to bring successful claims would be similar to that which
the judicial interpretation of the definition of "disability" had on litigants
pre-ADAAA. As one scholar noted:
[T]he specific wording of the ADA's definition of "disability," bor-
rowed from the earlier Rehabilitation Act, has undercut the statute's
goal of fostering greater participation in society on the part of people
146. Hickox, supra note 23, at 427-28.
147. Id.
148. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just
Right": The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND.
L.J. 181, 181-82 (2008)).
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with disabilities. The problematic language in the definition fails to
reflect the congressional intent to cover people with a broad range of
physical and mental impairments, and it actually cuts against several
of the theoretical underpinnings of the disability rights movement. 149
If the essential functions requirement of the ADAAA is used as a gate-
keeper for disability discrimination claims, it, like the gatekeeping that
occurred pursuant to the ADA's definition of "disability," could un-
dermine the disability rights movement.
The disability rights movement sought to integrate individuals with
disabilities into society and end paternalism toward them.151 The essen-
tial functions requirement to block potential plaintiffs would seriously
undermine those goals because it requires making a judgment about
those individuals' abilities. As highlighted by the dissent in Picture Peo-
ple,152 an employer's assessment of the capacities of an individual with a
disability can reflect common stereotypes about people with disabili-
ties.153
Furthermore, focusing on the employee's limitations themselves-
as opposed to focusing on whether an accommodation is reasonable or
on whether an employer participated in an interactive process-
reinforces the common stereotype that individuals with disabilities are
lesser human beings.154 The focus on limitations ignores that society
needs to change, which is a major goal of the disability rights movement.
Rather, it emphasizes the shortcomings of the individual herself (whether
those shortcomings are real or assumed based on stereotypes). Thus, the
real or perceived limitations of plaintiffs with disabilities would be sys-
tematically scrutinized. Again, the focus of disability discrimination cas-
es should be on how society should change,155 not on how an individu-
al's disability makes her unqualified for a position.
149. Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1408.
150. See id,
151. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4-6.
152. EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 1000 (10th Cir. 2012) (Holloway, J., dissent-
ing).
153. See Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1416 ("[Nlon-disabled people find it difficult to under-
stand how people can live full, satisfying lives despite mental and physical impairments . . . ."); see
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability, " 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 423 (2000)
("[P]eople with disabilities may be deprived of opportunities because of stereotypes-overbroad
generalizations about the limiting effects of their impairments.").
154. See Eichhorn, supra note I1, at 1411-12 ("Those who wish to draw lines-to reify disa-
bility-are simply trying to ensure their own place on the correct, 'normal' side. They can then
assume that those on the other side are somehow lesser humans, whose primary need in life is a cure
that will allow them to join the ranks of the normal." (footnotes omitted)); see also Jonathan C.
Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal
Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1343 (1993)
("Frequently, people with disabilities are stigmatized as less than human . . . .").
155. This is not to say that there should be or is no limit to what employers are obliged to
accommodate. The ADA provides an "undue hardship" defense to an accommodation request, even
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C. The Interactive Process
Mandating that employers participate in an interactive employer-
employee mediation process and be subject to liability for failure to do so
could refocus employment discrimination cases back onto how society
needs to change. Courts disagree as to whether the interactive process is
required.156 Many courts only require that an employer participate in an
interactive process if an employee has requested such an accommoda-
tion. 157 Courts also disagree about the consequences an employer faces
for failure to participate in the interactive process. 15 The EEOC regula-
tions provide that in the interactive process, the employer and employee
should
(1) [a]nalyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose
and essential functions; (2) [c]onsult with the individual with a disa-
bility to ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by the
individual's disability and how those limitations could be overcome
with a reasonable accommodation; (3) [i]n consultation with the in-
dividual to be accommodated, identify potential accommodations and
assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the individual to
perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) [c]onsider the
if that request is reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2012) ("The term 'undue hardship' means an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of [several] factors[,
including] (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed . . ; (ii) the overall financial re-
sources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact
otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial re-
sources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of opera-
tion or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.").
156. See, e.g., John R. Autry, Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA: Are Employers
Required to Participate in the Interactive Process? The Courts Say "Yes" but the Law Says "No,"
79 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 665, 677-685 (2004); Alysa M. Barancik, Comment, Determining Reasona-
ble Accommodations Under the ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an
"Interactive Process," 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 527 (1999); Valderrama, supra note 3, at 206.
Compare Picard v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., 423 F. App'x 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing requested jury instruction in ADA case that
failure to engage in the interactive process once accommodation was requested constituted per se
violation of the ADA), with Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App'x 738, 741 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that employers are required to engage in an interactive process with employees to
identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations).
157. Sam Silverman, The ADA Interactive Process: The Employer and Employee's Duty to
Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is More than a Game of Five Card Stud, 77
NEB. L. REV. 281, 287 (1998).
158. Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 615, 627-28 (2004) ("While at least one circuit court decision has suggested that independent
liability may exist under the ADA for a party who fails to participate in the interactive process, most
courts hold that liability will arise only where an employer has failed to implement a reasonable
accommodation that would enable a disabled employee to perform adequately in the workplace.
Taking a somewhat different tack, a growing number of circuit courts have ruled that an employer's
failure to engage in the interactive process ordinarily should warrant a trial court's refusal to grant an
employer's motion for summary judgment." (footnote omitted)).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and im-
plement the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the em-
ployee and the employer.159
1. The Benefits of an Interactive Process
A requirement that an employer participate in an interactive process
in good faith with the risk that failure to participate will result in inde-
pendent liability could potentially decrease litigation,160 benefit employ-
ers financially,161 and reinforce the notion that society needs to change,
not the individual with a disability.
A mandated interactive process would allow employees to deter-
mine what kind of accommodations an employer could provide. 162In
turn, the employee would have the opportunity to suggest alternatives,
which might be less costly for the employer.163 Along the same lines, an
employer could "overestimate the costs of an accommodation without
input from the employee."'164 Furthermore, "the interactive process has
many of the same benefits as mediated settlements; it is 'cheaper than
litigation, [and] can help preserve confidentiality, allow the employee to
stay on the job, and avoid monetary damages for an employer's initially
hostile responses to requests for accommodations."'
1 65
Finally, mandating an interactive process would reinforce the idea
that society needs to change because it requires slightly more from an
employer. For people with disabilities to be truly given an equal oppor-
tunity to succeed in the workplace and beyond, the goal should continue
to be integrating individuals with disabilities into society as much as
possible.
2. The Kind of Interactive Process to Mandate
The Third Circuit requires participation in the interactive process.166
To prove that an employer violated the requirement to participate, the
Third Circuit provides that a plaintiff needs to show:
"(1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; (2) the em-
ployee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disabil-
ity; (3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the
employee in seeking accommodations; and (4) the employee could
159. Valderrama, supra note 3, at 208.




164. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disabil-
ity Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 154 (2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316
n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)).
166. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317.
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have been reasonably accommodated" had the employer made a good
faith effort to do so.
The interactive process should focus less on whether a reasonable
accommodation existed and more on whether the employer made a good
faith effort to discuss with the employee the essential job functions. 6 8
Additionally, the employee should not be required to request an accom-
modation in order to trigger a required interactive process.
a. An Employer Should Communicate with the Employee
About the Essential Job Functions
The determination of whether an employee could be reasonably ac-
commodated depends on the essential functions of the job. If the em-
ployer does not communicate these functions to the employee, then it is
unfair to protect an employer from liability when no reasonable accom-
modation could have been provided because, in some cases, the essential
functions of the job are decided only after a claim is brought.
The facts from Picture People exemplify this unfairness. The em-
ployer clearly knew about Jessica's disability, and Jessica asked for a
reasonable accommodation by requesting an ASL interpreter. At this
point, an interactive process should have occurred, in which the employ-
er could have articulated to Jessica that verbal communication was an
essential function of the job of performer and that there was no reasona-
ble accommodation available. However, no interactive process occurred,
and the verbal communication essential job function was only declared
after the plaintiff filed her claim. As a result, before the claim was filed,
the plaintiff did not know what the essential functions of her job were
and thus could not know whether a reasonable accommodation existed.
Additionally, it seems that Picture People decided that verbal communi-
cation was an essential job function after Jessica brought her claim. Had
Jessica claimed that Picture People should have been liable because it did
not in good faith participate in an interactive process, Jessica would have
been awarded no remedy because no reasonable accommodation was
available. This result is unfair given that Jessica did not know while em-
ployed what the essential functions of her job were, or consequently,
whether a reasonable accommodation would have allowed her to perform
those essential functions.
167. Valderrama, supra note 3, at 209 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142,
165 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated on reh'g on other grounds, 184 F.3d 296 (1999).
168. These two inquiries (whether a reasonable accommodation exists and whether an employ-
ee can perform the essential functions of a job) are separate inquires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012)
("The term 'qualified individual' means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires.").
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Therefore, an employee should not be required to show that she
could have been reasonably accommodated unless the employer partici-
pated in an interactive process in which the essential functions of the job
were discussed.
b. An Employee Should Not Have to Request a Reasonable
Accommodation to Trigger the Interactive Process
If an employer knows or should know that an employee has a disa-
bility, the interactive process should take place regardless of whether the
employee has requested a reasonable accommodation. It would be in
both parties' best interest to discuss the essential functions of the job and
what reasonable accommodations might be available.169 Additionally,
employees might not know that they can request accommodations. Em-
ployers are likely to know of their obligations due to licenses they obtain
to do business in the state. Thus, there should be no obligation that an
employee ask for reasonable accommodations to trigger the requirement
for an interactive process.
c. What the Interactive Process Mandate Should Look Like
Although Picture People was not decided on the issue of a required
interactive process, I believe that it should have. A plaintiff should prove
the following elements to show that an employer violated the ADA re-
quirement to participate in the interactive process: (1) the employer knew
or should have known about the employee's disability; (2) the employer
did not make a good faith effort to discuss with the employee the essen-
tial functions of the job and to assist the employee in seeking accommo-
dations; and (3) the employee could have been reasonably accommodat-
ed had the employer made a good faith effort to do so. Thus, if an em-
ployer failed to communicate to the employee the essential functions of
her job, the employer would be in violation of the ADA and would be
independently liable.
By mandating an interactive process like the one described, em-
ployment discrimination claims brought under Title I of the ADA would
focus more on how society can help stop discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities, rather than on the limitations of these individuals.
This process would be more consistent with the goals of the ADA and
would offer other benefits to both employees and employers; it could
potentially avert subsequent lawsuits, saving employers the time and
expense of litigation, and reinforce the notion that society needs to
change, not the individual with a disability.
169. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Picture People shows that the essential function requirement of the
ADA could be used as a screening mechanism in employment discrimi-
nation cases based on disability. Permitting courts to systematically use
this requirement to screen out cases would undermine the goals of the
ADA. To prevent this outcome, the ADA should mandate that employers
participate in an interactive process that focuses not only on reasonable
accommodations but also on the essential job functions. This mandate
would remove the focus from the real or perceived shortcomings of an
individual with a disability, place the focus back onto society, and serve
to better integrate individuals with disabilities into the workplace.
Amy Knapp
* J.D. Candidate, 2014. I would like to thank the Denver University Law Review Board
members and editors, as well as Professor Nicole B. Porter for her inspiring and insightful class,
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ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: TiHE NEED FOR CONSISTENT
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPLICATION OF THE
BAN ON EXECUTING THE INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED*
ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in deciding Atkins v. Virginia. In Atkins, the
Court prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled individuals. In
doing so, however, the Court provided the states with very little guidance
and left the implementation of the ban to the discretion of the states.
Providing the states such discretion has resulted in Atkins standards with
inconsistencies in the following areas: (1) the definitional framework,
(2) the definitional components, (3) the identity of the fact finder and the
timing of the determination, and (4) the allocation of and standard for the
burden of proof.
To highlight the inconsistencies in the Atkins standards among vari-
ous states, this Comment will survey the Atkins standards in three of the
Tenth Circuit states: Oklahoma, Colorado, and Kansas. This Comment
will then examine how such inconsistency violates the Eighth Amend-
ment and the doctrine of incorporation. To remedy these violations, it is
vital that the states implement a consistent Atkins standard to implement
the Supreme Court's ban on executing the intellectually disabled. Conse-
quently, this Comment will sum up by recommending the standard that
the states should implement. This recommendation provides a consistent
standard and incorporates the mandates provided by the Supreme Court
in Atkins along with mandates of the mental health sciences. Implement-
ing this standard will allow the states to remedy the aforementioned con-
stitutional violations and uphold the law laid down in Atkins v. Virginia.
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* There has been a recent trend in replacing the term "mental retardation" with "intellectual
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INTRODUCTION
In Atkins v. Virginia,' a landmark Eighth Amendment case, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that executing intellectually disa-
bled defendants falls within the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.2 In its opinion, however, the Court provided very little guid-
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Id at 321. The Court explains that the Eighth Amendment prohibits categories of "exces-
sive" sanctions and that the concept of excessiveness is to be determined by reference to society's
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ance on how to define and enforce this new ban and instead left the task
up to the states. As a result, the Atkins standard has been applied incon-
sistently among the states allowing the death penalty.4 These inconsist-
encies, discussed in Part H and III of this Comment, can be found in sev-
eral areas, including the definitional framework for intellectual disability,
the assessment of the components of the definition, the appropriate fact
finder and timing for the intellectual disability determination made dur-
ing an Atkins hearing, and the standard and allocation of the burden of
proof.
These inconsistencies, in turn, have lent themselves to two principal
constitutional issues discussed in Part IV of this Comment. First, the
inconsistent and arbitrary application of the Atkins standard among the
states violates the Eighth Amendment due to the resultant unequal treat-
ment of intellectually disabled defendants based solely on their state of
residence. Second, for similar reasons, the inconsistent application of the
standard also violates the doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
These constitutional violations call for a remedy, and that remedy
can be found in consistent use of the Atkins standard and procedures that
this Comment recommends in Part V. The recommended standard for
intellectual disability includes utilization of the definitional framework
advocated by the American Association on Intellectual Disabilities
(AAIDD) (formerly the American Association on Intellectual Disability)
and its concomitant definitions of each component thereof. To ensure
consistent application across the states, it is important to have a con-
sistent procedure for implementing the Atkins ban. Accordingly, this
Comment recommends that prior to trial, a judge make the intellectual
disability determination. It is further recommended that defendants have
the burden of proving that they are intellectually disabled by a prepon-
derance of the evidence based on the findings of a qualified expert. Con-
sistent utilization of this standard will remedy the constitutional viola-
tions posed by the various Atkins standards and will help to fairly and
consistently implement the ban mandated by the Atkins Court.
I. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: THE CREATION OF THE ATKINS STANDARD
In Atkins, defendant Daryl Atkins was tried and convicted of capital
murder.6 During the sentencing phase of trial, a forensic psychologist for
the defense testified that based on interviews with Atkins's associates,
"evolving standards of decency." Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Id. at 317.
4. Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the Intel-
lectually Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L REV. 685, 686 (2009).
5. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders
and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77 passim (2003).
6. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
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his school, medical, and court records, and an intellectual quotient (IQ)
test, Atkins was "mildly"7 intellectually disabled. The State then present-
ed evidence from the trial record and from victim impact statements to
prove Atkins's future dangerousness and the "vileness of the offense."
After deliberations, the jury chose to impose the death penalty on At-
kins.9 Due to errors in the verdict form, however, the Supreme Court of
Virginia ordered a second sentencing hearing.' 0 At that hearing, the State
put on its own rebuttal expert (apart from the original defense expert),
who testified that Atkins was of "average intelligence, at least."" Again,
the jury chose to impose the death penalty. 12 Relying on the Supreme
Court precedent of Penry v. Lynaugh,13 the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the sentence.14 Atkins appealed to the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States and due to "the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape"
since the Penry decision, the Court granted certiorari.'
In its decision on the merits, the Court held that executing intellec-
tually disabled offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.16 At the outset,
it noted that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence depends on society's
"evolving standards of decency."' 7 With that in mind, the Court began by
surveying the various state legislative declarations concerning execution
of intellectually disabled offenders.'8 Because over thirty-four states had
enacted legislation either exempting intellectually disabled criminals
from the death penalty or eliminating the death penalty entirely since the
Penry decision, the Court surmised that modem society now viewed in-
tellectually disabled offenders as "categorically less culpable" than other
criminals.'9 Consequently, the Court concluded that a national consensus
had developed against the execution of intellectually disabled offend-
ers.20
In considering the issue, the Court utilized the AAIDD's definition
of "intellectual disability": subaverage intellectual functioning, signifi-
cant limitations in adaptive skills, and onset prior to the age of eight-
een.21 It listed a number of characteristics often associated with this defi-
7. Id at 308.
8. Id.




13. 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically ban
the execution of intellectually disabled offenders).
14. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 316.
17. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
18. Id. at 318.
19. Id. at 316.
20. See id
21. Id. at 318. Note that the Atkins Court used the term "mental retardation."
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nition, including diminished capacity for processing information, com-
municating, abstracting and learning from mistakes, engaging in logical
reasoning, controlling impulses, and understanding the reactions of oth-
ers.22 The Court stated that such characteristics negated the major pur-
poses underlying imposition of the death penalty-retribution and deter-
rence. 23 The Court reasoned that the national consensus that had devel-
oped likely reflected the judgment that the characteristics accompanying
intellectual disability made intellectually disabled offenders less culpable
and consequently less deserving of retribution.24 Similarly, these same
characteristics made it less likely that intellectually disabled offenders
consider the potential for execution when carrying out crimes, thereby
negating the death penalty's deterrent effect. 25 The Court further opined
that these characteristics might also undermine the procedural safeguards
inherent in capital proceedings because intellectually disabled offenders
may be less able to assist their lawyers, act as good witnesses, or appear
to juries to have remorse for their crimes. 2 6 Consequently, the Court held
that the execution of intellectually disabled offenders violates the Eighth
Amendment.2 7 However, it left open to the states the task of properly
defining the scope of and enforcing this new prohibition.
II. INCONSISTENCIES AMONG THE STATES
Because of the Supreme Court's deference to the states in defining
and implementing the ban on intellectually disabled offenders, different
standards have arisen. These inconsistencies can be divided into four
general categories: the definitional framework, the assessment of the
definitional components, the fact finder and timing for the intellectual
disability determination, and the standard and allocation of the burden of
proof. Variations in each area will be reviewed in turn.
A. Inconsistencies in the Definitional Framework
In general, states have utilized three definitional frameworks in de-
fining "intellectual disability": the AAIDD's definition, the American
Psychological Association's definition, and state-created definitions. The
most common of these definitions, and the one referred to in the Atkins
case, 2 9 is the definition provided by the AAIDD. 30 The AAIDD defines
"intellectual disability" as a "disability characterized by significant limi-
tations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as ex-
22. Id.
23. Id at 319.
24. Id
25. Id.
26. Id. at 316-317.
27. Id. at 316.
28. Id at 317.
29. Id at 318.
30. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 87-89.
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pressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability
originates before age 18."31 This definition can be broken into three dis-
tinct components: (1) the "intellectual functioning" component, (2) the
"adaptive behavior" or "adaptive functioning" component, and (3) the
manifestation during the developmental period (commonly referred to as
"early onset") component.32 According to the AAIDD, the intellectual
functioning component includes characteristics such as learning, reason-
ing, and problem solving. The AAIDD states that an IQ score of two
standard deviations below the mean for the IQ test used is the upper
threshold for meeting the intellectual functioning component. 34 The
adaptive behavior component requires limitations in the following three
skill sets: conceptual, social, and practical skills.35 A score of two stand-
ard deviations below the mean for the adaptive behavioral assessment
used qualifies an individual as having limitations in adaptive function-
ing.3 6 The early onset component requires that the disability originate
before the age of eighteen.37
Other states choose to follow the similar three-pronged definition
from the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The APA's current
definition, included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-
IV), is as follows:
A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of approx-
imately 70 or below39 on an individually administered IQ test.
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning
(i.e., the person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for
his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the fol-
lowing areas: communication, self-care, home living, so-
cial/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.
40C. The onset is before age 18 years.
31. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition, AM.
Ass'N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 1 (Jan. 2008),
http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/AAIDDFAQonlD.pdf [hereinafter AAIDD Definition].
32. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 87, 89.
33. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 2.
34. Id (noting that generally a score two standard deviations below the mean will fall in the
range of a score of 70 to 75 depending on the IQ test used).
35. Id.
36. Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems ofSupport, AM. Ass'N ON
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 20 (2010),
http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/CoreSlide.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual Disability].
37. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31.
38. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 88.
39. The word "approximately" in the definition indicates that a score of 70 is an approxima-
tion of a score that is two standard deviations below the mean for the IQ test being used. Richard J.
Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association's Resource Document on Mental Retardation and




The APA definition also categorizes an individual's level of intellectual
disability based on IQ score into one of the following categories: mild,
moderate, severe, and profound.4 '
Generally, states use either the AAIDD's or the APA's definition of
"intellectual disability" due to the clinical nature of each.42 However,
despite the general similarities between the two definitions, obvious dif-
ferences exist. For example, the APA sets an approximate cutoff score,
whereas the AAIDD allows for a wider variation of scores depending on
the IQ test used. Furthermore, the two definitions differ as to the adaptive
functioning areas in which an individual must have behavioral limita-
tions to be deemed intellectually disabled. Consequently, utilization of
the different definitions results in states measuring the intellectual func-
tioning component and defining the adaptive functioning component in
41divergent manners.
In a wholly separate category are states that adopt their own inde-
pendent definitions of "intellectual disability." Some of these states adopt
terms from the AAIDD or APA definitions and then rely on judicial in-
terpretation to fill in the meanings of those terms." For example, Cali-
fornia defines "intellectual disability" as "significantly subaverage gen-
eral intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adap-
tive behavior and manifested before the age of 18. The lack of further
definition requires judicial interpretation of the meaning of each defini-
tional component. Other states define "intellectual disability" as at or
below a certain IQ score and then shift the burden to the prosecution to
prove the defendant is not intellectually disabled.4 6 For example, Illi-
nois's criminal procedure statute provides for a presumption of intellec-
tual disability when an individual scores 75 or below on an IQ test.4 7
Although the statute also requires concurrent deficits in adaptive behav-
ior, the presumption accompanying the IQ score causes the adaptive be-
havior component to carry far less weight because the presumption au-
tomatically shifts the burden of proof to the other side.
B. Inconsistencies in the Assessment of the Definitional Component
In addition to variations in the definitional framework of the intel-
lectual disability standard, states vary in how they define and assess each
40. ROBERT L. SPITZER ET AL., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS CASEBOOK 366 (4th ed. 1994).
41. Id. at 549.
42. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 92.
43. Id. at 92-93.
44. Brooke Amos, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Analyzing the Correct Standard and Examination
Practices to Use When Determining Mental Retardation, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 469, 482
(2011).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (West 2012).
46. See Amos, supra note 44.
47. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/114-15 (West 2012).
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component of the "intellectual disability" definition. Because the three-
pronged clinical definition is the most popular, 4 8 only variations in as-
sessment of that definition's components will be analyzed. First, states
vary widely in the instrument they use to measure intellectual function-
ing. Second, states vary in how adaptive behavior limitations are as-
sessed, especially due to the varying definitions of this component.
Third, states differ in how they determine whether an individual's intel-
lectual disability originated prior to eighteen years of age.
Although states widely agree that the intellectual functioning com-
ponent should be measured by a standardized IQ test,4 9 the options for
such a test are many. Some of these variations include the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (assessing verbal comprehension, perceptual
reasoning, working memory, and processing speed),50 the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scale (assessing verbal reasoning, quantitative reasoning,
and short-term memory),5 ' the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelli-
gence Test (assessing sequential reasoning, induction, long-term
memory, word knowledge and language development, language compre-
hension, listening ability, visual processing, cultural knowledge, and
delayed memory),52 and the Cognitive Assessment System (assessing
planning, attention, integration of separate stimuli, and the ability to seri-
ally order things). 3 Although each test purports to measure intelligence,
each does so on a different basis. The consequences of this divergence
become apparent when considering that the scientific community gener-
ally agrees that intellectually disabled individuals have limitations that
exist concurrently with their strengths.5 4 Consequently, one test might
highlight an individual's strengths, whereas another test might highlight
that same individual's weaknesses and therefore provide a vastly differ-
ent score. 5 These discrepancies could mean the difference between be-
ing classified as intellectually disabled or not and consequently being
spared or sentenced to death.56
48. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 87, 89.
49. Amos, supra note 44, at 490.
50. John Fabian et al., Life, Death and IQ: It's Much More than Just a Score: Understanding
and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual
Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399,406 (2011).
51. Richard Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge oflImplementing Atkins v. Virgin-
ia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudication of Mental
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 827 (2007).
52. Kaufinan Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test, ENCYCLOPEDIA MENTAL DISORDERS,
http://www.minddisorders.com/Kau-NulKaufman-Adolescent-and-Adult-Intelligence-
Test.html#ixzz29xNOC4bW (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
53. ESTHER STRAUSS ET AL., A COMPENDIUM OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS:
ADMINISTRATION, NORMS, AND COMMENTARY 133 (3d ed. 2006).
54. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31.
55. See Fabian et al., supra note 50, at 414 (explaining that test scores are not expected to be
the same across different tests).
56. See infra Part II.D.
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Variations in assessing the adaptive behavior component are even
greater than those in assessing intellectual functioning due to the adap-
tive behavior component's relatively new addition to the scientific defi-
nition of "intellectual disability."57 Consequently, over 200 different as-
sessments of adaptive behavior currently exist. 8 Typical adaptive behav-
ior assessments involve mental health professionals interviewing or
providing questionnaires to third parties, such as teachers and parents,
who are involved in an intellectually disabled individual's life.59 Some of
these tests depend solely on accounts provided by third parties such as
caregivers, some depend on a wider variety of third-party accounts, and
some incorporate observation of the individual being assessed.6 0 The
existence of these divergent approaches to assessment of the adaptive
behavior component highlights the lack of one uniform and reliable
method and the consequent need to choose an assessment with proven
scientific reliability and validity.6 1
Despite its seemingly clear definition, the early onset component of
intellectual disability is also measured in varied ways. Measurement can
include diagnoses made before the age of eighteen, IQ tests administered
before the age of eighteen, or any variety of evidence indicating the onset
of intellectual disability prior to the age of eighteen. 62 Allowing for vari-
ous forms of evidence to indicate the onset of intellectual disability prior
to eighteen is appropriate because problems can arise when states require
formal diagnoses or test results from before an individual turned eight-
een.63 Such requirements can result in discrimination against persons
whose mental health needs were not appropriately addressed during their
adolescence.64 For example, some intellectually disabled offenders may
not have had adequate access to mental health services as a child, result-
ing in their mental health needs being overlooked.6
C. Inconsistencies in the Identity of the Fact Finder and the Timing of the
Determination
In addition to these definitional variances, states differ as to who de-
termines the existence of intellectual disability and when during the trial
that determination is made. States may select the judge, the jury, or an
expert to make the intellectual disability determination.6 6 The Atkins de-
termination is very similar to criminal competency and criminal insanity
57. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 846.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 847.
60. WILLIAM COOK, DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SERVICES TO PERSONS WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN MONTANA: A STAFF REFERENCE MANUAL 14-16 (5th ed. 2011).
61. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 97.




66. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 85; see also Amos, supra note 44, at 495.
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determinations. Consequently, for purposes of determining the appropri-
ate fact finder, this Comment will treat the role of the fact finder in At-
kins determinations as identical to that in competency and insanity pro-
ceedings.67 When a judge is used as the fact finder, the judge generally
makes a pretrial determination during an Atkins proceeding about wheth-
er the facts presented by the party with the burden satisfy the relevant
legal standard.68 This, in turn, dictates how the ensuing prosecution will
proceed.69 For example, if the judge decides that the defendant is not
intellectually disabled, then the prosecution will pursue a capital trial. On
the other hand, when the jury acts as fact finder, the Atkins determination
generally occurs after the guilt phase of trial. 70 Typically, the determina-
tion will involve some consideration of the individual's culpability in the
charged crime.7 1 Finally, when the court selects and utilizes an expert as
fact finder, the expert can acts as a neutral party wholly separate from the
adversarial process.72 The experts make their determinations based on
their interpretations of facts relevant to diagnosing intellectual disabil-
ity.7 3 The experts then present their opinions via testimony as part of the
defense's mitigation theories.74
D. Inconsistencies in the Allocation of and Standard for the Burden of
Proof
The final area of inconsistency among the states is the allocation of
and standard for the burden of proof at an Atkins hearing. States can allo-
cate the burden of proof on either the defendant or the Government. No
states, however, have chosen to place the burden on the Government. 76
This procedural aspect therefore requires little discussion. On the other
hand, states do vary in the standard they impose for the burden of
proof.7 7 Three categories for this burden exist: (1) preponderance of the
evidence, (2) clear and convincing proof, and (3) beyond a reasonable
doubt.78 Because states consistently allocate the burden to the defendant,
oftentimes the standard alone will ultimately determine whether a de-
67. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 105.
68. Id. at 106. Alternatively, a judge may make the intellectual disability determination during
the sentencing phase of trial. However, if a defendant is determined pre-trial not to be intellectually
disabled, a less involved sentencing phase may be required. Therefore, generally the judge will make
the determination during the pre-trial phase to increase judicial efficiency. See id. at 105-06, 110.
69. Id. at 105.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Amos, supra note 44, at 495.
73. Id.
74. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 857.
75. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 114.
76. Seeid.atll8.
77. Justin Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill ofRights: The Tension Between the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modem Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J.




fendant is found intellectually disabled. 9 A defendant who could be
found intellectually disabled in a state whose burden is preponderance of
the evidence may not be found intellectually disabled in a state whose
burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. This disparity exemplifies the in-
consistency resulting from differing burdens of proof among the states.80
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE A TKiNS STANDARD IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Because of these discrepancies among the states, modern death pen-
alty jurisprudence regarding the prohibition on executing the intellectual-
ly disabled has proven incapable of producing a consistent standard.81
This lack of consistency is exemplified by surveying the Atkins standards
applied in some of the state trial courts comprising the Tenth Circuit. A
comparison of the standards in Oklahoma, Colorado, and Kansas is tell-
ing. In Oklahoma, the relevant standard utilizes the three-pronged clini-
cal definition but adds a requirement that the defendant have an IQ of no
more than 70.82 Colorado also adheres to the three-pronged definition,
and although it does not implement additional requirements as Oklahoma
does, it does not provide any definitional guidance as to each of the three
prongs.83 Conversely, Kansas's utilization of the three-pronged standard
includes precise definitional components and implements a precondi-
tion84 that defendants must meet before they can even attempt to prove
their intellectual disability.85 A detailed comparison of the Atkins stand-
ard in these three states follows. This comparison shows that even among
states adhering to the three-pronged definition, wide variation abounds
regarding the definitions and processes by which these states implement
the Atkins ban.
A. Oklahoma
Application of the Atkins standard in Oklahoma is exemplified in
the recent Tenth Circuit case of Hooks v. Workman,86 in which an Atkins
hearing resulted in a determination that the defendant was not intellectu-
ally disabled.87 In Hooks, the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder and first-degree manslaughter for the beating death of his preg-
79. Id. at 1289.
80. Id. at 1289-90.
81. Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally
Protect the Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529,
578 (2011).
82. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003), overruled on other
grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
83. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101 (2012).
84. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6622 (2012) (requiring the court to determine that there is
"sufficient reason to believe" that the defendant has an intellectual disability prior to allowing an
Atkins proceeding).
85. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01 (2012).
86. 689 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2012).
87. Id. at 1173.
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nant common law wife.8 At the defendant's Atkins hearing, both parties
agreed that the defendant's disabilities had manifested themselves before
the age of eighteen but disagreed as to whether the defendant had limita-
tions in his intellectual and adaptive functioning." At the Atkins hearing,
nine IQ tests taken over a thirty-four-year period were presented to the
jury with scores ranging from 53 to 80.90 The jury also heard evidence
about the defendant's limited functioning in the adaptive skill areas of
communication and academics. 9' Considering the range of IQ scores and
the strengths the defendant had in other areas of adaptive functioning, the
jury concluded that the defendant had not proven his intellectual disabil-
ity by a preponderance of the evidence and his conviction was upheld.92
Thereafter, the defendant filed two habeas petitions, addressing,
among other matters, the shortcomings of the procedure and result of his
Atkins hearing. 93 The defendant claimed that despite the jury's finding,
he had proven with sufficient evidence that he was intellectually disabled
based on his IQ scores and his limitations in two areas of adaptive func-
tioning.94
To resolve the defendant's sufficiency challenge and determine
whether the lower court had reasonably applied Atkins, the Tenth Circuit
began by reciting Oklahoma's Atkins standard as laid out in Murphy v.
State.95 The Murphy court held that a defendant is intellectually disabled
if he or she has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, the in-
tellectual disability manifested prior to the age of eighteen, and the de-
fendant concurrently suffers from significant limitations in adaptive
functioning. 96 The Murphy court provided a list of areas in which the
limitations of the defendant's intellectual functioning must be apparent
and a list of nine skill areas in which limitations in adaptive functioning
could be manifest. These limitations can be proven through IQ tests,
along with other evidence.9 8 The court held that defendants must estab-
lish their intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence dur-
ing trial.99 The court also imposed a precondition that a defendant must
have an IQ of no greater than 70 to even be allowed an Atkins hearing.100
88. Id. at 1161.
89. Id.at1l67.
90. ld at 1168.
91. Seeid.atll71.
92. Seeid.atll71.
93. Id. at 1161-62.
94. Seeid.at 1164.
95. 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Blonner v.








In considering whether the defendant had presented sufficient evi-
dence to meet the intellectual functioning prong of this test, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the lower court's reasoning that the lower IQ scores
reflected Hooks's refusal to cooperate during a period of trauma in his
life rather than limitations in intellectual functioning.'01 The two test
scores that the lower court found reliable included a 72 and a 76.102 The
court held that because these scores fell above the threshold score of 70
required by Murphy, a rational trier of fact could have found that the
defendant was not eligible to be considered intellectually disabled and
that the court had not unreasonably applied Atkins.'0 3
The court then moved on to consider whether the defendant pre-
sented sufficient evidence to meet the significant limitations in the adap-
tive functioning prong.' Contrary to the defendant's argument, and not-
ing that the Supreme Court had left "the precise contours of the defini-
tion" to the states, the court reasoned that it was not necessary to focus
on the defendant's limitations at the exclusion of his strengths.'0o After
listing various evidence regarding Hooks' strengths in many of the adap-
tive functioning skill sets, the court concluded that a rational fact finder
could have found that Hooks did not satisfy this prong of the test.'06 The
court also reasoned that all of the evidence presented by the defendant
regarding his adaptive functioning had come from witness testimony and
therefore should be appraised based on witness credibility.107 It cited the
rational fact finder standard as further reason to deny the defendant's
sufficiency of the evidence challenge and to find that the lower court had
reasonably applied the Atkins standard.'o
B. Colorado
The application of the Atkins standard in Oklahoma can be contrast-
ed with that in Oklahoma's Tenth Circuit sister state of Colorado. The
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Colorado's stat-
ute banning the execution of intellectually disabled defendants in People
v. Vasquez.109 In Vasquez, the defendant, Jimmy Vasquez, was charged
with first-degree murder."o He filed a motion indicating his intent to
establish that he was intellectually disabled, and subsequently asked the
court to find Colorado's Atkins statute unconstitutional because it re-
101. Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1171.
105. Id. at 1171-72.
106. Id. at 1172-73.
107. Id. at 1l73.
108. Id.
109. 84 P.3d 1019, 1020-21 (Colo. 2004).
110. Id. at 1020.
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quired defendants to prove their intellectual disability by clear and con-
vincing evidence."'
The Colorado Supreme Court began its analysis by referencing Col-
orado's statute banning the execution of intellectually disabled individu-
als.'1 2 The statute defines "intellectually disabled defendant" as "any
defendant with significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested and documented during the developmental period."" 3 The
statute also requires that the intellectual disability determination be made
prior to trial and that the defendant have the burden of proving his intel-
lectual disability by clear and convincing evidence."14 Because of the
timing of the determination, the statute designates the court as the fact
finder.' 's Regarding the intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior
evaluations themselves, the statute also requires that if more than one
evaluation is ordered, at least one must be performed by a psychologist
recommended by the executive director of the Department of Human
Services.11 6 The statute allows for evidence of statements made by the
defendant, of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime, and of the defendant's medical and social history to be included in
the evaluation.'17
After its review of the relevant intellectual disability standard, the
court reviewed the Atkins decision and noted that it implemented a sub-
stantive, rather than procedural, rule." 8 The Colorado Supreme Court
then held that both the allocation of the burden and the burden itself were
constitutional because Atkins had left it up to the states to determine how
to implement the ban and nothing in Atkins bars a state from enacting a
process by which to exclude intellectually disabled defendants from capi-
tal punishment." 9
C. Kansas
The Atkins standard implemented in Oklahoma and Colorado con-
trasts sharply with the Atkins standard implemented in Kansas. Accord-
ing to Kansas's relevant statutory scheme, when defendants wish to es-
tablish that they are intellectually disabled, the court must initially de-
termine whether there is sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant
1 11. Id.
112. Id. at 1021.
113. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2012). Note that the statute uses the term "mentally
retarded defendant."
114. Id. § 18-1.3-1102.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 18-1.3-1104.
117. Id.
118. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1022 (Colo. 2004).
119. Id. at l021.
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is intellectually disabled.120 If the court finds evidence for this belief, in
order to make its final determination, the court must appoint two profes-
sionals to perform an evaluation on the defendant: either two psycholo-
gists, two physicians, or one of each.12 1 The professionals must be "quail-
fled by training and practice" in order to be appointed by the court. 2 2
The Kansas statutory scheme defines "intellectual disability" as
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing con-
currently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
period from birth to age 18.",123 The statute requires that the defendant
have significant subaverage general intellectual functioning "to an extent
which substantially impairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality
of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of
law." 2 4 For defendants to fulfill the subaverage intellectual functioning
prong of the test, they must score at least two standard deviations below
the mean score on a standardized test that is specified by the secretary of
social and rehabilitation services.12 5 The statute also provides a definition
of "adaptive behavior": "the effectiveness or degree with which an indi-
vidual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsi-
bility expected of that person's age, cultural group and community." 2 6
At the Atkins hearing, defendants may present any evidence they wish to
convince the judge that they are intellectually disabled.12 7
D. Comparison of the Tenth Circuit States
To further highlight the inconsistent ways in which the Atkins
standard is applied among the states, Table I below presents a side-by-
side comparison of the three Tenth Circuit states just discussed. For each
state, the table compares the definitional framework, the assessment of
the definitional components, the fact finder and timing for the determina-
tion, the allocation of and standard for the burden of proof, and types of
evidence allowed in an Atkins hearing. The comparison presented by the
table highlights the obvious lack of a consistent Atkins standard.
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6622 (2012).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01 (2012).
124. Id. § 21-6622.
125. Id. § 76-12b01.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 21-6622.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM INCONSISTENT ATKINS
STANDARDS
The inconsistencies among states in the application of the Atkins
standard lend themselves to a number of constitutional issues. These
issues stem from the fact that the Supreme Court left it to state discretion
to decide how to define and implement the Atkins ban. This decision, and
the consequent varying standards that states have promulgated since, lead
to violations in two areas of the Constitution: the Eighth Amendment and
the incorporation doctrine.
A. Eighth Amendment Issues
Ironically, although Atkins was intended to remedy violations of the
Eighth Amendment in light of "evolving standards of decency,"l 28 the
fact that the Court deferred to the states the decision about how to im-
plement the new ban has resulted in a different violation of the Eighth
Amendment: arbitrariness. In Furman v. Georgia,129 the Supreme Court
held in a plurality opinion that an arbitrarily applied punishment falls
into the category of "cruel and unusual punishment." 30 Justice Douglas,
in concurrence, reasoned that the Eighth Amendment's predecessor in
the English Bill of Rights was aimed at preventing "selective or irregular
128. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
129. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
130. Id. at 239-40.
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application of harsh penalties."' 3 He noted that this now contemporary
recognition of "the basic theme of equal protection" implicit in the
Eighth Amendment is violated when a punishment is applied arbitrarily
or discriminatorily.13 2 As aptly stated by Justice Stewart, "where the ul-
timate punishment of death is at issue[,] a system of standardless jury
discretion violates the Eighth ... Amendment[]."
The Supreme Court left the Atkins decision vulnerable to arbitrary
application in violation of the Eighth Amendment by deferring the defi-
nition and implementation processes to the states. By not providing a
precise definition, process, or designated fact finder, the Court provided
for an increased likelihood of arbitrary results.134 When juries without
backgrounds in psychology or health care are allowed to determine
whether a defendant is intellectually disabled, it is far more likely that
extrinsic, individualized factors will weigh in their decisions, causing the
decisions to be highly subjective and potentially baseless.'35 To be sure,
these dangers are present in all capital murder cases; however, the dan-
gers are especially apparent in Atkins hearings due to the clinical under-
pinnings of the Atkins standard. 3 6
B. Doctrine ofIncorporation Issues
The other constitutional issue brought about by the inconsistencies
in the implementation of the Atkins standard involves violations of the
doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine of incorporation refers to the pro-
cess by which the fundamental rights provided in the Bill of Rights are
applied to the individual states.' 37 The doctrine places particular im-
portance on the uniform application of the Bill of Rights across the sev-
eral states, specifically prohibiting the states from applying "watered-
down" versions of the rights.'3 ' This leaves almost no room for deference
to the states when it comes to defining the incorporated rights.' 39
In Robinson v. Cahfornia,14 0 the Supreme Court noted that the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment was applica-
ble to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.141 According to the doctrine of incorporation, therefore, the
Eighth Amendment must be applied "consistently and with equal force"
131. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 249.
133. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n. 47 (1976).
134. Amos, supra note 44, at 484.
135. Id. at 485.
136. See id. at 493.
137. Marceau, supra note 77, at 1242.
138. Id. at 1242-43 (quoting Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 24 (1964) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
139. Id.
140. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
141. Id. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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across the several states. 142 However, even a quick glance at the Tenth
Circuit summary table shows that the Atkins ban has certainly not been
applied in any consistent manner. 14 3 States vary in how they define, as-
sess, and procedurally implement the ban. Such disparity directly vio-
lates the doctrine of incorporation.144
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR A CONSISTENT STANDARD
Constitutional concerns such as these justify the need for a con-
sistent Atkins standard among the states. To comport with the mandates
of the doctrine of incorporation, and to avoid further violation of the
Eighth Amendment, there must be at least a minimum baseline level of
consistency in the Atkins standard.14 5 The most appropriate standard is
one that takes account of three important considerations: the general
guidelines provided by the Supreme Court in Atkins, current scientific
research regarding the definition and diagnosis of intellectual disabil-
ity,146 and the mandates of the Constitution.14 7 Implementation of the
consistent standard recommended by this Comment will remedy the not-
ed constitutional violations because those violations derive from the in-
consistent application of the standard itself. Focusing on the remaining
two considerations, the guidance of the Atkins court and the principles of
science, will supply the needed consistent standard.
This Comment recommends the following: when implementing the
Atkins ban, courts should adhere to the AAIDD definition of "intellectual
disability" for both their definitional frameworks and for the definitions
of the components of that framework. In regard to assessing the compo-
nents of this definition, the intellectual functioning component should be
assessed by either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) or the
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Stanford-Binet), the adaptive func-
tioning component should be assessed by Scales of Independent Behav-
ior (SIB-R), AAIDD Adaptive Behavior Scale (ABAS-II), or Inventory
for Client and Agency Planning (ICAP), and the early onset component
should be a holistic assessment. It is further recommended that procedur-
ally the judge should make the intellectual disability determination prior
to trial and defendants should bear the burden of proving intellectual
disability by a preponderance of the evidence. Adherence to this standard
142. Marceau, supra note 77, at 1242.
143. See supra Part fIl.D.
144. Marceau, supra note 77, at 1292 ("These divergent standards as to a federal constitutional
right are in tension with the general dictates of federal supremacy and the specific mandates of
constitutional incorporation. There is simply no federal oversight, much less uniformity.").
145. See id. at 1302.
146. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
147. Use of a consistent standard in and of itself will ensure that the third consideration is met.
Therefore, in justifying this Comment's various recommendations, only the other two considerations
will be explicitly addressed.
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will remedy the problems created by the current lack of a consistent
standard. 148
A. Recommended Definitional Framework: The AAIDD Definition
The AAIDD's definition of "intellectual disability" should be used
consistently at all Atkins hearings. The Atkins decision supports the use
of this definition. Although the Supreme Court in Atkins did not mandate
a definition for use by the states, it did provide some general guide-
lines. 149 According to the Court, "clinical definitions of [intellectual dis-
ability] require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also
significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-
care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18."lso In
providing this definitional framework, the Court referenced two separate
definitions-those of the AAIDD and the APA.15 ' Although these two
definitions are nearly the same in substance, the goals underlying each
are different. The goal of the APA is to promote education, research, and
patient care in the field of psychiatry.152 The AAIDD's stated mission, on
the other hand, is to "promote[] progressive policies, sound research,
effective practices, and universal human rights for people with intellectu-
al and developmental disabilities."1 5 3 As a matter of policy and for the
sake of consistency, the AAIDD's definition should be used because it
incorporates evolving policy, research, practice, and human rights of the
intellectually disabled, rather than the more general concern with the
field of psychiatry found in the APA's definition. The underlying poli-
cies of the AAIDD also contribute to the alignment of the AAIDD defini-
tion with the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Atkins and with
the ever-evolving scientific standards behind intellectual disability. Con-
sequently, this Comment recommends that the appropriate definitional
framework for use in an Atkins hearing is as follows: (1) significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in adaptive
behavior, and (3) onset or origination before the age of eighteen.154
In keeping with the need for consistency, each component of the
definitional framework should align with the well-developed correspond-
ing AAIDD definition of the component. Accordingly, "subaverage intel-
lectual functioning" should be defined as limitations in one's "general
mental capability that include[] the ability to reason, solve problems,
think abstractly, plan, and learn from experience, [and] comprehend[]
148. See Entzeroth, supra note 81, at 578.
149. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 308 n.3.
152. About APA & Psychiatry, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, http://www.psychiatry.org/about-
apa-psychiatry (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
153. Mission, AM. Ass'N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
http://www.aamr.org/content 443.cfin?navlD-129 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
154. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 5-6.
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one's surroundings." 5 5 Subaverage intellectual functioning is reflected
by a score at least two standard deviations below the mean score on the
IQ test being used, taking into account the standard error of measurement
for the test as well.'56 "Adaptive behavior" should be defined as perfor-
mance in three categories of skill sets: conceptual skills,'5 7 social
skills,' 58 and practical skills.'5 9 Like subaverage intellectual functioning,
limitations in adaptive behavior are also reflected by a score at least two
standard deviations below the mean score on the behavioral assessment
being used, taking into account the standard error of measurement for the
assessment.160 The AAIDD's definitions for these individual components
align with the guidance provided by the Atkins Court and are based on
the most up-to-date clinical science.
B. Recommended Assessment of the Definitional Components
Because the AAIDD provides a clinical definition of "intellectual
disability," it is most appropriate to assess each component according to
modem clinical research and standards.' 6' This ensures utilization of the
most modem science. It is important, however, to also align these clinical
principles with the policy considerations behind the prohibition on exe-
cuting the intellectually disabled, as noted by the Atkins Court.
1. Recommended Assessment of the Subaverage "Intellectual
Functioning" Component
Choosing an assessment standard is complicated due to the various
available options for IQ tests.16 2 In deciding the appropriate test, one
must seek to maintain consistency without mandating one single test
because no test is one-size-fits-all. 63 In its manual, the AAIDD does
provide some guidance as to what type of test is most appropriate by
stating that "[u]ntil more robust instruments based upon one or more of
the multifactorial theories of intellectual functioning are developed and
demonstrated to be psychometrically sound, we will continue to rely on a
155. Amos, supra note 44, at 474 (quoting AM. Ass'N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 55 (10th ed. 2002))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
156. Intellectual Disability, supra note 36, at 8.
157. Conceptual skills include language and literacy; money, time, and number concepts; and
self-direction. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 2.
158. Social skills include interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility,
naivet6 (i.e., wariness), social problem solving, and the ability to follow rules or obey laws and to
avoid being victimized. Id.
159. Practical skills include activities of daily living (personal care), occupational skills,
healthcare, travel or transportation, schedules or routines, safety, use of money, and use of the tele-
phone. Id
160. Intellectual Disability, supra note 36.
161. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 815-16.
162. See supra Part I.B.
163. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 827-28.
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global (general factor) IQ as a measure of intellectual functioning."'6
Additionally, these tests should be generally accepted by the scientific
community and utilize the most up-to-date diagnostic procedures.1 6 5
Choosing tests that fit these standards will therefore satisfy the consid-
eration of utilizing up-to-date scientific research and methods.
At the outset, it should be noted that due to the inclusion of defend-
ants with mild intellectual disability in the Atkins prohibition,'66 the IQ
test used must adequately include these individuals within the intellectual
disability definition to comport with the guidance provided by the Atkins
Court. Although there are many tests available, this Comment recom-
mends that subaverage intellectual functioning be assessed using either
the WAIS or the Stanford-Binet intelligence quotient test.
The WAIS is considered exceptionally reliable, valid, organized,
and easy to use.167 It measures vocabulary, arithmetic, and visual-spatial
skills on both a verbal and performance basis.168 Likewise, the Stanford-
Binet is highly representative of the general population and is considered
highly reliable overall.169 It measures five different categories: fluid rea-
soning (the ability for complex problem solving), knowledge, quantita-
tive reasoning (the ability to complete mathematical word problems),
visual-spatial processing (interpretation of figures and diagrams), and
working memory (short-term memory).17 0 The test assesses these factors
both verbally and non-verbally.171 Both IQ tests, when used in their full
form as they should be, utilize various subtests to create a composite IQ
score based on a range of intellectual functioning components.172 This
comports with the guidance provided by the AAIDD. Furthermore, both
of these tests are normed on the general population, thereby including
individuals with intellectual capacities ranging from severely intellectu-
ally disabled to genius level.173 Consequently, they sufficiently account
for the Atkins Court's mandate that the definition of "intellectual disabil-
ity" include those individuals with only mild intellectual disability who
may not be accounted for in tests focusing only on more obviously intel-
lectually disabled individuals.
164. AAIDD AD Hoc COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 41 (1 Ith ed. 2010).
165. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 829-30.
166. Id. at 822.
167. Alexis K. Dowling, Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's
Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 799 (2003).
168. Id. at 798 n.230.
169. Id at 800.
170. Tips to Encounter a Stanford Binet IQ Test, PERSONALITY-AND-APTITUDE-CAREER-
TESTS.COM, http://www.personality-and-aptitude-career-tests.com/stanford-binet-iq-test.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2013).
171. Id
172. See id
173. Dowling, supra note 167, at 799 800.
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To promote consistency and ensure that tests are not chosen arbi-
trarily, Virginia's model for available choices of IQ test should be uti-
lized by all states. Virginia's statutory scheme "requires the Comiis-
sioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Ser-
vices [to] maintain an 'exclusive list' of appropriate tests for use in
courts during Atkins hearings. 7 4 An analogous official in each state
should be appointed or required to carry out this same responsibility.
Initially, only the WAIS and Stanford-Binet should be included in such a
list of tests. However, formalized procedures should be provided for any
litigant wishing to add additional tests to this list. 17 5 Although the exact
contours of such a procedure are beyond the scope of this Comment, the
procedure should serve the dual purpose of providing a screening mech-
anism that would help ensure that only the highest quality tests are al-
lowed into the courtroom and allowing the list to be updated as newer
and more scientifically sound tests are produced. 176
2. Recommended Assessment of the Limitations in "Adaptive
Functioning" Component
Limitations in adaptive functioning should be assessed with one of
the three following tests: the SIB-R, the ABAS-II, or the ICAP. As with
IQ tests, an exclusive list of appropriate tests should be maintained by a
designated authority, along with a formalized procedure for the addition
of new tests to ensure that up-to-date science is being utilized.
The SIB-R, ABAS-II, and ICAP are the three most commonly used
adaptive behavior assessments for adults. 7 7 The S1B-R is a comprehen-
sive assessment that provides a score based on a combination of an indi-
vidual's adaptive and maladaptive behaviors.178 It measures these behav-
iors in the categories of motor skills, social interaction and communica-
tion skills, personal living skills, and community living skills."' The
SIB-R can be administered either as a questionnaire or as a structured
interview.'so Developed by the AAIDD, the ABAS-II is used to assess
how individuals cope with the demands of their natural and social envi-
ronments.18' The test can be administered in a school or in a community
setting.182 The ICAP is an assessment tool that, like the SIB-R, measures
174. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 832 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1
(2012)).
175. See id at 832-33.
176. See id. at 833.
177. Brad Hill, Adaptive and Maladaptive Behavior Scales, ASSESSMENT PSYCH. ONLINE,
http://www.assessmentpsychology.com/adaptivebehavior.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 2012).
178. Id.
179. Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised, NELSON EDUC.,
http://www.assess.nelson.com/test-ind/sib-r.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
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an individual's adaptive and maladaptive behaviors.183 It also takes into
account an individual's demographics, diagnoses, support services, and
leisure activities.184 Each of these tests comport with the AAIDD's rec-
ommendation that adaptive behavior be assessed "through the use of
standardized test measures normed on the general population, including
people with disabilities and people without disabilities.""' However,
each of these tests also has drawbacks: the SIB-R does not incorporate
observation of the individual being assessed, the ABAS-II is somewhat
confusing and "unidimensional" because it only measures one dimension
of behavior, and the ICAP is limited in scope due to its short length. 18 6
However, the adaptive behavior component is a relatively new addi-
tion to the intellectual disability definition.187 Consequently, new and
improved adaptive behavior assessments are on the horizon. For exam-
ple, in 2013 the AAIDD will release the Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior
Scale, which will directly assess the skill sets included in the AAIDD's
definition of "adaptive behavior."' 88 This makes the recommendation for
a formalized procedure for adding new tests especially important for
adaptive behavior assessments. Some of the standards that should be
included in this procedure include tests that consider each adaptive be-
havior skill set in the context of the individual's peer group, social envi-
ronment, and cultural environment.18' In addition, assessments must in-
clude third-party input from individuals who have regular, substantial
contact with the defendant. 190 This procedure will ensure that the most
modern and scientifically sound assessments are utilized to measure
adaptive behavior for an Atkins hearing.
3. Recommended Assessment of the "Early Onset" Component
The onset of intellectual disability prior to the age of eighteen
should be a holistic assessment. This means that as much information as
possible should be gathered about the defendant's past adaptive behav-
iors and intellectual functioning. 19 This information can be gathered
from an individual's past test scores, medical records, school records,
juvenile court records, etc.' 9 2 There is a general consensus among mental
health organizations that intellectual disability need not be formally di-
agnosed before the age of eighteen, but rather that there be evidence
183. Id
184. Id
185. Bridget M. Doane & Karen L. Salekin, Susceptibility of Current Adaptive Behavior
Measures to Feigned Deficits, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 331 (2009).
186. See Hill, supra note 177.
187. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 846.
188. Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale, AM. ASS'N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, http://www.aaidd.org/contentI 06.cfm?navlD-23 (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
189. Id.
190. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 847.
191. Fabian et al., supra note 50, at 410.
192. Id at 408.
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from sources such as these that it originated prior to that age.'93 Allowing
for a variety of evidence is important because many defendants will not
have a formal diagnosis of intellectual disability that occurred prior to
the age of eighteen' 94 and the mental health needs of many of these indi-
viduals are not properly met during their adolescence.19 5 By allowing
various forms of evidence to show early onset of intellectual disability,
this recommendation will ensure that the Atkins ban is properly applied
to individuals suffering from intellectual disability since adolescence, as
the Atkins Court intended, regardless of the presence of a prior formal
diagnosis.
4. Policy Considerations in the Assessment of Intellectual Disabil-
ity
In addition to aligning with the guidance provided by the Atkins
Court and keeping pace with current scientific standards, the above rec-
ommended definitions and assessments comport with the policy consid-
erations noted by the Atkins Court when mandating the prohibition. In
Atkins, the Supreme Court based part of its reasoning for the ban on the
idea that the characteristics underlying the clinical definition of "intellec-
tual disability" negate the purposes behind the death penalty: deterrence
and retribution. 19 6 The Court explained that the goal of deterrence is only
served in situations in which the crime at issue is the product of premedi-
tation and deliberation.'97 However, the cognitive and behavioral im-
pairments associated with IQ test scores two standards deviations below
the mean, as the AAIDD and this Comment recommend, negate the goal
of deterrence.'9 8 For example, significant limitations in planning and the
ability to think abstractly severely limit one's ability to premeditate com-
plex crimes like homicide and to therefore be deterred by a potential
death penalty sentence.1 99
Regarding retribution, the Atkins Court stated that the purposes of
the death penalty are only served when the offender is highly culpable.200
Philosophers such as Aristotle have long indicated a number of charac-
teristics that a moral agent (i.e., a person who can be morally culpable)
possesses.2 0 ' Some such characteristics include the ability to care for
others, be self-reflective, formulate plans of action, and exercise self-
193. Id. at 407.
194. Id.
195. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 855.
196. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). Note that the Atkins Court used the term
"mental retardation."
197. Id.
198. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 83-84.
199. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
200. Id. at 319-20.
201. Peggy Sasso, Implementing the Death Penalty: The Moral Implications ofRecent Advanc-
es in Neuropsychology, 29 CARDOzO L. REv. 765, 774-76 (2007).
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control.202 The skill sets listed in the adaptive functioning component of
the AAIDD definition address these characteristics. 20 3 Significant limita-
tions in self-reflection and the ability to care for others restrict individu-
als' capacity for moral culpability and cognizance of their "deserving of
execution."204
C. Recommended Procedural Components for Implementing the Atkins
Standard
In addition to having one standardized framework for definition and
assessment, the procedures for implementing the Atkins ban must be con-
sistent. As reflected by the comparison of three Tenth Circuit states, dif-
fering procedural processes may be the sole determination of whether a
defendant is found to be intellectually disabled.205 The first two suggest-
ed procedural aspects are interconnected; they are the timing of the de-
termination and the fact finder. In this regard, a judge, prior to the guilt
phase of trial, should make the Atkins determination. Furthermore, de-
fendants should carry the burden of proving their intellectual disability
by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, this Comment recommends
that proper utilization of expert testimony by the defendant will further
assist in accurate and consistent determinations of whether a defendant is
found to be intellectually disabled.
1. Recommended Fact Finder and Timing for the Determination:
The Judge, and Prior to the Guilt Phase of Trial
The Atkins determination should be made by a judge, prior to the
guilt phase of trial. Because the Atkins Court provided no guidance on
these procedural aspects of the ban, general policy considerations in im-
plementing the ban will be examined for the justification of each recom-
mendation. Preliminarily, and contrary to the views of some legal schol-
ars, using the jury as the fact finder is not required in Atkins hearings.206
The Atkins Court mentioned no such requirement, and prior Supreme
Court precedent only requires that juries make determinations of fact in
situations in which there is a potential for a defendant's punishment to be
increased beyond the statutory maximum. 20 7 The purpose of an Atkins
determination is to determine whether the defendant can be removed
from the purview of the death penalty, thereby potentially decreasing the
punishment rather than increasing it.20 8 Therefore, using the judge as the
fact finder is not only allowable, it is preferable for the following rea-
sons.
202. Id. at 775-76.
203. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 2-3.
204. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
205. See supra Part IID.
206. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 107.
207. Id. at 106-07.
208. Id. at 107.
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As previously mentioned, when the judge is used as the fact finder,
the relevant determination is made prior to trial based on a legal standard
of intellectual disability. 209 A requirement that the determination occur in
this manner is a vital aspect of protecting the Atkins ban.2 10 It is far more
difficult for defendants to make an adequate showing of intellectual disa-
bility after the prosecution has presented all of its evidence, especially if
the crime committed was a heinous one. 2 1 ' This difficulty is heightened
when the jury is the fact finder because jurors might confuse the trial
phase and sentencing phase as being interrelated or improperly consider
* 212the details of the defendant's crime in their determinations. By using
judges, who are more familiar with making objective determinations
based on complicated legal standards (such as the clinical definition of
"intellectual disability"), such risks of inaccuracy and bias are signifi-
cantly reduced.2 13 Of course, judges are humans too and still may be sus-
ceptible to some of these same biases. Therefore, having the determina-
tion occur before the guilt phase of trial will help to further insulate the
judge's decision from improper influences (e.g., knowing the gruesome
details of the crime), thereby decreasing the arbitrariness of Atkins de-
terminations. Furthermore, holding the Atkins determination first will, at
least in some cases, prevent the need for costly and unnecessary capital
d*214proceedings.
2. Recommended Allocation of and Standard for the Burden of
Proof: On the Defendant, and by a Preponderance of the Evi-
dence
For comprehensive procedural consistency in Atkins determinations,
defendants should bear the burden of proving their intellectual disability
by a preponderance of the evidence. The allocation of and standard for
the burden of proof, like the fact finder and timing issues, are best justi-
fied with reference to general policy considerations due to the lack of
guidance from the Atkins Court.
The proper allocation of and standard for the burden of proof are
best determined with reference to two landmark Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding mental competency hearings: Medina v. California215 and
Cooper v. Oklahoma,2 16 respectively. In Medina, the Court held that
placing the burden of proof on a defendant in a criminal competency
209. See supra Part II.C.
210. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 109-10.




215. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
216. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
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proceeding did not violate any principles of fundamental fairness.2 17 The
Court reasoned that access to the proceeding in the first place allowed the
defendant "a reasonable opportunity" to prove incompetence.2 18 In that
case, the Court upheld the placement of the burden on the defendant to
prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.2 19 In
Cooper, on the other hand, the Court held that requiring a defendant to
prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence did violate
principles of fundamental fairness.220 This was so, the Court reasoned,
because it meant that even if defendants could prove that they were more
likely than not incompetent, they still might not satisfy the clear and
convincing evidentiary burden.2 2 1 The significant risk of this occurring
222could pose dire consequences for defendants.
Considering that the Supreme Court and a majority of states have
accepted the preponderance of the evidence standard, this is the most
appropriate standard for use in proving a defendant's intellectual disabil-
ity. 22 3 Contrary to the clear and convincing standard, which the Supreme
Court critiques, the preponderance of the evidence standard allows de-
fendants a reasonable opportunity to prove their intellectual disability
and lessens the risk of an excessively high burden, which would allow
the execution of defendants who would otherwise fall within the Atkins
ban. Therefore, the standard of proof for an Atkins determination should
be a preponderance of the evidence. Because it is permissible to place the
burden on the defendant and defendants are in the best position to prove
their own mental health, the burden of proof should be allocated to the
defendant.224
3. Other Recommendations to Ensure Constitutionality
One last related issue that has received scant attention is how evi-
dence of intellectual disability should be presented. All evidence present-
ed at an Atkins hearing should be presented through a uniquely qualified
expert to ensure that an Atkins hearing comports with the most up-to-date
scientific research and standards. This recommendation also aligns with
the Atkins Court's utilization of a clinical definition.225 There has been
some argument that not only should the evidence be presented via an
expert, but that the same expert should also act as the fact finder and
make the final decision as to whether a defendant is intellectually disa-
217. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448-49 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Id. at 451.
219. Id. at 453.
220. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363-64.
221. Id at 364.
222. Id at 363-64.
223. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 118.
224. See id. at 117-18.
225. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
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bled.226 However, it is common knowledge that "[t]he law is the ultimate
arbiter of criminal responsibility."2 27 The criminal trial process decides
the moral guilt or innocence of an individual and imposes sanctions
based on that individual's culpability.228 An individual may not receive
these sanctions unless he or she is morally culpable, and this determina-
tion hinges on whether a person is deemed intellectually disabled under
the law. 2 29 Consequently, an appropriate legal fact finder-a judge, as
advocated in this Comment-needs to make the intellectual disability
determination based on sound scientific evidence provided by an appro-
priate expert.
To ensure the accuracy of information brought forth during the At-
kins hearing and to protect against arbitrariness, a consistent set of guide-
lines must be in place for choosing an expert to present testimony on a
defendant's intellectual disability. Virginia's statute provides a model for
what should be required of an expert: (1) the expert should be either a
psychologist or a psychiatrist; (2) the expert should have training and
experiencing in assessing, scoring, and interpreting intelligence and
adaptive behavior measures; and (3) the expert should be trained and
experienced in the performance of forensic evaluations. 2 30 The Supreme
Court has previously noted that "the determination of 'whether a person
is mentally ill turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpret-
ed by expert psychiatrists and psychologists."' 23 1 However, as noted pre-
viously, the ultimate decision must lay with the fact finder-the judge.
These suggested standards simply help judges determine whether an ex-
pert is qualified to provide information relevant to an intellectual disabil-
ity determination. Qualified experts, in turn, support the provision of
reliable and consistent information during Atkins proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Atkins brought forth an important change in Eighth Amendment j u-
risprudence. The prohibition on the execution of the intellectually disa-
bled was a pivotal step in protecting less culpable offenders from exces-
sive punishment. This important protection, however, has been diluted
through its inconsistent application among the several states. A compari-
son of only three states within the Tenth Circuit demonstrates such in-
consistencies. States vary in how they define, assess, and procedurally
implement the ban on executing the intellectually disabled. These incon-
sistencies pose serious threats to the constitutional rights of intellectually
disabled capital defendants.
226. See Amos, supra note 44, passim.
227. Sasso, supra note 201, at 806.
228. Id. at 807.
229. Id. at 808.
230. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 856.
231. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 449
(1979)).
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To resolve such threats, it is important that there be a level of con-
sistency in the application of the ban. This Comment recommends that
such consistency be realized through the utilization of the AAIDD's def-
initional framework because the AAIDD is referenced by the Atkins
Court and is the leading authority on intellectual disability. It is further
recommended that the AAIDD definitions of each component of that
framework be adopted. Next, utilizing tools consistent with the most up-
to-date scientific research and methods to assess each component of the
AAIDD definition will help to ensure consistent application of the defini-
tional framework. For IQ tests, either the WAIS or Stanford-Binet
should be used as the method of assessment. For adaptive behavior as-
sessments, the SIB-R, ABAS, or ICAP should be utilized until more ad-
vanced tests become available.
To avoid further arbitrariness, this definitional framework and as-
sessment must be consistent in its procedural application. The most ap-
propriate fact finder for an intellectual disability determination is a judge,
who is less likely to be improperly swayed than is a layperson jury. To
further insulate the judge from improper outside influences, the Atkins
determination should be made prior to trial, before any gruesome details
of the crime have been brought forth. Relatedly, judges must base their
decisions on information provided by an appropriate and qualified ex-
pert, thereby ensuring the reliability of judicial determinations as well as
procedural consistency. Lastly, the burden and standard of proof demand
procedural consistency. Placing a preponderance of evidence burden on
the defendant comports with precedent and historical practice while still
allowing defendants a reasonable opportunity to prove their intellectual
disability. Requiring the states to implement these policies will ensure
that the ban on execution of the intellectually disabled is not implement-
ed arbitrarily, thereby protecting the rights of intellectually disabled capi-
tal defendants just as the Supreme Court intended in Atkins v. Virginia.
Kathryn Raffensperger*
* J.D. Candidate, 2014. The author would like to thank Professor Justin Marceau for his
guidance in writing this Comment and her husband, Nick Raffensperger, for his support throughout
the publication process.
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U.S. vs. THEM: A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW ARISING FROM UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GARCIA
AND THE COMBINATION OF IMPRISONMENT AND
DEPORTATION
ABSTRACT
This Comment centers on immigration law, specifically, U.S. im-
migration law. United States v. Rosales-Garcia, a recently published case
from the Tenth Circuit, was the original diving board for the thoughts
that follow. In Rosales-Garcia, Raul Rosales-Garcia (Rosales), an un-
documented immigrant, had been deported following a state drug convic-
tion and was caught having illegally returned to the United States. He
appealed the length of his sentence for a federal conviction of illegal
reentry. The district court had enhanced (increased) his sentence based
on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Rosales appealed the level of en-
hancement. While the Tenth Circuit's decision ultimately helped to clari-
fy how sentence enhancements for Rosales and similarly situated de-
fendants are calculated, it did not answer a more fundamental question.
Prior to his illegal reentry, Mr. Rosales had been convicted of a state
drug-trafficking felony. He was sentenced to ninety days in jail and three
years of probation. After serving the ninety days in jail, Mr. Rosales was
deported. My question is, why, if we are going to deport an immigrant,
are we first bothering to imprison him?
This Comment considers the importance of citizenship by looking at
the roots of modem democratic civilization: ancient Greece and Rome.
The Comment then looks at the birth of the United States, specifically
the fact that from the beginning, this country was a nation of immigrants.
Now, the original popular perception of America as a haven welcoming
immigrants appears to have changed. America no longer seems so wel-
coming in light of the current popular perception that immigrants are
dangerous. The idea of immigrants as criminals is reflected in the hostili-
ty present in current immigration law, which is set up to both punish and
deport the criminally convicted immigrant. I suggest that deportation
itself is more properly a punishment than a collateral consequence, and
therefore the combination of deportation and imprisonment is excessive.
The time has come for reform; immigration law needs to reevaluate the
purposes it serves and ensure that the laws and regulations are set up to
further those purposes rather than to pay tribute to hostile feelings to-
wards the immigrants who continue to dare enter our land.
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INTRODUCTION
Well I'm so glad I'm livin' in the U.S.A.
Yes I'm so glad I'm livin' in the U.S.A.
Anything you want we got right here in the U.S.A.
-Chuck Berry, Back in the U.S.A.
This Comment deals with double jeopardy 2-a special kind of dou-
ble jeopardy not recognized by the U.S. legal system. 3 In our current
1. CHUCK BERRY, Back in the U.S.A., on REELIN'& ROCKIN' (Chess Records 1959).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "double jeopardy" as "[t]he fact
of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same offense"); see also U.S. CONsT.
amend. V (providing that no "person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb").
3. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorpo-
ration of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469, 481 (2007) ("[Blecause deportation
has been held not to be punishment, the constitutional bar on double jeopardy does not preclude the
government from bringing deportation proceedings once the person has completed his or her crimi-
nal sentence.").
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system of immigration law, deportation is not considered punishment.4
An undocumented immigrant convicted of a crime can therefore be both
imprisoned and deported.5 This was the experience of one such immi-
grant, Raul Rosales-Garcia (Rosales), who was convicted of a state felo-
ny, imprisoned, released on parole, and deported.6 But Rosales' saga of
crime and punishment did not end there. He was caught having returned
to the United States.7 His return was a double violation because it violat-
ed not only the terms of his probation but also the federal code. Rosales
was sent back to state prison to serve another sentence as punishment for
violating probation.9 After completing that sentence, he was released into
federal custody to be tried for the crime of illegal reentry.10 The Gov-
ernment sought not only to imprison Rosales for this charge but also to
enhance" his base sentence.12 It was the length of the enhancement that
Rosales appealed before the Tenth Circuit.
13
The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rosales-Garcia4
provided an important clarification for the particular sort of sentence
enhancement Rosales faced, that which is provided for undocumented
immigrants who have been previously convicted of a serious crime.' 5 A
drug-trafficking felony, like the one for which Rosales was convicted, is
enumerated as a serious crime for purposes of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.' 6 The amount of enhancement depends upon the maximum
length of the sentence imposed for the prior crime.' 7 The question on
appeal was how much longer Rosales's federal sentence could be: either
a 12-level enhancement, based on the length of his original state sentence
of ninety days followed by three years of probation, or a 16-level based
on the maximum length of his probation-revocation sentence (fifteen
years), imposed after deportation.'" When Rosales-Garcia was decided,
4. See, e.g., id. at 472 ("For more than a century,. . . the courts have uniformly insisted that
deportation is not punishment.").
5. See United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1349 (10th Cir. 2012); Legomsky,
supra note 3.
6. See Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
7. See id
8. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012)).
9. Id.
10. Id
11. An enhanced sentence is one which is made longer for some reason. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 609 (defining "enhanced" as "[m]ade greater; increased").
12. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349 (referring to the Presentence Report prepared by the
United States Probation Office).
13. Id. at 1349-50.
14. 667 F.3d 1348 (10th Cir. 2012).
15. See id. at 1349 ("The sentencing scheme embodied in § 2L1l.2 imposes, via enhancements
to the defendant's base offense level, more severe punishment for defendants who have committed
serious prior crimes.").
16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2012); see also Rosales-
Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)-(B).
18. The levels refer to the length of time by which a sentence can be increased (enhanced). If
the 12-level enhancement were applied to Rosales, the range of sentencing would be twenty-four to
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it was unclear whether the predicate sentence (the length of which de-
termines the level of enhancement) must have been imposed before de-
portation and subsequent reentry.' 9 The court in Rosales-Garcia held that
the predicate sentence must precede deportation and reentry.20 Only a
sentence imposed prior to the defendant's deportation and illegal reentry
may be used for enhancement of the federal sentence punishing illegal
reentry.2 1
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gorsuch lamented the ambiguity in
the language of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, adding that whether his
interpretation or the majority's was correct "may be ultimately less im-
portant than the fact we're unable to agree."22 Not long after the decision
in Rosales-Garcia, the commentary accompanying the Sentencing
Guidelines was amended.23 It would seem that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission heard and complied with Judge Gorsuch's request for clari-
ty.24 With the official clarification provided by the amendment, the
courts will no longer be split on this issue and, at least regarding this
particular aspect, "similarly situated defendants [will] receive . . . con-
sistent treatment" by the federal courts.25
Though the Rosales-Garcia decision was restricted to the narrow
question of sentence enhancements of the criminal immigrant,2 6 it served
as the diving board for the broader consideration of U.S. immigration
law that follows. It may be somewhat intuitive that the penalty inflicted
upon the undocumented when caught within our borders is to eject them
and send them back whence they came. 27 What is not intuitive, however,
is why we feel the need to first imprison them within the very borders
from which we plan to evict them. The paradoxical penalty is that to pun-
ish the undocumented for being here when we don't want him, we shall
thirty months. When the U.S. Probation Office applied the 16-level enhancement, the result was a
range of thirty-seven to forty-six months. The district court applied the 16-level enhancement and
sentenced Rosales to a prison term of thirty-seven months. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1350.
19. See id. at 1354; United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948, 952-53 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868-69 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Compres-Paulino,
393 F.3d 116, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
20. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1351 ("Because it is undisputed that the defendant's prior
conviction must have occurred before deportation, we agree with Mr. Rosales that the most logical
reading of§ 2L1.2 is to refer to the date of deportation in evaluating whether the 'sentence imposed'
for the prior felony exceeded 13 months.").
21. Id. ("In other words, we conclude that the temporal requirement contained in the text of §
2L1l.2 with regard to the defendant's conviction also applies to the imposition of his sentence for that
conviction.").
22. Id. at 1359 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) (2012).
24. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1359; see also United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331, 333
(9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("Recognizing this ambiguity, the Sentencing Commission recently
clarified the interpretation in Amendment 764 to the Guidelines . . . and discussed Bustillos-Pena,
Lopez, Rosales-Garcia, Guzman-Bera, and Compres-Paulino.").
25. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1359 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1349 (majority opinion).
27. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 476 ("Violations of the immigration laws, naturally
enough, have consequences. One of those consequences is removal from the United States . . . .").
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first force him to stay. Though we cannot properly define this as double
jeopardy,2 8 we may classify it as a double sanction for the undocumented
immigrant.
I suggest that a driving force behind this double sanction of incar-
ceration and removal provided by our legal system is a brand of xeno-
phobia which has directed the trend of U.S. immigration law over the
course of the twentieth century. 29 A good number of the American public
assumes that immigrants are here illegally. 30 In the case of Rosales, he
was in the U.S. illegally and was convicted of a felony.3' However, "the
vast bulk of immigration to the United States occurs through legal chan-
nels." 32 Why should the popular perception be that immigrants are ille-
gal?33 The preoccupation in this country is with illegal immigration ra-
ther than with the many legal channels of immigration.34 This reflects a
shift occurring in the twentieth century from a land calling on the rest of
the world to send us their "tired,... poor,. . . huddled masses yearning
to breathe free"35 to a nation edged with fences and border patrols. 3 6
Based on the continuing surge of immigration into the United States,37 it
would seem that the huddled masses are still eager to come to our shores
and partake of the American way of life to which Chuck Berry jubilantly
refers in Back in the U.S.A. This Comment considers why there has
been this shift in the American immigration paradigm. Why is it that the
Statute of Liberty no longer has the loudest voice on the border? This
Comment will suggest that the answer lies within a certain xenophobic
paranoia that immigrants are dangerous. 39
Part I of this Comment takes a brief look at the importance of citi-
zenship in the ancient world and considers both the disdain of foreigners
and the duty of hospitality to strangers. Part II turns specifically to the
28. See id. at 515 (citing Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to apply
double jeopardy to a deportation proceeding)).
29. The fear being, in part, that immigrants are responsible for heightened crime in the United
States. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44
GA. L. REV. 65, 145 (2009) ("Surveys consistently show that the public associates immigrants-
whether or not undocumented-with high rates of crime.").
30. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 503-04.
31. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
32. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 503-04.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 504-05.
35. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 2601 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003).
36. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 509 (highlighting specifically increased border
patrol in an effort to respond to perceived "security vulnerabilities in the immigration laws").
37. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform,
23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 111 (2011) ("[The United States] annually accepts the largest intake of
immigrants in the world."); STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD., PROJECTING
IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON THE SIZE AND AGE STRUCTURE OF THE 21ST CENTURY AMERICAN
POPULATION 16 (2012) ("The high standard of living in the United States means that it remains an
attractive option for migration, particularly for people in less-developed countries.").
38. See BERRY, supra note 1.
39. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 29.
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United States and looks at the popular conception of America as the land
of opportunity with a warm welcome mat at Lady Liberty's feet. Part III
tracks the progression of immigration law in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, looking specifically at the blending of civil immigration
law with criminal law and the related popular perception that if one is an
immigrant, then he is likely to be an undocumented one. Part IV turns to
United States v. Rosales-Garcia, summarizing the case's facts, procedur-
al history, and opinions. Part V analyzes the conclusions reached by the
majority and the dissent and concludes by discussing the odd state of
affairs presented by Rosales-Garcia: current immigration law is set up to
punish the criminal immigrant within our own penal system and then
remove the immigrant altogether. Part V also considers whether deporta-
tion truly is not punishment. The closing suggestion is that immigration
law should consider the purpose of this practice of combining imprison-
ment and deportation and whether it is necessary or desired.
I. "XENOLOGY"
Allez, venez, Milord




Etprenez bien vos aises
Vos peines sur mon coeur
Et vos pieds sur une chaise.
-Edith Piaf, Milordo
A. Prized Possessions: The Value of Citizenship in the Classical World
The ancient Greeks greatly prized and protected citizenship. 4' The
Greek polis42 was a closely knit community, with a dynamic akin to that
40. EDITH PIAF, Milord, on MILORD (Columbia Records UK 1959) ("Come along, Milord, /
Sit yourself at my table / It is so cold outside / Here it's comfortable. / Relax, Milord / And take your
at ease / Put your troubles on my heart / And your feet on a chair.").
41. See, e.g., SARAH B. POMEROY ET AL., ANCIENT GREECE: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL HISTORY 451 (3d ed. 2012) ("Alexandria ... was founded [by Alexander] as a Greek
polis with citizenship limited to Greeks and Macedonians.").
42. H.D.F. Krro, THE GREEKS 64 (2d ed. 1957) ("Polis' is the Greek word which we trans-
late 'city-state."'); see also POMEROY ET AL., supra note 41, at 530 (defining polis as a "[c]ity [or]
town"). "Beginning in the eighth century, polis came to designate a political community, composed
of a principal city or town and its surrounding countryside, which together formed a self-governing
entity, the city-state." Id.
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of a family.43 Inclusion within the citizenry of the polis was therefore
strictly limited, and outsiders were rarely naturalized." The polis that
was perhaps the strictest in this regard was Sparta, who not only resisted
naturalization of outsiders but was also known for removing them entire-
ly from the community.45 While Athens was far more hospitable to out-
siders, citizenship and naturalization were severely limited.4 Inclusion
within the citizenry was an honor and much was expected of the citi-
zens.47 Pericles famously said, "We ... regard a man who takes no inter-
est in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character. . .' 8
Citizenship thus was not merely nominal membership within the citizen-
ry but literally a government ruled by the people. 49
In Rome, a civilization that greatly admired and, to a certain extent,
emulated the Greeks,o citizenship was also prized and protected.5' Take,
for example, the Social War, fought because the Romans denied citizen-
ship to their Italian city-state allies.52 In this instance, the Italian allies
43. See, e.g., C.M. BOwRA, THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 65 (1969) ("[The Greeks] felt that the
city-state was a natural development first of the family and then of the village .... [They did not]
look beyond rthe city-state, or polis,] to some more embracing unity.... Even when Athens and
Sparta built empires in the fifth century, these were largely coalitions, in which the members main-
tained a considerable degree of local autonomy, and there was little sense of corporate identity.");
KIaro, supra note 42, at 78 ("The polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or as-
sumed-a kind of extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life.
44. See KITro, supra note 42, at 74.
45. See e.g., id. (using Pericles's Funeral Speech as recorded by Thucydides).
46. See, e.g., Simon Homblow, Greece The History of the Classical Period, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD 135 (John Boardman et al. eds., 1986) ("A law of the year 451
[B.C.] restricted citizenship and thus its benefits ... to persons of citizen descent on both sides....
Athenian (and Spartan) stinginess with the citizenship was singled out by panegyrists of Rome as the
chief cause of the brevity of their empires."); see also Oswyn Murray, Life and Society in Classical
Greece, supra, at 210 ("[I]n the classical period the state intervened to establish increasingly strin-
gent rules for citizenship and so for legitimacy: ultimately a citizen must be the offspring of a legally
recognized marriage between two Athenian citizens, whose parents must also be citizens.... It
became impossible for an Athenian to marry a foreigner or to obtain recognition for the children of
any other type of liaison: the development is essentially democratic, the imposition of the social
norms of the peasant majority on an aristocracy which had previously behaved very different-
ly . . . .").
47. See, e.g., THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 333-34 (Simon Homblower & Antony
Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 1996) (defining "citizenship, Greek"); id at 334-35 (defining "citizenship,
Roman").
48. Thucydides, The Funeral Oration of Pericles and the Plague, in GREEK AND ROMAN
CLASSICS IN TRANSLATION 410 (David McKay Co. ed., 1947).
49. See 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 442-43 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "democracy"
as "[g]ovemment by the people" and explaining that the word is derived from the combination of the
Greek words demos (the people) and kratia (rule)).
50. Perhaps the best example of Rome's admiration and emulation of the Greeks they con-
quered is Virgil's Aenied, hoped to be the Roman equivalent of Homer's Iliad. See, e.g., VIRGIL,
THE AENEID, Bk. VI, 11.847-53 (H. Rushton Fairclough trans., 1974) (19 B.C.) ("Others, I doubt not,
shall beat out the breathing bronze with softer lines; shall from marble draw forth the features of life;
shall plead their causes better; with the rod shall trace the paths of heaven and tell the rising of the
stars: remember thou, 0 Roman, to rule the nations with thy sway-these shall be thine arts-to
crown Peace with Law, to spare the humbled, and to tame in war the proud!" (footnotes omitted)).
51. THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 334-35 (defining Roman citi-
zenship).
52. Circa 91-88 B.C., Rome's Italian allies waged the Social War (also called the Marsic War
or the Italic War) against Rome. WILLIAM E. DUNSTAN, ANCIENT ROME 149-50 (2011). Rome was
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felt that having both served and paid tribute to Rome, they had a right to
become full citizens of Rome. 5 3 The city-states had long desired the ben-
efits of Roman citizenship, and this came to a head in the Social War.5 4
At the conclusion of the war, the city-states won their citizenship and the
associated privileges of Roman citizenship." Subsequently, the Roman
Empire continued this trend of granting the privilege of citizenship to her
allies. The benefits of Roman citizenship were conferred upon selected
members of the outlying territories that Rome had conquered and incor-
porated into the Empire.57
B. Us vs. Them: The Notion ofBarbarians
Fear of, dislike for, and distrust of foreigners has been a longstand-
ing tradition of civilized society. 8  The ancient Greek term
"ot 3apptpot" (hoi barbaroi) was used to refer to anyone who was not
Greek and thus foreign.59 This term has been transported into modem
English as "barbarians," 60 which tends to carry with it the additional as-
sociation of uncouth, uncivilized, and even savage.61 At first, this more
negative connotation of barbarian was not associated with the term as the
Greeks used it.62 As time passed, however, the connotations of foreigners
as uncouth and inferior to the Greeks became incorporated into the usage
of the term.63
C. Welcoming Them to the Table: The Role ofHospitality
In spite of the limits on naturalization and the view of non-Greeks
as uncultivated and even savage, it was a moral requirement of the
victorious mainly because of her concession to the Italian allies to grant them citizenship, which
united all of Italy south of the Po River by the common bond of Roman citizenship. Id.
53. See, e.g., Michael Crawford, Early Rome and Italy, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
CLASSICAL WORLD, supra note 46, at 413-16.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 1330 (entry for "Rome (histo-
ry)").
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., HAROLD MACMILLAN, RIDING THE STORM: 1956-1959, at 49 (1971) ("This kind
of isolationism or economic nationalism, amounting to xenophobia, seized all nations, great and
small, from time to time.").
59. A LEXICON: ABRIDGED FROM LIDDELL AND SCOTr'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 126-27
(Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1997) (1891) [hereinafter A LEXICON] ("Plato divides mankind into Barbar-
ians and Hellenes, as the Hebrews gave the name of Gentiles to all but themselves. [FIrom the Au-
gustan age, the term was applied by the Romans to all nations except themselves and the Greeks: but
the Greeks still affected to look upon the Romans as Barbarians.").
60. See I THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 945.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., BOWRA, supra note 43, at 14 ("[1]n its early days the Greek word [for barbarian]
was not necessarily contemptuous or hostile, and meant little more than 'foreign."').
63. See, e.g., id. ("After the Persian Wars had revealed what hideous destruction could be
wrought by barbarian invaders, the Greek attitude hardened, and the word barbaros began to assume
some of its modem associations.").
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Greeks to offer hospitality to the strangers who crossed the threshold. 4
Interestingly, the word "4evos" (xenos) in ancient Greek originally con-
noted guest, host, and stranger.65 It is from the Greek roots "xenos" and
"phobos" (fear, terror, dismay)66 that modem English derives the term
11,,67xenophobia. And so, Athens was thrown open to the world and for-
eigners were given hospitality but not citizenship.68
II. TIRED, POOR, AND HUDDLED MASSES 69
Tell the folks back home this is the promised land callin'
And the poor boy is on the line.
-Chuck Berry, Promised Lando
The United States of America proclaims to be a nation rooted in the
principle of "liberty and justice for all." 7 1 America was seen as the coun-
try where those suffering under the yoke of persecution could find asy-
lum and, ultimately, a new life. 72 And certainly this promise of safe ha-
ven from persecution was at least partially true for the early colonization
of American shores. 73 The Pilgrims, dissatisfied with their lives in Eng-
64. A LEXICON, supra note 59, at 471. Hospitality is also a recurring motif in classical my-
thology. See e.g., Ovid, Philemon and Baucis, in METAMORPHOSES 192 (A.D. Melville trans., Ox-
ford Univ. Press ed., 1986) (8 A.D.) ("This wicked neighbourhood shall pay / Just punishment [for
refusing to admit the gods across the threshold]; but to you there shall be given / Exemption from
this evil."); see also POMERORY ET AL., supra note 41, at 525. Xenia [guest friendship] is "[a] form
of ritual friendship whereby a 'stranger' (xenos) entered into a relationship of mutual friendship with
a man from another demos, each being obliged to offer hospitality and aid when visiting the other's
community.... A prominent feature of Homeric society, xenia continued throughout antiquity . .
Id.
65. A LEXICON, supra note 59, at 471.
66. Id. at 764.
67. 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 674 ("A deep antipathy to
foreigners.").
68. See, e.g., Thucydides, supra note 48 ("Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never
expel a foreigner .... ).
69. Lazarus, supra note 35.
70. CHUCK BERRY, Promised Land, on ST. LOUIS TO LIVERPOOL (Chess Records 1964).
71. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
72. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic Rights and an International
Text: "A Miracle for Breakfast," 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 438 (1993) ("Wave upon wave of immi-
grants have come to [America] to escape ancient systems of caste, class and ownership, to be rid of
bureaucracies and kings, to be left alone, free to make their fortunes by their own wit and hard work.
It is the American dream, and it has bred a wild energy, a spirit of openness and innovation marveled
at throughout the world." (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 13
(1992) ("Those intrepid Europeans who had torn up their roots to brave the wild Atlantic wanted to
forget a horrid past and to embrace a hopeful future. They expected to become Americans. Their
goals were escape, deliverance, assimilation. They saw America as a transforming nation, banishing
dismal memories and developing a unique national character based on common political ideals and
shared experiences."))).
73. See, e.g., William Bradford, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 121
(Nina Baym et. al. eds., 8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter NORTON ANTHOLOGY] ("For Bradford, as well as
for the other members of this community [the first wave of Pilgrims], the decision to settle at Plym-
outh was thc last step in a long march of exile from England, and the hardships they suffered ...
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land and in Holland, chose to immigrate to America.74 As the coloniza-
tion continued, many more people from England, France, Holland, Spain,
Portugal, and elsewhere settled in America.7 ' At the completion of the
American Revolution, the newborn United States reaffirmed their7 6 val-
ues of liberty, justice, and freedom for (almost) all.77 As further confir-
mation of America's warm welcome to all those who shared the treas-
ured value of liberty, the Statue of Liberty took her post at Ellis Island.
In 1903, the following words of welcome were etched in a plaque at her
base: "Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free."79 Certainly, America was popularly associated with free
and welcome immigration.80
As time passed, America, peopled by a varied and multifaceted
mixture of backgrounds, continued to be perceived as welcoming immi-
were tempered with the knowledge that they were in a place they had chosen for themselves, safe at
last from persecution.").
74. See, e.g., Introduction: Pilgrim and Puritan, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 73, at
13 ("In 1608, ... the Scrooby congregation [Pilgrims] left England and settled in the Nether-
lands.... Eventually, fearing that they might lose their religious identity as their children were
swallowed up in Dutch culture, they petitioned for the right to settle in the vast American territories
of England's Virginia Company.").
75. See generally I SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 84-86 (Meridian 3d ed. 1994) (1965).
76. Prior to the American Civil War, the United States were referred to in the plural form;
ever since the war, the United States has been referred to in the singular form. This syntactical shift
exhibits the reunited states' desire to be, once and for all, a single union rather than a league of
individual states. See Shelby Foote, The Civil War (PBS television series Sept. 23-27, 1990).
77. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."). I have noted this as "freedom and liberty for (almost)
all" because, of course, not everyone in the newborn United States was free, at least not until slavery
was repealed. See, e.g., American Literature 1700-1820: Pursuing Happiness, in NORTON
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 73, at 374 ("Of course, in 1820, many Americans were still not free. Some
of the Founding Fathers, including George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, were themselves
slave owners .... Men could not vote unless they owned property; women could not vote at all.").
78. Statue of Liberty, NAT'L PARK SERVICE, http:www.nps.gov/stli/index.htm (last updated
Mar. 21, 2013) ("The Statue of Liberty Enlightening the World was a gift of friendship from the
people of France to the people of the United States and is a universal symbol of freedom and democ-
racy. The Statue of Liberty was dedicated on October 28, 1886, designated as a National Monument
in 1924 and restored for her centennial on July 4, 1986.").
79. Lazarus, supra note 35 ("Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, / With conquering
limbs astride from land to land; / Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand / A mighty woman
with a torch, whose flame / Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name / Mother of Exiles. From her
beacon-hand / Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command / The air-bridged harbor that
twin cities frame. / 'Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!' cries she / With silent lips. 'Give me
your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, / The wretched refuse of your
teeming shore. / Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, / I lift my lamp beside the golden
door!'" (footnotes omitted)).
80. The reference to "(almost) all" in note 77 is applicable here too, as there were concerns
regarding certain specific immigrants right from the birth of the nation. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion
Act of May 6, 1892, ch. 60, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
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grants with open arms.8 1 As Fievel Mousekewitz was told in the animat-
ed film An American Tail, "[Y]ou are in luck, my little immigrant. This
is America." 82 In the picture of America painted by Lady Liberty's iconic
lines, the United States was truly a land of the free where "the more the
merrier" held true. Was this utopian vision true? Perhaps. Did it hold?
Judging by the morass of complex immigration laws and criminal penal-
ties for undocumented immigrants, and coupled with tightened border
patrols and fences, it would seem that the American lens of immigration
is no longer quite so rosy-hued.8 4 What happened to "[g]ive me your
tired, your poor"? 5 One possible answer is that "[n]ow it reads 'NO
VACANCIES."'8 6
III. CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRATION
I just spent 60 days in the jailhouse
For the crime of having no dough, no no
Now here I am back out on the streets
For the crime of having nowhere to go!
-The Band, The Shape I'm In87
A. The View oflmmigrants as Criminals
There is no reason to assume that the term "immigrant" refers spe-
cifically to illegal immigrants88 ; however, that is the trend in our society
81. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 72, at 438-40 (describing the American "rhetoric of opportuni-
ty," which held "that there was plenty for everyone willing to work hard and take a chance in Amer-
ica" and continued through various waves of immigration from the colonial period to the Great
Depression).
82. AN AMERICAN TAIL (Amblin Entertainment 1986).
83. Lazarus, supra note 35.
84. See, e.g., Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona-Immigrants Out!: As-
sessing "Dystopian Dreams" and "Usable Futures" of Immigration Reform, and Considering
Whether "Immigration Regionalism" Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3
(2010); Samuel Bettwy, Assisting Soldiers in Immigration Matters, 1992 ARMY LAW. 3, 3 ("Many
attorneys consider immigration law to be the most complicated area of American jurisprudence,
rivaled in its complexity only by tax law."); Kristina M. Campbell, Imagining a More Humane
Immigration Policy in the Age of Obama: The Use of Plenary Power to Halt the State Balkanization
of Immigration Regulation, 29 ST. Louis. U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 417 (2010); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten
Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1599, 1637 (2009) ("The U.S. immigration laws have long been incredibly complex. By many
accounts, only the much-maligned Internal Revenue Code rivals the intricate, lengthy, and frequent-
ly obtuse Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which is the centerpiece of modem American
immigration law."); Legomsky, supra note 3, at 509 (highlighting specifically increased border
patrol in an effort to respond to perceived "security vulnerabilities in the immigration laws"); Diana
R. Podgomy, Comment, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal Measures in Immigration Law as
Reflected in the Expansion of the "Aggravated Felony" Concept, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
287, 298 (2009).
85. Lazarus, supra note 35.
86. LETHAL WEAPON 4 (Warner Bros. 1998). The response to this line in the film was "I
guess your parents were Native Americans . . . ." Id.
87. THE BAND, The Shape I'm In, on STAGE FRIGHT (Capital Records 1970).
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today.89 My own mother is an English emigrant legally working and re-
siding here in the United States, so I know of legal channels of immigra-
tion from personal experience. And yet, I hear the term "immigrant" and
my mind, like that of so many others, conjures an image of someone
crawling under a barbed-wire fence on the Texas-Mexico border.90 It is
clear that a certain hostility towards immigrants is present in America
today.9' Again, that "NO VACANCIES" slapped across the Statue of
Liberty's slogan crops up. Famous, or in some circles infamous, exam-
ples of this hostility appear in state and local immigration initiatives,
such as Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and California Proposition 187.92 One
has only to look at the statements by Barbara Coe, Proposition 187's
drafter, to see evidence of this hostility:
'You get illegal alien children, Third World children, out of our
schools, and you will reduce the violence. That is a fact.... You're
not dealing with a lot of shiny face, little kiddies.. .. You're dealing
with Third World cultures who come in, they shoot, they beat, they
stab and they spread drugs around in our school system.93
While Proposition 187 was never passed, Arizona's new immigra-
tion law is in full legal effect. 94 There is certainly a lot that can be, and
has been, said about Arizona's controversial immigration law.9 5 The fact
that the title of the law is "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
88. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 503-04 ("Although the vast bulk of immigration to the
United States occurs through legal channels, the public thinks the opposite is true.").
89. See id at 471-72 ("Public perception of criminals and foreigners have become ever more
intertwined."); see also Campbell, supra note 84.
90. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 502-04.
91. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 84, at 416, 418-19.
92. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010) (amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)); Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (approved by
electors Nov. 8, 1994); see also Johnson, supra note 84, at 1606 ("[Tjhe state and local immigration
ordinances have been motivated in no small part by racism and nativism.").
93. See Podgomy, supra note 84, at 299 n.90 (quoting Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary,
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L.
REv. 1827, 1841 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010) (amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)).
95. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 passim (2012); Karla Mari
McKanders, Unforgiving of Those Who Trespass Against US.: State Laws Criminalizing Immigra-
tion Status, 12 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 331, 352 (2011) ("Numerous lawsuits have been filed challeng-
ing the constitutionality of S.B. 1070."); Scott Nakama, Senate Bill 1070: The Implication ofArizo-
na's Immigration Law upon MLB, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 23 (2011) (describ-
ing Arizona's Senate Bill 1070 as "one of the most controversial pieces of immigration legislation in
recent history"); Lisa Sandoval, Race and Immigration Law: A Troubling Marriage, 7 MODERN AM.
42, 43 (2011); David A. Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What
S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 523, 523-24 (2011)
("S.B. 1070 is fascinating on many levels for many reasons. It has focused a national and interna-
tional spotlight on Arizona. It has broadened and intensified the national debate regarding immigra-
tion policies and enforcement. It has tested the constitutionality of state and local enforcement of
immigration laws... . S.B. 1070 is so controversial in part because of strong feelings and deep
divisions about racial profiling.").
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Neighborhoods Act"96 strongly suggests that perception of immigrants as
criminals was a driving force behind the law. Initiatives like Proposi-
tion 187 and Senate Bill 1070 are specifically designed to target immi-
grants.97
Let's take another example, this time from the turn of the twentieth
century: the passing of laws prohibiting marijuana.98 When these federal
marijuana laws were enacted, right around the time that Prohibition end-
ed, the Mexican-American population was the main consumer of mariju-
ana.99 So, the addition of marijuana to the list of banned substances ef-
fectively created a new crime for the Mexican-American immigrant pop-
ulation.'00
This new crime was at least partly a response to the growing popu-
lation of Mexican immigrants. While twenty-two states had prohibited
marijuana between 1910 and 1931, marijuana was not targeted on the
federal level until 1932.101 That year, marijuana was added to the catalog
of banned drugs listed in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.102 The follow-
ing year, Prohibition was repealed. 0 3 Four years later, Henry J. Ansling-
er, Director of the new Federal Bureau of Narcotics, successfully passed
the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 after just three days of truncated hearings
unsupported by empirical findings or research.10 4 The early twentieth
century saw a significant increase in the number of Mexicans immigrat-
ing into the western United States. os From the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury through the 1930s, there was very little in the way of general public
concern regarding the use of marijuana. 06 It was generally thought that
Mexican immigrants were the main users of marijuana and thus the ones
bringing the "narcotic" into the country.' 0 7 Not coincidentally, the first
states to restrict marijuana were the southwestern states. 08 When Texas
passed the McMillan Senate Bill, which included marijuana restrictions,
the Austin Texas Statesman noted, "[Marijuana is] a Mexican herb ...
96. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010) (amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)).
97. Id.; Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (approved by electors Nov. 8, 1994).
98. See Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed
1970).
99. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of
Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV.
971, 1011 (1970).
100. See id. at 1012.
101. Id. at 1010.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
104. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 99, at 1054.
105. Id. at 1012.
106. Id. at 1011.
107. Id. at 1012.
108. Pete Guither, Why Is Marijuana Illegal?, DRUGWARRANT.COM,
http://www.drugwarrant.com/articles/why-is-marijuana-illegal/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (refer-
ring, in chronological order, to California, Wyoming, Texas, Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Washington,
Arkansas, Nebraska, and Montana).
2013] 781
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
said to be sold on the Texas-Mexican border." 09 Accordingly, the early
days of marijuana illegalization appeared targeted toward the Mexican
immigrants, the drug's primary user group, and arguably reflected the
American West's negative view of immigrants and immigration." 0
What does this brief overview of our nation's marijuana war have to
do with the criminalization of immigration laws? Marijuana was feared
as subversive."' Mexican immigrants (along with other minority groups
in the East) were the main users during this period.1 2 For this reason, the
law banning marijuana can reasonably be viewed as a prophylactic
measure designed, at least in part, to protect citizens from the Mexican
immigrants who used the drug." 3 As Professors Bonnie and Whitebread
put it, "We conclude that the legislative action and judicial approval [of
marijuana restrictions] were essentially kneejerk responses uninformed
by scientific study or public debate and colored instead by racial bias and
sensational myths.""14
This perception of immigrants as criminals bringing drugs to our
country has not abated."' Kevin Johnson points to an "all-too-common
... headline: 'Illegal Alien Indicted for Possession With Intent to Dis-
tribute Marijuana."' 16 According to Johnson, "[t]he reference to 'illegal
alien,' . . . serves to inflame passions and tilt the debate toward favoring
more immigration enforcement (especially at the expense of 'criminal
aliens') and more restrictive immigration laws."" 7 Furthermore, the An-
ti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 described its policy goal as providing a
"drug-free America" by "reducing the number of drug users and decreas-
ing the availability of illegal drugs."" 8 One available inference is that by
keeping out immigrants (specifically, Mexican and South American im-
migrants), the United States can curb the availability and use of illegal
drugs within her borders.
109. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 99, at 1014 (quoting the June 19, 1923 Austin Texas
Statesman) (internal quotation mark omitted).
110. See id at 1012, 1015 (pointing out "that public perception of marijuana's ethnic origins
and crime-producing tendencies often went hand in hand, especially in the more volatile areas of the
western states," and although there was not much public awareness of the drug, newspapers in the
1930s would include the occasional "vociferous allusion to the criminal conduct inevitably generated
when Mexicans ate 'the killer weed').
111. See, e.g., REEFER MADNESS (Motion Picture Ventures 1936).
112. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 99, at 1012.
113. See id. at 1012-16.
114. Id at 1010.
115. See Johnson, supra note 84, at 1633.
116. Id. (quoting Illegal Alien Indicted for Possession with Intent to Distribute Mariuana,
STATES NEWS SERV., Dec. 10, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id (quoting Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
118. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 292.
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Another modem example of how the perception of immigrants as
dangerous has served to shape immigration law is the USA PATRIOT
Act, passed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001."
Just as the War on Drugs had its effect on immigration, the War on
Terror had a marked effect on the criminalization of immigration.120 A
fear of all immigrants based on the immigrant status of the terrorists led
to heightened immigration measures premised on the need for national
security.121 Based on an "examination of the rhetoric behind the recent
immigration laws," Diana Podgomy interprets three justifications for the
increasingly strict criminal immigration laws: "[T]he perception that
non-citizens are the reason for increasing criminality in the United
States, a desire to protect ... the economic interests of citizens, and a
blurred line between crime control efforts related to non-citizens and
protection of national security."1 22
B. The Blurred Line Between Civil and Criminal Law in the Immigration
Context
A cognizable trend in modem American immigration law is that the
criminal code has been imported and transmuted into the body of civil-
based immigration law.123 Although immigration law has always con-
tained at least some aspects of the penal system,124 the modem trend has
been accused of unfairly taking "the enforcement components of crimi-
nal justice without the corresponding adjudication components." 25 A
example of the "lacking adjudication" component is arguably the fact
that deportation of immigrants subsequent to criminal proceedings does
not fall within the category of double jeopardy as deportation is consid-
119. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 856 (2003) ("The USA PATRIOT Act expands the defini-
tion of 'terrorist activity' for purposes of the immigration laws in ways that may result in an addi-
tional removal ground for noncitizens convicted of assault and similar crimes. 'Terrorist activity'
thus has gone the way of 'aggravated felony' for immigration purposes, expanded well beyond what
one normally would consider to be truly 'terrorist' in nature. The USA PATRIOT Act further pro-
vides that a spouse or child of a 'terrorist' generally is inadmissible. A noncitizen also may be
deemed inadmissible for being 'associated with a terrorist organization,' broad terms reminiscent of
the principle of guilt by association, a discredited law enforcement technique popular during the dark
days of the McCarthy era. Fears also have been expressed that the expanded definition of 'terrorist
activity' in the USA PATRIOT Act will adversely affect bona fide asylum-seekers fleeing persecu-
tion in their native lands." (footnotes omitted)).
120. See Podgomy, supra note 84, at 298-300 ("[T]he primary motivation behind the 1996
Acts and the USA PATRIOT Act was a concern over national security."); see also Johnson, supra
note 119.
121. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 508-10.
122. Podgomy, supra note 84.
123. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 469 ("Sometimes dubbed 'criminalization,' the trend
has been to import criminal justice norms into a domain built upon a theory of civil regulation.").
124. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 289 ("Immigration law has always contained some elements
of penal law in its attempt to preempt criminal aliens from seeking naturalization in the United
States, but the lines between immigration and penal law have recently become increasingly blurred."
(footnote omitted)).
125. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 473.
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ered a collateral consequence rather than a direct, punitive consequence
of an immigrant's criminal proceeding. 12 6
Recent laws have added enhanced punishments for immigrants con-
victed of crimes as well as easier avenues of deportation. 12 7 The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 introduced the notion of an aggravated felony,
which provided for harsher penalties of imprisonment, expedited remov-
al, and longer bans on reentry for immigrants guilty of the crimes falling
within the "aggravated felony" definition.' 2 8 While this started as a very
narrow definition, limited to murder and trafficking of weapons or drugs,
it has since expanded so that "now an aggravated felony need no longer
be either aggravated or a felony" for purposes of removing immi-
grants. 129 The increased ease of deportation based on these criminal stat-
utes has greatly increased the number of such federal prosecutions. "Im-
migration cases are now the largest single category of federal prosecu-
tions, accounting for 32% of the annual total"1 30 and "surpassing even
drug prosecutions."13'
It is in this current context of criminalized immigration that we turn
to United States v. Rosales-Garcia. Earlier this year, the Tenth Circuit
decided this immigration case, which involved an illegal immigrant who
was convicted and imprisoned on a drug charge. He was released on pa-
role and deported, and was then caught having illegally reentered the
United States, a violation of both his parole and federal law.1 32 The ques-
tion at issue in the case was whether the enhancement of the defendant's
federal sentence could be based on the parole-revocation sentence fol-
lowing deportation or whether it had to be based on the original sentence
prior to deportation.133
126. See id. at 481-82 ("[C]riminal prosecution is therefore an add-on, not a substitute, for
deportation.").
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).
128. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified
throughout 8 U.S.C.); see also Legomsky, supra note 3, at 484 ("In its nascent form, the aggravated
felony definition was defined narrowly, in keeping with the harsh consequences .... The term
included only murder, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking. [The aggravated felony definition]
is now a colossus." (footnote omitted)); Podgorny, supra note 84, at 292.
129. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 289.
130. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 479 80 (referring to the increase in Department of Homeland
Security's recommended immigration prosecutions).
131. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 308.
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012); United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1349 (10th
Cir. 2012).
133. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GARCIA
"Oh help me in my weakness"
I heard the drifter say
As they carried him from the courtroom
And were taking him away.
-Bob Dylan, Drifter's Escape'34
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2008, a Utah state court convicted Raul Rosales-Garcia of a
drug-trafficking felony and sentenced Rosales to ninety days in jail and
three years' probation.' 31 Upon being released on probation, Rosales was
deported.13 6 Following his removal, Rosales reentered the country in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and was soon arrested by federal agents.'37
The Utah state court imposed a probation-revocation sentence as a con-
sequence for Rosales illegally reentering the country in violation of the
terms of his probation.138 While the original state drug-trafficking sen-
tence was a term of ninety days, the probation-revocation sentence was a
term of one to fifteen years.139 Rosales served his time in state prison and
was then released into federal custody to be prosecuted for his illegal
reentry.140
Rosales chose to participate in the district of Utah's fast-track pro-
gram by agreeing to plead guilty to the federal charge.141 In its Presen-
tence Report, the United States Probation Office recommended a 16-
level enhancement of Rosales' sentence based on section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and Rosales's fifteen-year state proba-
tion-revocation sentence.142 Not surprisingly, Rosales objected to the 16-
level enhancement.143 Unlike the drifter in Bob Dylan's song,'" Rosales
had no opportunity for escape, but he did have the opportunity for ap-
pealing the Presentence Report. 145 Specifically, Rosales challenged the
"procedural reasonableness of his [federal] sentence" because his state
134. BOB DYLAN, Drifter's Escape, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Columbia Records 1967).







142. Id. Note that, for purposes of section 2Ll.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the maxi-
mum term of the previous sentence is used for purposes of calculating a sentencing enhancement.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1l.2 cmt. n. I (B)(vii) (2012).
143. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
144. See DYLAN, supra note 134.
145. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1350.
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sentence for the base offense of drug trafficking did not exceed thirteen
months at the time of his illegal reentry and thus, argued Rosales, should
not satisfy the 16-level enhancement requirements of sec-
tion 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).1 46 Rosales conceded that his original sentence made
him eligible for a 12-level enhancement of his sentence but was not will-
ing to concede his eligibility for the 16-level enhancement, which relied
on the state probation-revocation sentence rather than on the sentence for
his base drug-trafficking conviction. 147 Rosales properly reserved his
issue for appeal, arguing that the statutory language only allows en-
hancements for the sentence imposed at the time of his illegal reentry. 48
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo.14 9 If the court were to
agree with Rosales, he would face a 12-level enhancement, providing a
sentence range of twenty-four to thirty months' imprisonment for the
federal charge." 0 If the court were to agree with the federal Government,
Rosales would face a 16-level enhancement, providing a sentence range
of thirty-seven months to forty-six months.''
B. The Majority Opinion
The appeal in this case was based solely on a question of law. The
facts, as summarized above, were, according to the Tenth Circuit,
straightforward, uncomplicated, and uncontested.15 2 The narrow issue
before the court was whether a sentence can be enhanced based on a pri-
or sentence that did not exceed the minimum sentence length until after
the deportation and subsequent illegal reentry.'53 The Sentencing Guide-
lines contained in section 2L1.2 allow for more severe punishments for
illegal immigrants who have committed sufficiently serious prior
crimes.154 The relevant provision directs the government to increase the
base offense level by sixteen levels "[ijf the defendant previously was
deported . . . after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug traffick-
ing offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months."' 55
Therefore, the question presented for the court was, when may a predi-
cate sentence be imposed in order to be eligible for calculation of section
2L1.2 sentence enhancements.156
146. Id. at 1349-50.
147. Id. at 1355.
148. Id. at 1349-50.
149. Id. at 1350 (citing United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2010)) ("We review de
novo a district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines where the appellant's argument
was properly preserved before the district court.").
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1349.
153. Id.
154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
155. Id
156. See Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
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Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rosales's interpretation of
the Guidelines and remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah for resentencing.'57 Because the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the predicate sentence must have been imposed before the defend-
ant's deportation, the court remanded the case for resentencing based on
the length of Rosales's original state jail sentence, eligible only for the
12-level enhancement.' 58 The court reached its conclusion by focusing on
the language of the statute,' 59 the Sentencing Commission's accompany-
ing application notes, and analogous precedent.' 60
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Whereas the majority concluded that Rosales's interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines was correct,161 the dissent concluded that the
Government's interpretation was preferable. 162 In his opinion, Judge
Gorsuch dissected the statutory language. 163 After pointing out the ambi-
guity in the construction of the statute, Judge Gorsuch turned to the ac-
companying commentary and concluded that it resolved the ambiguity
by specifically stating that the predicate "sentence imposed" includes
"any terms of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole,
or supervised release."6 The dissent held that "any terms of imprison-
ment" would include even those given on revocation of parole following
the defendant's deportation and illegal reentry.'65 This conclusion was in
accord with the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Compres-
Paulino,166 a case which presented the same issue of when a predicate
sentence must have been imposed in order to apply for the higher 16-
level sentence enhancement.'
67
Based on the dissent's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines
and accompanying commentary, Rosales' state sentence imposed after
his deportation and subsequent reentry would apply for purposes of the
Guidelines.'68 Because his probation-revocation sentence of one to fif-
teen years exceeded thirteen months, Rosales would then be subject to
157. Id. at 1355.
158. Id.
159. "If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States
after . .. a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence im-
posed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
160. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1350-55.
161. Id. at 1355.
162. See id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 1355-57.
164. Id. at 1357 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
165. Id. at 1356-57 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii))
(internal quotations mark omitted).
166. 393 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 118.
168. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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the 16-level enhancement for his federal sentence.' 69 Judge Gorsuch's
dissenting opinion therefore held that the district court "got it right" and
properly applied the 16-level enhancement. 17 0
V. ANALYSIS
I asked him for water, he poured me some wine
We finished the bottle, then broke into mine.
-Bob Weir, The Greatest Story Ever Toldl71
A. The Question Presented
The question on appeal was whether the district court had correctly
applied the 16-level enhancement to Rosales's federal sentence.17 2 As
previously noted, the 16-level enhancement provided in the Sentencing
Guidelines can only be applied when the preceding conviction carried a
sentence longer than thirteen months.173 Rosales's original state sentence
(prior to his deportation and subsequent reentry) would not satisfy the
16-level enhancement requirements set out above because his original
ninety-day sentence did not exceed thirteen months. 174 However,
Rosales's one- to fifteen-year probation-revocation sentence, if used for
the calculation of enhancing the federal illegal reentry sentence, certainly
would qualify Rosales for the 16-level enhancement.'75 Even if Rosales
were to only serve the minimum of that sentence (i.e., one year, which
would not exceed thirteen months), it would not matter for the purpose of
section 2L1.2 because the accompanying commentary clearly states that
when the previous sentence is a range of time, the maximum length of
that sentence is to be used for sentencing purposes.176 In the event that
Rosales's enhanced state drug-trafficking sentence could be used for
sentencing, fifteen years would be the length of the sentence imposed,
thereby clearly subjecting Rosales to the 16-level enhancement.
B. The "[S]entence [O]nly a [G]rammar [T]eacher [Clould [L]ove"l 77
Both the dissenting opinion and the majority opinion point out that
the phrasing of the statute allows for two separate interpretations.77 The
169. Id.; see also id. at 1349 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
171. BOB WEIR, The Greatest Story Ever Told, on ACE (Warner Bros. Records 1972).
172. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349 (majority opinion) ("The sole question presented before
us on appeal is whether the 16-level enhancement in USSG § 2Ll.2(b)(l)(A) applies to a defendant
whose sentence for an earlier drug trafficking felony was made longer than 13 months after the
defendant was deported and committed the base offense of illegal reentry.").
173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1 .2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
174. Id. § 2L1l.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii); see also Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349 (majority opin-
ion).
175. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1l.2(b)(1)(A).
176. Id § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii).
177. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1356 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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majority went with the interpretation of a temporal restriction on when a
predicate sentence was imposed;17 9 the dissent interpreted the statute to
mean any predicate sentence, whether imposed before or after deporta-
tion and subsequent reentry. 8 0
While certain phrases, such as "venial syntactical sins"'"' and the al-
literative "prudent penological policy," 82 seem unnecessarily overblown,
Judge Gorsuch's dissenting opinion made it readily apparent that he
agreed with the Government's interpretation of the Sentencing Guide-
lines. 18 3 To be fair, this interpretation was in accord with that of the Sec-
ond Circuit.' 84 Nonetheless, Rosales's interpretation, shared by the ma-
jority and the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, was plausible, not precluded by
the language, and preferred in light of the policy behind the Sentencing
Guidelines.' 85 As the dissent's reasoning focused more on an analysis of
the language, we shall look first to the dissent's analysis.
The dissent turned first to the relevant language of sec-
tion 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), denouncing it as "a sentence only a grammar teach-
er could love." 86 The language of the statute is as follows: "If the de-
fendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug trafficking
offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a
sentence enhancement]."l 87 The dissent pointed to the string of preposi-
tional phrases,188 the passive voice,1 8 9 and the "scraggly expression of
time" 90 as the "gnarled" grammar of the statute.9
The dissent observed that the use of the past tense is not particularly
helpful in the statute. Judge Gorsuch reasoned that the past tense of "im-
posed" and "exceeded" could equally indicate a sentence given prior to
deportation or any other sentence imposed before the current prosecu-
tion. 192 The majority agreed that this was a plausible interpretation but
178. See id. at 1351-52, 1356-58.
179. See id at 1351 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1355.
182. Id at 1358.
183. Id. at 1357.
184. United States v. Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
185. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1351-52 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 1356 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
187. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1l.2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
188. Id. ("If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a convictionfor a felony that is ... a drug trafficking offensefor which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." (emphasis added)).
189. Id. ("If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is .. .a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." (emphasis added)).
190. Id ("If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug trafticking offense for which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." (emphasis added)).
191. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1356.
192. Id
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declined to concede that it was the better interpretation based on the Sen-
tencing Commission's commentary and the purpose behind the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.' 9 3 The dissent agreed that the first prepositional phrase
made clear that the prior conviction must occur before deportation.' 94
However, the dissent reasoned, "[W]e can have no similar confidence
that the 'sentence imposed' must [come prior to deportation]" because
the prepositional phrase modifying "sentence imposed" is placed "two
modifying phrases away."
Let us walk through the grammar ourselves. At its most basic, the
sentence in section 2L1.2 is an if-then statement. If the court is dealing
with a prior drug-trafficking conviction that imposed a sentence longer
than thirteen months, then add a sentence enhancement. Based on the
facts in this case, we may ignore the "or unlawfully remained in the
United States" line because Rosales was deported and illegally reen-
tered.'96 The string of prepositional phrases referenced by the dissent
read, "[W]as deported . . . after .. . a conviction for a felony that is ... a
drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13
months."' 97 Both the phrase "for which the sentence imposed exceeded
13 months" and "for a felony that is a drug trafficking offense" modify
the term "conviction."' 98 It does not matter that the "sentence imposed"
phrase "comes at the caboose of the prepositional train." 99 What matters
is that both phrases modify conviction, and the conviction must come
after deportation. Therefore, the grammatical construction of the sen-
tence, as the majority held, indicates that the conviction and its corre-
sponding sentence must come before the deportation. Said in a slightly
simpler fashion, if the defendant was deported after a drug-trafficking
felony conviction for which the sentence imposed exceeded thirteen
months, then apply the 16-level enhancement.
C The Purpose Behind the Sentencing Guidelines
The majority's discussion of the overall purpose behind sec-
tion 2L1.2 provides a helpful foundation for understanding the reasoning
of the court.2 00 As the majority pointed out, both parties in the case
agreed that "the purpose of § 2L1.2(b)(1) is to punish illegal reentry
more severely where the defendant has committed one or more of certain
enumerated prior crimes," including the drug-trafficking felony at issue
here. 20 1 The method for determining the seriousness of the prior crime is
193. Id. at 1351 n.2 (majority opinion).
194. Id at 1356 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Rosales-Garcia, 67 F.3d at 1356 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
200. Id at 1353-54 (majority opinion).
201. Id. at 1353.
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to look at the maximum sentence imposed on the defendant.2 02 The court
stated that using the sentence as a measure of the prior crime's magni-
tude may be rough, but it is nonetheless one that provides at least a mod-
icum of consistency and "numerically prescribed" precision. 20 3 Simply
put, the longer the sentence a defendant received in state court, the more
serious the offense would appear in a situation like this.20
In spite of the fact that his probation-revocation sentence was
"technically imposed as part of the punishment process for an earlier
felony," the majority agreed with Rosales's interpretation of the Com-
mission's intentions. 205 This interpretation was that "the Commission did
not intend consideration of a sentence imposed as a result of post-
,,206
deportation actions. As the court adroitly pointed out, the increased
sentence stemming from Rosales's failure to comply with his probation
by reentering the country had nothing to do with the seriousness of the
original drug-trafficking offense.207 The court reasoned that this interpre-
tation, which looks only to the sentence of the prior offense before the
deportation, is consistent with the distinction between pre- and post-
deportation and reentry drawn by section 2L1.2.208
The dissent expressed the concern that the majority, by accepting
Rosales's interpretation and the distinction between pre- and post-
deportation proceedings, altogether ignored probation-revocation sen-
tences when calculating the seriousness of an offense. 20 9 The majority's
response to this concern was that the categorization as original sentence
or as probation-revocation sentence was not the determining aspect and
cited United States v. Moreno-Cisneros,210 where a probation-revocation
sentence was taken into consideration during sentencing. 211 However, in
Moreno-Cisneros, the revocation of probation occurred before deporta-
tion.212 Thus, the Rosales-Garcia court held that the temporal placement
of the sentence, whether it occurs before or after deportation, is definitive
when applying the Sentencing Guidelines.2 13
This temporal focus is, according to the Rosales-Garcia court, sup-
ported by the language of both the statute and the accompanying notes
supplied by the drafters.2 14 In his argument, Rosales stressed the choice
202. Id. at 1353-54.
203. Id.





209. Id. at 1358 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
210. 319 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2003).
211. Id. at 457.
212. Id. at 458.
213. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1355 (majority opinion).
214. Id. at 1350-53.
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and placement of the word "after" in section 2L1.2(b)(1), along with the
"repeated use of the past tense . . . in referring to the predicate drug traf-
ficking felony sentence." 215 In the language of the statute, "[i]f the de-
fendant previously was deported ... after ... a conviction for a felo-
,,216 - 217ny, the conviction is read to precede the deportation. The use of the
past tense for the words "imposed" and "exceeded" was interpreted by
Rosales and the majority to mean that that there must be some date of
reference before which the predicate sentence was given. 2 18 The court
reasoned that the date of reference is the same for both the prior convic-
tion and the predicate sentence; 219 therefore, because there is no dispute
that the prior conviction must take place before deportation, the predicate
sentence must occur before deportation as well.220
In its argument, the Government countered that the Sentencing
Commission's commentary to section 2L1.2(b)(1) indicates that any sen-
tence prior to the federal sentence is eligible for the purposes of sentence
enhancement.221 The commentary defines "sentence imposed" as "any
term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation."222 The major-
ity accused the Government of "urg[ing] a simple truism: 'any' means
'any."' 223 While the dissent was persuaded by this "simple truism," the
22majority was not.224 Instead, the majority relied on the fact that the com-
mentary did not mention the temporal aspect at issue here.225 Because the
commentary did not mention the temporal constraint at issue in Rosales-
Garcia and similar cases, the majority concluded that the Government's
226interpretation was not consistent with the commentary.
Furthermore, the court explained "any term of imprisonment" for
sentences imposed by way of the "relation back" doctrine.22 7 Rather than
referencing any conviction as an indication that post-deportation convic-
tions count, the Rosales-Garcia court understood the commentary to be
instructing courts to consider all of the defendant's convictions prior to
the illegal reentry, regardless of how far in the past those convictions
occurred.228
The dissent proceeded to respond to the remaining points made in
the majority opinion. Judge Gorsuch found that the commentary's silence
215. Id. at 1351.
216. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ll.2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
217. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1351.
218. Id
219. Id at 1351-52.
220. Id. at 1351.
221. Id. at 1352.
222. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(vii).
223. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1352.
224. Id.
225. Id
226. Id at 1353.
227. Id. at 1352.
228. Id.
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on the temporal restraint, and the analogous silence regarding the issue in
the four supporting cases cited by the Commission, did not indicate "lim-
iting language" about the sentence imposed.2 29 The dissent accused the
majority of relying on mere guesswork about the commentary's silence
and omission to amend in light of the circuit split.23 0 The dissent also
rejected the policy concern of arbitrary anomalous results based on
"whether state or federal officials happen to collar the defendant first"
because the federal courts have the discretion in sentencing to consider
fairness concerns such as this.23 1 Of course, this discretion suggests that
federal courts can do exactly the same overreach of authority that the
dissent accused the majority of doing: using discretion when applying the
Sentencing Guidelines. In short, the dissent did not convincingly respond
to the analysis of the majority.
D. Precedential Support and the Circuit Split
Throughout its opinion, the Rosales-Garcia majority included refer-
ences to precedential support. For persuasive authority, the court cited
four opinions from other circuits regarding the same issue: United States
232 233v. Lopez, United States v. Bustillos-Pena, United States v.
Jimenez,"' and United States v. Guzman-Bera.":' In all these cases, the
courts similarly concluded that a sentence enhancement under sec-
tion 2L1.2 could only be based on a conviction prior to deportation.236
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit agreed in Lopez that the Sentencing
Commission's commentary did not support the Government's view that
any conviction, including those after deportation, would apply for sec-
tion 2L1.2.237
Additionally, the court offered the fact that none of the four cases238
chosen by the Sentencing Commission to support the commentary's def-
inition of "sentence imposed" implicated the temporal issue of post-
deportation convictions.239 In all of the four cases offered by the com-
mentary, the previous sentence imposed occurred before deportation and
subsequent illegal reentry. 240 The court pointed out that the commentary
included these four cases but excluded Guzman-Bera, which implicates
229. Id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1358 n.l.
231. Id. at 1358-59.
232. 634 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2011).
233. 612 F.3d 863 (5th CiT. 2010).
234. 258 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2001).
235. 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2000).
236. Lopez, 634 F.3d at 950; Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d at 869; Jimenez, 258 F.3d at 1125-26;
Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d at 1021.
237. Lopez, 634 F.3d at 953.
238. United States v. Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Compi-
an-Torres, 320 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281 (2d Cir.
2002) (per curiam); United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 313 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2002).
239. United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 2012).
240. See d
2013] 793
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the temporal constraint.24 And so, the court did not find an intention by
the commentary to include post-deportation sentences within the mean-
ing of a "sentence imposed" for purposes of section 2L1.2.242 The court
noted that this conclusion did not strip the commentary of all meaning;
for any probation-revocation sentence imposed prior to deportation, the
enhancement provisions set forth in section 2L1.2 would certainly apply
based on the definition set forth in the commentary.243
The opinion also acknowledged the presence of a circuit split on the
precise issue of the case.2 44 The majority specifically referenced United
States v. Compres-Paulino, a per curiam case that came to precisely the
opposite conclusion as that of the Rosales-Garcia court.245 in Compres-
Paulino, the Second Circuit found that "any punishment assessed for a
violation of probation is actually imposed for the underlying convic-
tion." 24 6 The court in Rosales-Garcia chose to follow the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits not only for the reasons outlined above but also because the
Rosales-Garcia court was concerned with the "needless and nonsensical
aberrant results" that would flow from the Compres-Paulino holding.24 7
Specifically, the aberrant results with which the court was concerned
were that a defendant like Rosales could be punished more or less se-
verely based solely upon "the happenstance that his state probation was
revoked before his federal prosecution commenced." 2 4 8 In other words,
the Rosales-Garcia court disdained the consequence of different sentenc-
es based only upon the coincidence of sequencing.249 Under the holding
in Compres-Paulino, Rosales would have received only the 12-level en-
hancement had the State of Utah revoked his probation after the federal
trial but the higher 16-level enhancement if Utah had revoked the proba-
tion before the federal sentence. 2 5 0 According to the majority, avoidance





244. Id at 1354 ("We acknowledge that our decision is squarely in conflict with the Second
Circuit's holding in United States v. Compres-Paulino.").
245. Id. at 118-19; Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1354.
246. Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d at 118 (quoting United States v. Huerta-Moran, 352 F.3d 766,
770 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1354.
248. Id.
249. Id. ("One particular concern we have with [the Compres-Paulino] decision is the disparate
treatment it gives to like offenders whose prosecutions have happened to differ sequentially. As Mr.
Rosales points out, if we were to adopt the Second Circuit's rule, Mr. Rosales would face more
substantially increased punishment solely because of the happenstance that his state probation was
revoked before his federal prosecution commenced.... [This] bolster[s] our conclusion ... by
acknowledging that it avoids needless and nonsensical aberrant results.").
250. See Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d at 118 19.
251. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1354.
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The court also noted that the Sentencing Commission omitted
amending its Guidelines contained in the commentary in spite of the
holdings of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in Bustillos-Pena and Lopez,
respectively. 2 52 The decision in Bustillos-Pena presented the first circuit
split on the temporal issue of pre- and post-deportation.253 And yet, the
Sentencing Commission did not amend its commentary.2 54 The opinion
in Lopez, which agreed with the Fifth Circuit, was issued a mere month
before the Sentencing Commission submitted proposed amendments to
the 2011 congressional session. 2 55 And still, the Commission failed to
amend the definition of "sentence imposed." 256 While the court admitted
that this failure to amend is far from dispositive, the court noted, "[T]he
Commission's failure to address this [narrow] issue . . . offers at least a
modicum of further support for the notion that the Fifth and Seventh Cir-
cuits' construction of the provision is not inconsistent with the Commis-
sion's intention." 25 7 In conclusion, the majority held that Rosales's inter-
pretation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was the better interpretation
by way of an opinion that was thoughtful, well reasoned, well supported,
and complete with rational responses to the reasoning contained in the
dissent.258
E. Judge Gorsuch's Plea for Clarification
To his credit, Judge Gorsuch ended his dissent well. He closed with
"a plea for syntactical assistance" from the Sentencing Commission.2 5 9
He closed by calling upon the Commission to clear up the confusion
once and for all. 260 Because, as he rightly pointed out, the current state of
affairs means that "similarly situated defendants receive different sen-
tences only because of the happenstance of the circuit in which they
sit."261 Although I agree with the reasoning and holding of the majority, I
also agree that clarity on this issue, one way or the other, is to be desired.
It would appear that the Sentencing Commission heard Judge Gor-
such's plea.262 Effective November 1, 2012, Amendment 764 to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines confirmed that the majority's interpretation of a tem-
poral restraint on when a "sentence imposed" may apply is correct 2 6 3: A
sentence following revocation of probation may still apply for purposes
252. Id.
253. Id. (discussing United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2010)).
254. Id.
255. Id. (discussing United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2011)).
256. Id.
257. Id at 1355.
258. See generally id. at 1349-55.
259. Id. at 1359 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
260. Id
261. Id.
262. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) (2012); see also
United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
263. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii); United States v.
Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1355 (10th Cir. 2012).
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of section 2L.1 but only when the revocation occurred before deporta-
tion.264 The Sentencing Commission indicated that the amendment re-
sponds to and resolves a "circuit conflict" and discussed the holding in
Rosales-Garcia.2 65 So, as it turns out, the majority got it right. And be-
cause Judge Gorsuch's plea for clarification by the Sentencing Commis-
sion was granted, defendants in Rosales's position will receive consistent
treatment in all the federal circuits. Indeed, one such similarly situated
defendant has already felt the effect of the amendment. 266 In United
States v. Catalan, the amendment was applied retroactively to a defend-
ant who had been given a higher level of sentence enhancement based on
his post-deportation probation-revocation sentence.267 As was Rosales's,
Catalan's fate was remanded back to the district court for sentencing
based on a 12-level, not a 16-level, enhancement.268
F. The Paradox ofPunishing and Removing
What does this case teach us? For starters, the case illustrates the
level of complexity now standard within immigration law. 2 69 The differ-
ence between the holding in Rosales-Garcia and the holding in the Sec-
ond Circuit also illustrates the "inconsistent and unpredictable applica-
tion" of immigration laws. 270 The Rosales-Garcia decision further serves
as an example of the increasing "criminalization" of immigration law
through the use of enhanced sentencing.271 But the case also highlights a
paradox-the fact that Rosales was both imprisoned in the United States
and removed from the country. What sense does this make? When the
law provides for removal of illegal immigrants, including those who, like
Rosales, have committed crimes in this country, why do we feel the addi-
tional need to punish prior to deportation? As it currently stands, immi-
gration law views deportation not as punishment but rather as a conse-
quence divorced from the punishment of incarceration.2 72 Therefore, un-
264. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) ("The length of the
sentence imposed includes any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or
supervised release, but only if the revocation occurred before the defendant was deported or unlaw-
fully remained in the United States.").
265. See Catalan, 701 F.3d at 333 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 26 (2012)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 333 ("Pursuant to the amendment, which we apply retroactively, we hold that the
district court erred in imposing a 16-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), rather than a
12-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).").
268. Id.
269. See Bettwy, supra note 84.
270. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 315.
271. See United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1349 (10th Cir. 2012); Legomsky,
supra note 3, at 476.
272. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3 ("[B]ecause deportation has been held not to be pun-
ishment, the constitutional bar on double jeopardy does not preclude the government from bringing
deportation proceedings once the person has completed his or her criminal sentence." (footnote
omitted)).
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documented immigrants like Rosales can be both imprisoned and re-
moved.273
Can it really be argued that deportation is not punishment? The
courts insist that "deportation is not punishment."2 74 However, most peo-
ple would see deportation-being sent into exile away from the place
considered home and the people considered friends and family-as a
punishment.2 7 5 Historically, deportation was used as punishment (e.g.,
the practice of sending convicted criminals out of English prisons and
into the American and Australian colonies).276 The current argument that
deportation is not punishment "is tautological: deportation is not pun-
ishment because we do not view it as punishment." 2 77
In spite of the insistence that deportation is not punitive, it seems
that the ends of deportation bear a striking resemblance to traditional
theories of punishment, "particularly retribution, deterrence, and incapac-
itation." 278 The most obvious connection between deportation and tradi-
tional theories of punishment is the connection between incapacitation
and deportation.279 Incapacitation is "the isolation of the undesirable of-
fender from society."280 It does not require sophisticated scholarship to
see that deportation serves the purpose of incapacitation even better than
imprisonment; if the individual is removed from a country, then he is no
longer able to cause trouble in that country. The deterrence theory of
punishment provides that the individual offender (specific deterrence) as
well as potential future offenders (general deterrence) will be discour-
aged from committing the offense through knowledge of the attendant
consequences if caught. 2 8 1 This same general deterrence theory arguably
holds true for deportation as well. 28 2 If immigrants are aware of the pos-
sible consequence of deportation, they are less likely to commit the of-
fense that could carry a deportation consequence with it. 2 83 The retribu-
tion theory of punishment has perhaps the weakest connection with de-
284
portation. However, "even retribution might well come into play when
273. See id.
274. See id. at 472.
275. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1895 (2000) ("[Mlost
people undoubtedly do see deportation as punishment.").
276. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 513 (citing Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Pun-
ishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern
Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 129 (1999)).
277. Kanstroom, supra note 275.
278. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 488.
279. See, e.g., id. at 513-14.
280. Id. at 514.
281. Id.
282. Id
283. Id. at 514-15 ("Congress might well feel that the threat of deportation, with all its long-
term effects, deters unlawful entries or violations of the terms of one's admittance.").
284. See id. at 514 ("The retribution rationale for criminal punishment admittedly has less
universal application to deportation .... .").
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deportation is predicated upon the commission of an independent wrong,
rather than upon the remedying of an immigration status violation."285
I will not delve further into the connection between deportation and
the traditional theories of punishment here. Let it be sufficient for the
moment to note that having citizens pay for the jail time of the criminally
convicted non-citizen and then having the immigrant deported upon re-
lease is overkill. Immigration law needs to consider what the larger pur-
pose behind incarceration and deportation is and then make a rational
decision regarding the fate of convicted non-citizens. Either we accept
the criminal immigrant, punish him, and release him into our society
after his rehabilitation, 286 or we "sentence" him to deportation. It seems
to me that current immigration law does not have a sufficient reason for
both imprisoning and then deporting.
CONCLUSION
Red and white, blue suede shoes
I'm Uncle Sam, how do you do?
Gimme five; I'm still alive! Ain't no luck; I learned to duck!
-The Grateful Dead, U.S. Blues287
What is the purpose of immigration law? Dean Johnson has noted
that the United States has often been unclear about the goals of the im-
migration laws.288 It is clear that we want to protect our citizens. Regard-
less of whether immigrants pose an actual threat, a perceived threat has
resulted in a trend toward criminalizing immigration laws.289 It is also
clear that in order to be naturalized, immigrants coveting American citi-
zenship must have "good moral character." 2 90 This desire to protect our
citizens and to guard our citizenship from those lacking good morals is
both natural and beneficial. However, where do we fall on the other end
of the spectrum? Do we still retain any of that welcoming, hospitable
sentiment that we posted on our Statue of Liberty? 2 9 1 In a nation built on
285. Id
286. Of course, this option has its own problems; if such an option were put in place, then the
easiest way to become naturalized would be conviction of a crime.
287. THE GRATEFUL DEAD, U.S. Blues, on FROM THE MARS HOTEL (Grateful Dead Records
1974).
288. Johnson, supra note 84, at 1638.
289. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 469 ("Sometimes dubbed 'criminalization,' the trend
has been to import criminal justice norms into a domain built upon a theory of civil regulation.");
Podgomy, supra note 84, at 289 ("Immigration law has always contained some elements of penal
law in its attempt to preempt criminal aliens from seeking naturalization in the United States, but the
lines between immigration and penal law have recently become increasingly blurred." (footnote
omitted)).
290. 8 U.S.C. § l 101(f) (2012).
291. Lazarus, supra note 35.
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mass immigration,2 92 is it fair that we have slapped a "NO VACANIES"
sign over those words of unqualified welcome? It is time to address the
issue of immigration within the context of our modem world and take a
stand. If nothing else, consistency in the application of the law needs to
be achieved. During his 2004 presidential campaign, President Obama
declared:
Now is the time. Now is the time not just for comprehensive immi-
gration reform at the federal level, but for humane, meaningful im-
migration reform that respects the dignity of all persons and reflects
both a knowledge and embrace of international human rights law. . .
that fulfills the promise of our great nation as a haven for persons the
world over regardless of race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.293
I am not presuming to be able to provide satisfactory answers to all
these questions here, nor am I able to suggest a comprehensive reform of
one of the most complex areas of U.S. law.294 I do, however, hope to
have illustrated through this Comment that immigration laws, specifical-
ly the combination of enhanced punishment by imprisonment and re-
moval that Mr. Rosales encountered, are colored by hostility towards
immigrants. In the process of writing, it was pointed out to me that even
using the term "illegal immigrant" risks perpetuating the stigma of im-
migrants as criminals.295 So, rather than providing the necessary reform,
my goal was to expose one of the problems in immigration law and
thereby show that reform is necessary.
This is not to say that there should not be laws affecting non-citizen
immigrants. The simple fact of the matter is that undocumented persons
residing in this country are here illegally. But in determining the conse-
292. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform,
23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 110 n.1 (2011) (noting that the literature supporting America as a
"'nation of immigrants' is too vast to cite").
293. See Campbell, supra note 84, at 457-58.
294. Immigration law has been dubbed as one of the most complex areas of U.S. law. See
Bettwy, supra note 84; Johnson supra note 84.
295. See also Chac6n, supra note 93, at 1838-39 ("By the 1950s, the phrases 'illegal immi-
grant' and 'illegal alien' had become a staple of the popular lexicon. Today, the press, politicians
and individuals and organizations promoting restrictionist immigration laws commonly use the
phrases 'illegal alien' and 'illegal immigrant' when describing unauthorized migrants in the United
States. Thus, in law and language, there is a clear link between irregular status and illegality. Care is
not always used in how the 'illegal immigrant' label is applied. With their entry and their labor
criminalized, certain groups of migrants-most commonly Mexicans-increasingly bear the label
'illegal aliens,' whether or not that label applies to them. In other words, the term 'illegal alien'
(which has no clear legal meaning) is not only used to signify irregular migrants, but also often
applied to those perceived as irregular migrants, regardless of actual immigration status. These
perceptions of undocumented status are heavily influenced by racial stereotypes." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal Rights: An
Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Access to Housing, 39 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 529, 529-30 (2008) ("This author deems it inaccurate to refer to a group
of people as 'illegal' simply because they have committed a criminal act by entering the United
States without obtaining permission from the government. . . . [I]t is more accurate to describe them
as undocumented immigrants.").
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quences for those illegally present, the law should not be colored by xen-
ophobia. If the purpose is simply to curtail the number of undocumented
residents, then deportation is enough and punishment inhospitably gratui-
tous. Some laws are necessary, but as it stands currently, the additional
punishment of imprisonment with the very real possibility of enhanced
sentencing goes beyond necessity. This is intended to raise the provoca-
tive question of whether we are obliged to incarcerate non-citizens at all.
And so, in closing, I echo Judge Gorsuch's plea for clarification.2 96
Instead of clarification of the specific ambiguity presented by section
2L. 1, I call for clarification of the need for any level of sentence en-
hancement. Rather than debating or reforming the level of enhancement
and when that enhancement may be imposed, let us question whether we
require the sentence in the first place. Does this serve some purpose of
criminal justice or does this instead satisfy a xenophobic urge to enhance
the punishment of those who dare presume to trespass on our land? I
propose that the latter is the better interpretation. At best, the combina-
tion of imprisonment and deportation reflects ambivalence in the law's
consideration of the theory behind the practices.297 This urge is not prop-
er within the edicts of blind justice. Justice should be served on the un-
documented immigrant either through deportation or jail time, not both.
In short, the time for immigration reform has come.
Anna Natalie Rol*
296. United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1359 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
297. See Kanstroom, supra note 275, at 1934 ("In the field of immigration law in general, and
deportation law in particular, the lack of a comprehensive theoretical approach has been ... prob-
lematic. Classifying the proceedings as 'civil' has simply subjected questions of fairness and rights
to decisions based on a muddle of models.").
* J.D. Candidate, 2014. Like any writer, I owe much of my work to the response of its
readers, past, present, and future. Specifically in the case of the present Comment, I am indebted to
the assistance provided by the current Denver University Law Review Board, particularly to Edward
Shaoul and Melissa Lawson for their excellent guidance, thoughtful suggestions, and limitless ener-
gy and patience. Any faults or shortcomings in this Comment are mine alone. Also on the current
Denver University Law Review, I am much obliged to Trey Arbuckle, my shepherd, and to Alaina
Almond, my compatriot in Law Review arms. For the scholarship, proofreading, and reason provid-
ed by my family, I owe more than can adequately be expressed even through the richness of the
English language. Marco, Angie, and Harry Rol, the debts of gratitude I owe to you are not only my
greatest debts but also the ones I bear most happily. Perge modo.
800 [Vol. 90:3
A WAD V. ZIRIAX: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DEFENSE AGAINST
THE POWER OF RELIGIOUS MAJORITY FACTIONS
ABSTRACT
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment creates a wall of
separation between church and state and ensures government neutrality
concerning religious beliefs and practices. The Supreme Court has de-
veloped the Lemon and Larson tests to analyze Establishment Clause
violations but has not clearly articulated when either test should be ap-
plied. The Tenth Circuit grappled with this problem in Awad v. Ziriax
and, under the heightened Larson standard, struck down an anti-Sharia
law ballot initiative passed in Oklahoma's 2010 election. More im-
portantly, however, the case raises broader questions about the social
movements supporting anti-Sharia law sentiment and how a religious
majority can wield power in a democratic system.
This Comment utilizes James Madison's theory regarding repre-
sentative government as a safeguard against a majority political faction
in order to explore religious majority efforts to dictate the morals and
behaviors of non-adherents. Madison's cure of a democratic republic
largely fails in the context of the modern majority religious faction due to
increased communication through technology and a shrinking political
sphere. The First Amendment must be understood as protecting the peo-
ple from religion as much as it protects religious liberties in order to
guard unpopular religious and non-religious minorities from the power of
a religious majority. Consequently, the Larson "strict scrutiny" standard
should be extended to laws designed to establish mainstream religious
values while burdening non-adherents in order to protect against the es-
tablishment of a national religion.
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INTRODUCTION
The case of Awad v. Ziriax' emerges from the growing movement
by states to enact legislation aimed at preventing the use or consideration
of Sharia law in U.S. courts. Hearing a challenge to Oklahoma's Save
Our State Amendment, which specifically prohibited state courts from
considering international law or Sharia Law in making judicial decisions,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that such enactments
clearly violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.2 Although
the opinion is well reasoned and thoughtful, that is not why this case
holds great interest. The social movements leading up to and surrounding
the opinion reveal deeper issues within Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence and shed light on the dynamics of minority oppression and majori-
ty power.
Concerns surrounding the potential dangers of majority rule inher-
ent in democratic societies have existed since the founding of this nation
and are addressed by James Madison's musings on the "faction" in The
Federalist Papers.3 Madison theorized that the effects of a majority fac-
tion could be controlled through a representative government, providing
checks and balances on any majority vote that is inconsistent with long-
term constitutional rights and protections. But many aspects of Madi-
son's cure have failed the Awad case.
Part I of this Comment provides background on how courts interpret
and apply the religious protection conferred by the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history,
and majority opinion in Awad. Part III provides an analysis of why the
State of Oklahoma attempted to institute a clearly unconstitutional
amendment, explains Madison's theory of the democratic republic as a
safeguard against the majority political faction and why the theory large-
1. 670F.3dllll (l0thCir.2012).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion .... ).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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ly fails in this case, and offers some alternative solutions to continue the
Tenth Circuit's work in upholding protection for unpopular minorities
against a moral majority. The Comment concludes that the First
Amendment protections provided to unpopular religious minorities must
necessarily be expanded to include any unpopular minority being op-
pressed by legislation motivated by a moral majority agenda. First
Amendment freedom of religion includes freedom from the majority
religious group attempting to impose its particularized morality through a
secular government.
I. BACKGROUND
This portion of the Comment will provide background on the legal
doctrine used by the Tenth Circuit in determining the Awad case. First, it
will broadly describe the Establishment Clause jurisprudence developed
by the Supreme Court in analyzing government and religion interactions.
Second, it will describe the Lemon test and the Larson test, and explain
the different applications of the tests.
A. The Establishment Clause
As interpreted by federal courts, the Establishment Clause has given
rise to a complex and layered doctrine that applies to a wide range of
government conduct. The original intent of the Founders when enacting
the Establishment Clause was "to erect 'a wall of separation between
Church and State."A broad principle of the Establishment Clause is
complete, official neutrality by the government,6 although some scholars
have argued that complete neutrality is impossible and the Establishment
Clause requires only that the government give no official religious man-
date. 7 The Supreme Court has stated that the Establishment Clause pri-
marily protects against governmental "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."8 The Es-
tablishment Clause is applicable if the government action involves aid to
religious institutions or entanglement between religion and government.9
4. See generally Richard F. Duncan, The "Clearest Command" of the Establishment Clause:
Denominational Preferences, Religious Liberty, and Public Scholarships that Classify Religions, 55
S.D. L. REV. 390 passim (2010).
5. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
6. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitu-
tional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1317, 1338-39 (1997).
7. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.
REv. 146, 148 (1986) ("To insist on strict neutrality in all cases arising under the religion clauses
would be wholly inconsistent with the demands of free exercise and, as the separationists would
emphasize, nonestablishment as well. Protections for religious liberty are no more 'neutral' toward
religion than freedom of the press is 'neutral' toward the press").
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).




In Everson v. Board ofEducation,10 the Supreme Court considered a
New Jersey law that provided taxpayer funds to parochial schools to
cover bus fares for children commuting to and from school.' 1 The Court
held that, because the primary nature of parochial schools is to teach
children through a religious lens, any state funding going to parochial
schools is a violation of the Establishment Clause. Government funding
of schools teaching a particular religious view gave the appearance of
government support of a religious institution,12 despite the fact that the
funding was aimed at the secular purpose of providing bus fares." Alt-
hough New Jersey could not make a special provision just for parochial
schools, the state would not have been precluded from sponsoring bus
fares for all students, public and private.14 In Colorado Christian Univer-
sity v. Weaver,15 the Tenth Circuit considered a Colorado statute that
subsidized higher education costs for in-state students but excluded funds
to universities that were deemed "pervasively sectarian" based on certain
factors. 6 The court held that the law discriminated among higher educa-
tional institutions in determining which ones would receive state aid
based upon the level of sectarianism within the institution, thereby vio-
lating the Establishment Clause's command of government neutrality
concerning religious sects.'7
The purpose of preventing entanglement between government and
religion is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either into the
precincts of the other."18 Elements to consider when determining whether
"excessive entanglement" exists are the character and purpose of the
benefited institution, the nature of the state aid, and the resulting rela-
tionship between government and the religious entity.19 One underlying
concern of entanglement is that a law may involve government in reli-
gious contexts that are better resolved within the religious institution
itself 20 The Supreme Court considered the excessive entanglement
standard in the context of a government Christmas display with a Chris-
tian nativity scene in Lynch v. Donnelly.21 The Court was reluctant to
create a bright-line test for determining entanglement in "this sensitive
area"22 but ultimately found that the nativity scene did not cause gov-
ernment entanglement with religion because there was no government
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. Id at 3.
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id at 17.
14. Id.
15. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
16. Id at 1250.
17. Id. at 1257-58.
18. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
19. Id. at 615.
20. Sedler, supra note 6, at 1410-11.
21. 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
22. Id. at 679.
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contact with any particular religious entity, a minimal amount was spent
on the display, and it caused very little interaction between any church
and state organizations.23
B. The Lemon and Larson Tests
1. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 4 the Supreme Court developed a three-part
test for Establishment Clause analysis: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 2 5 The
case combined challenges to similar statutes passed in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island that provided state aid to nonpublic schools, most of which
were affiliated with the Roman Catholic church.2 6 The state statutes pro-
vided that state support would go towards secular aspects of the school's
needs, specifically the salaries of teachers of secular subjects.27
The main issue in Lemon was whether the statutes created "exces-
sive government entanglement with religion." 28 To determine the level of
entanglement, a court must "examine the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited" by the statute, the nature of the state bene-
fit provided, and the resulting relationship between government and the
benefited institution.2 9 The Court found that the institutions receiving aid
were clearly religious and the aid was directed at teacher salaries.30 The
resulting relationship created excessive entanglement because it is diffi-
cult for teachers of even secular subjects to be sufficiently religiously
neutral while working in a religiously affiliated school of their own
faith.3 ' Although purely secular teaching materials like textbooks can be
provided by the state, a teacher of a secular subject within a religious
environment is likely unable to remain religiously neutral32; therefore,
23. Id. at 684.
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 606, 609-10.
27. Id. at 607, 609.
28. Id. at 613-14 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding
the first two prongs of the test to be satisfied).
29. Id. at 615.
30. Id. at 616, 641.
31. Id.at618.
32. Id. at 618, 626. The Court explained that a teacher in a parochial school of even a purely
secular subject likely cannot remain religiously neutral because he or she is employed by the reli-
gious organization, is subject to direction and discipline by that employer, and works in a system
designed to rear children in a particular faith. Id. at 618. This immersion in the religious organization
obstructs a clear separation of a secular-subject teacher from the established tenants of the religion.
Id. at 618-19.
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government aid for teachers' salaries is a violation of the Establishment
Clause.33
In later cases, the Court began to carve out and refine the Lemon
prongs.34 In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice
O'Connor introduced the endorsement test as an extension of the Lemon
test. This clarification focused on avoiding excessive entanglement of
government and religion that would create the appearance of the gov-
ernment endorsing or disapproving of religion. Justice O'Connor ex-
plained that the Lemon test's prongs are about the message communicat-
ed to the public by the government action at issue-Does the government
have a "purpose" to endorse or disapprove a religion and does the con-
veyance of that message have an "effect" on the community? 37 If the
answer is yes to either question, there is excessive entanglement due to
the government endorsement of religion; therefore, the action is invalid.38
Justice O'Connor viewed the avoidance of government endorsement of
religion as the basic principle of the Establishment Clause because en-
dorsement caused non-believers to feel like outsiders in the political
community and indicated that believers were the favored insiders.39 She
later clarified in Wallace v. Jaffree40 that the determination of when a
government action communicates government endorsement of a particu-
lar religion is based upon "whether an objective observer, acquainted
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,
would perceive it as a state endorsement. . . .'*' The Lemon test and its
modifications remain pivotal to the analysis of Establishment Clause
cases involving government action that advances or burdens a particular
religious group.42
2. The Larson Test
In Larson v. Valente,43 the Supreme Court held that "[t]he clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another."44 The Court held that stat-
utes that discriminated among religious groups are per se unconstitution-
al unless they are justified by a compelling governmental interest and
33. Id. at 618-19.
34. Jeffrey R. Wagener, A Survey of the Supreme Court's Approach to the Establishment
Clause in Light of County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
169, 169 (1990).
35. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 688-89.
37. Id. at 690.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 688.
40. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
41. Id. at 76.
42. Stephanie E. Russell, Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause Tests, Looking
Past the Lemon, 60 Mo. L. REv. 653, 676 (1995).
43. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
44. Id. at 244.
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"closely fitted to further that interest" under a "strict scrutiny" test.45
Larson concerned the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, which re-
quired charitable organizations to disclose detailed fundraising infor-
mation.46 The Act contained an exception for religious organizations but
only if the organizations received more than half of their contributions
47from members or affiliated groups.
The Court found that the statute facially discriminated among reli-
gious groups based on their charitable funding sources and therefore
must satisfy the "compelling interest" standard to be upheld.48 The State
argued that it had a compelling interest in ensuring that its charities were
properly soliciting funds in order to prevent fraud.49 Organizations in
which less than 50% of the funds came from third parties were believed
to be more in control of the funds because the organization's members
acted as safeguards for proper fund uses, whereas organizations with less
than 50% from its own members lack this safeguard and needed public
disclosure of the funds to prevent fraud.50 The Court ruled that the State
failed to show that the statute had a compelling interest because there
was nothing in the record to suggest that a religious organization receiv-
ing more than half of its contributions from third parties would need any
more state supervision of funding records through public disclosure than
organizations receiving less than half.5 ' There was no reason to believe
that members supervised their organizations' funds any differently de-
pending on the mix of funding sources.52 Because there was no compel-
ling state interest for the arbitrary standard of 50%, the Court held the
statute was unconstitutional.53
In Larson, the Court took the opportunity to delineate the differ-
ences in applicability between the newly prescribed Larson test and the
previously established Lemon test. The Court explained that "the Lemon
v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions ... that discriminate among
religions"5 4 for which the Court developed the Larson standard. Howev-
er, the Larson Court went on to say that "[a]lthough application of the
Lemon tests is not necessary to the disposition of the case before us,
those tests do reflect the same concerns that warranted the application of
strict scrutiny."55 The Court also applied Lemon's prongs despite just
45. Id. at 246-47.
46. Id. at 230-31.
47. Id. at 231-32.
48. Id. at 246-47.
49. Id. at 248.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 249.
52. Id
53. Id. at 251.
54. Id. at 252.
55. Id.
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having created the heightened Larson standard. The Court's language
distinguishing Lemon's application to "all" religions and Larson's to
"among" religions did not clarify when either standard should be used56
and in many instances, both tests are arguably applicable. Ultimately,
the Larson test created a strict scrutiny standard for government actions
that discriminate among religious groups, whereas the Lemon test is a
lower scrutiny standard reserved for government action that favors a reli-
gion over non-religion. 8
II. A WAD V. ZIRIAX
A. Facts
In May 2010, the Oklahoma legislature passed House Joint Resolu-
tion 1056, placing a proposed amendment to the state constitution,
known as the Save Our State Amendment, on the 2010 mid-term election
ballot.59 The Amendment provided that "courts shall not look to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not
consider international law or Sharia Law."60 The Amendment defined
international law as "the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of in-
ternational organizations and independent nations, such as countries,
states, and tribes"61 and defined Sharia law as "Islamic law ... based on
two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching[] of Mohammed." 62
The Save Our State Amendment was placed on the Oklahoma ballot
as State Question 755 (SQ 755).63 The Amendment was approved by a
70% majority of the voters.6
56. Daniel W. Evans, Note, Another Brick in the Wall: Denominational Preferences and
Strict Scrutiny Under the Establishment Clause, 62 NEB. L. REV. 359, 378 (1983).
57. See Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson in
Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53, 105 (2005) ("Laws that would warrant strict scrutiny under
Larson because they create denominational preferences will frequently lack a primarily secular
purpose under Lemon. More importantly, a denominational preference almost by definition endorses
the religious beliefs of that denomination, rendering the practice invalid under the endorsement
inquiry of the 'effects' prong of Lemon. Other laws creating denominational preferences will also
create an excessive government entanglement with religion under Lemon, such as the law at issue in
Larson itself." (footnotes omitted)).
58. Id. at 86-87.
59. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d I 11, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012).
60. Id. at 1118 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
61. Id (quoting Okla. State Senate, Issues to Be Referred to Oklahoma Voters for Approval or
Rejection at the 2010 Elections, LEGIS. BRIEF, July 2010, at 5, 5, available at
http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/legislative briefs/legis brief 2010/state questions 2010.pdf)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Procedural History
Two days after the election, Muneer Awad, a Muslim U.S. citizen
and resident of Oklahoma, sued the Oklahoma State Election Board.5 He
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the certification of the election
results of SQ 755 and preclude the Oklahoma legislature from amending
the state constitution to prevent state courts from considering interna-
tional and Sharia law in their determinations.6 6 Awad claimed that the
proposed amendment violated his constitutional rights under the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses for two reasons:
(1) it negatively identified his religion specifically and, (2) it hindered his
practice of Islam by preventing Oklahoma courts from probating his will,
which contained references to Sharia law, and by providing inadequate
relief in the judicial system for Muslims. 67 The district court granted the
preliminary injunction, and the Oklahoma State Election Board appealed
to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.68
C. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit voted unanimously to affirm the decision of the
Oklahoma district court in granting the preliminary injunction.69 Two
issues were before the court: (1) whether Awad's claim was justiciable,
and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the
preliminary injunction.70 The court of appeals addressed only Awad's
Establishment Clause claim in determining these issues, finding suffi-
cient cause to uphold without having to analyze the Free Exercise Clause
can71claim.7
On the issue of whether the claim was justiciable, the court ad-
dressed Awad's standing to bring the claim and its ripeness.72 The Okla-
homa State Election Board argued that Awad did not have legal standing
because he had not suffered any injury in fact and any condemnation of
his religion was merely his own perception. The court reviewed its
precedent of injury in Establishment Clause cases and found that injury
is not required to be physical or economic but must be a direct conse-
quence of the alleged unconstitutional state action. 74 "[P]ersonal and
unwelcome[d] contact" with the state-sponsored action is sufficient to
establish standing in an Establishment Clause case.75 The court then de-
65. Id. at 1118-19.




70. Id at 1119.
71. Id.
72. Id at 1119-20.
73. Id. at 1120.
74. Id. at 1121.
75. Id. at 1122 (quoting Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1113 (10th Cir.
2010)) (internal cuotation marks omitted).
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termined that Awad had established standing because the explicit and
public condemnation of his religion was personal and unwelcomed con-
duct by the state that inflicted adverse treatment of his religion in state
courts. The Oklahoma State Election Board also argued that Awad's
claim was not ripe for review.7 7 The court held that because Awad chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the amendment on its face, the court did
not have to analyze the amendment in the context of a particular factual
scenario.78 In its determination, the court must balance the hardships of
both parties against withholding review. Here, it held that Awad faced
immediate injury without judicial review, whereas the Government did
not face any injury, thereby making the claim ripe for review.7 9
Finding the claim justiciable, the court then applied the "rational ba-
sis" test to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
granting the preliminary injunction.80 To obtain a preliminary injunction,
a plaintiff must show that on balance the following factors weigh in his
favor: (1) likely success on the merits of the claim; (2) if denied the in-
junction, he will suffer irreparable injury; (3) his injury outweighs any
potential injury to the opposing party; and (4) the injunction is in the
public interest.81 In analyzing the merits of the claim, the court initially
had to determine whether the case should be analyzed under the Lemon
test, which addresses laws pertaining to all religions, or the Larson test,
which addresses laws that discriminate against one particular religion.82
The court found that the Larson test applied in this case because the
amendment specifically delineated Islam as the target..8 3
The court then clarified that the burden of proof was on the Gov-
ernment to show that the amendment was not facially unconstitutional,
which is a strict scrutiny level of review under the Larson test.84 Larson
required the Government to show that (1) there is a compelling govern-
ment interest, and (2) the amendment is closely fitted to that interest.85
The Oklahoma State Election Board argued that "Oklahoma certainly has
a compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma
courts."8' The court did not find that interest compelling and noted that
the state board of elections did not cite a single instance of an Oklahoma
court considering either Sharia law or precepts of other nations or cul-
tures, indicating that the amendment did not serve to solve any existing
76. Id at 1122-23.





82. Id at 1126-27.
83. Id.at1128.
84. Id. at 1129.
85. Id.
86. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 16, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012)
(No. 10-6273), 2011 WL 5518034, at*16.
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problem within the state.87 The Government failed to satisfy the first part
of the Larson test because the alleged harm to the state was "speculative
at best and cannot support a compelling interest."88 Although the state
failed to establish a compelling interest in support of the amendment, the
court went on to say that the amendment is also not closely fitted to the
alleged state interest because a complete ban on even the consideration
of Sharia law in judicial decision making, rather than just a limitation on
applying Sharia law, was not a narrowly tailored solution to the per-
ceived harm.89
The court then addressed the remaining factors used in determining
whether to grant a preliminary injunction. It held that Awad's claim al-
leging a condemnation of his religion was sufficient to show irreparable
injury if the injunction were denied because suffering a violation of a
constitutional right is very difficult to remedy with monetary compensa-
tion after the fact.90 To show that the Government's potential injury from
granting the preliminary injunction outweighed Awad's injury from a
denial, the Oklahoma State Election Board asserted that Oklahoma voters
have a stronger interest in the manifestation of their majority vote.91 The
court disagreed, holding that when the majority votes against the explicit
provisions of the U.S. Constitution, its collective will cannot outweigh
individual constitutional rights. 92 Finally, the court held that the injunc-
tion was in the public interest because upholding individual constitution-
al rights is always in the long-term public interest, even over the short-
term public interest to vote and enact the majority view.
III. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Awad was well-reasoned and fol-
lowed Supreme Court precedent. The decision was supported under the
Larson standard because the Oklahoma amendment was clearly discrim-
inating among religious groups by burdening only Muslims without any
compelling government interest for that burden. The more interesting
questions arising from this case are the current and future social implica-
tions of the amendment and the voters who passed it. First, this Comment
will explore why the Oklahoma legislature and voters believed the
amendment was necessary despite its blatant unconstitutionality. Second,
it will discuss the tensions inherent in a democratic system between the
short-term majority vote and the long-term interest in personal freedom
and protected individual rights. Finally, it will review wider trends in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.





92. Id. at 1131-32.
93. Id.at1132.
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A. Why Pass a Blatantly Unconstitutional and Apparently Unnecessary
Amendment?
Oklahoma's State Question 755 explicitly placed restrictions on
courts considering two areas of law: international law and Sharia law.
This subpart analyzes why the restrictions were unconstitutional and
harmful to Oklahoma's residents and examines the motivation for the
provision. First, the restrictions were in conflict with longstanding doc-
trines of international and contract law. Preventing courts from consider-
ing international law undermined the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion with regard to the federal government's preeminent power to make
and enforce U.S. treaties as law and complicated the interpretation of
international agreements and contracts. Contract law is further under-
mined by the restriction on courts from considering international or Sha-
ria law by limiting Oklahoma residents' freedom to contract. Second, this
subpart explores why state legislators believed the restrictions were nec-
essary, and how a large percentage of the population was persuaded to
agree.
1. State Question 755 in Conflict with Fundamental U.S. Doctrines:
International and Contract Law
Oklahoma's State Question 755 included a preclusion of any con-
sideration of international law by state courts and defined international
law as "the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international or-
ganizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes.
It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with some of
their relationships with persons." 9 4 International law comes from three
general sources: (1) customary law, (2) international agreements, and
(3) derived principles common to all major legal systems. 9 5 The federal
Constitution explicitly states that all treaties made by the United States
are the supreme law of the land and bind the judges of the states.96 It has
been well settled throughout U.S. legal history that international law is
incorporated into U.S. law. 97 Not only is international law validly a part
of U.S. law, but courts are bound to consider international law when the
question presented concerns an international issue and there is no treaty
or other law on point.98 Additionally, on issues not settled by conven-
94. Id at 1118 (quoting Okla. State Senate, supra note 61) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SOURCES OF INT'L LAW §
102(1)(a)-(c) (1987).
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2 ("[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby . . . .").
97. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), aff'd, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 730 (2004).
98. Id ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice ... as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination." (emphasis added)).
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tional law, the opinions of foreign and international jurists can be given
great consideration in U.S. courts. 99
Oklahoma's proposed amendment seemed to include the "law of na-
tions" in its ban. 00 This ban included treaties (international agreements)
as well as domestic contracts with choice of law clauses because they fall
within "relationships with person" as part of SQ 755's definition of in-
ternational law.'0 ' This component of the proposed amendment was per
se unconstitutional in light of various federal holdings and was impracti-
cal and harmful to the state and citizens of Oklahoma.' 0 2 An amendment
to ban courts from considering international law in decision making went
directly against the Constitution's mandate that treaties are the supreme
law of the land and Supreme Court precedent that incorporates interna-
tional law into U.S. law. 0 3 SQ 755 explicitly stated that the provision's
complete ban on considering international law shall apply even to cases
of first impression, which is in direct conflict with the principle acknowl-
edged in Paquete Habana that courts should give great weight to interna-
tional sources on questions of unsettled law in the U.S.'04
SQ 755 was not only outright unconstitutional but also actually
harmful to the residents and judicial system of Oklahoma. The amend-
ment did not allow Oklahoma courts to look to the rulings and decisions
made in other states if they were based upon international or Sharia
law,'o thereby inhibiting the Full Faith and Credit Clause.'0o SQ 755
would disempower Oklahoma courts to enforce judgments made in other
states if the decision discussed international or Sharia law in any way, o0
causing conflicts for Oklahoma residents seeking to enforce divorce de-
crees or property rights within their home state if they contain language
references to international or Sharia law. The amendment also created
problems for business transactions and freedom of contract because Ok-
lahoma courts would be unable to (a) adjudicate any foreign choice of
law clause because the statute provided that the courts "shall not look to
99. Id at 701.
100. Robert E. Michael, The Anti-Shari'a Movement and Oklahoma's Save Our State Amend-
ment-Unconstitutional Discrimination or Homeland Security?, 18 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347,
355 (2012).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 367-68.
103. Id. at 355, 357.
104. Compare Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) ("The provisions of this
subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of
first impression." (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010))), with Paquete,
175 U.S. at 700-01 ("[Iln the absence of higher and more authoritative sanctions, the ordinances of
foreign states, the opinions of eminent statesmen, and the writings of distinguished jurists, are re-
garded as of great consideration on questions not settled by conventional law." (quoting I JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 18 (Legal Classics Library ed., 1986) (1826)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
105. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118.
106. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
107. Michael, supra note 100, at 358.
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the legal precepts of other nations,"' 08 or (b) enforce contracts that refer
to any Sharia principles throughout the agreement. 109 These restrictions
on Oklahomans enforcing contracts and business transactions in court are
the unintended negative consequences of a provision that was seemingly
meant to restrict only religious practice. The restriction of such a funda-
mental right necessarily leads to a ripple effect that ultimately impairs
other valued protections in U.S. law.
2. State Question 755 in Conflict with Religious Protections
The Tenth Circuit's First Amendment analysis of SQ 755 found that
the proposed Oklahoma amendment presented a clear violation.110 The
law singled out a specific religion by name and subsequently gave no
compelling interest to support the action.' The more interesting ques-
tion is why, despite the clear constitutional violation of the First
Amendment, did the state legislators, and subsequently an overwhelming
majority of voters, continue to pursue this unconstitutional and unneces-
sary amendment.
Several Oklahoma news sources, explaining the mid-term election
questions and making voting recommendations, gave SQ 755 a "no"
recommendation and described the ballot question in a variety of terms
indicating its obsoleteness: "[a] feel-good measure . . . [that v]oters
should reject . .. as unnecessary,"' 12 "no need for this law,"' 13 and "seeks
to solve a nonexistent problem.""14 If the journalistic consensus, presum-
ably providing an objective analysis of the ballot measures, was that the
proposed amendment was unnecessary to solve for any impending prob-
lem concerning Sharia law infiltrating the Oklahoma government, why
did SQ 755 get such wide support in the Oklahoma congress"' and gain
a 70% majority by voters?"'6 What caused this deviation? The political
messaging surrounding the amendment has something to do with these
results.
108. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Michael, supra note 100, at 361.
110. See supra Part II.
111. See supra Part II.C.
112. Editorial, We Support Four of II State Questions on Ballot: Our SQ Choices,
OKLAHOMAN (Okla. City, Okla.), Oct. 17, 2010, at 13A.
113. Editorial, Our Take on the State Questions, ENIDNEWS.COM (Enid, Okla.) (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://enidnews.com/opinion/x 154637225/Our-take-on-the-state-questions.
114. Editorial, State Questions, TULSAWORLD.COM (Tulsa, Okla.) (Oct. 24, 2010, 5:30 AM),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/article.aspx?subjectid=61 &articleid=20101024_61_0_Eleven67
0211&r=4250.
115. Marc Ambinder, Oklahoma's Preemptive Strike Against Sharia Law, ATLANTIC (Oct. 25,
2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/oklahomas-preemptive-
strike-against-sharia-law/65081/ (noting that the amendment passed the state legislature with an 82-
10 vote in the house and a 41-2 vote in the senate).
116. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 111, 1118 (1Oth Cir. 2012).
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The inspiration for the Save Our State Amendment came from vari-
ous judicial decisions emerging from courts outside of Oklahoma. There
has been a pattern of recent decisions made by European courts that in-
clude considerations of Sharia law in divorce decrees." 7 Also concerning
to the proponents of the Amendment was a New Jersey case in which a
trial court judge, referencing Sharia principles advocated by a party in
the case, denied a protection order petition against a man abusing his
wife, finding that he did not have the criminal intent because the husband
believed his religion allowed him to treat his wife however he wished." 8
The case was quickly overturned by the New Jersey court of appeals."9
Following these events, the primary author of SQ 755, Republican State
Representative Rex Duncan, envisioned the Amendment as a "pre-
emptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma." 20 Representa-
tive Duncan asserted that "America was founded on Judeo Christian
Principles," and fighting against the coming of Sharia law (or "the face
of the enemy") to the United States is "a culture war, it's a social war,
it's a war for the survival of our country."' 2' The organization ACT! for
America also supported SQ 755 by spending $60,000 promoting the
Amendment through advertising and robo-calling throughout Oklaho-
ma.2 Even the name "Save Our State" was a signal of the perceived
imminent doom Oklahoma faced from the oncoming threat of Sharia
law.
The wider purpose of language advocating a culture war against
Sharia law, and ultimately Muslim-American citizens, was to create ur-
gency for voters to go to the polls.123 Creating a message of fear that a
state or country is in danger of an invasion by an enemy force that is
infiltrating the system of American justice as we know it is effective in
motivating voters to engage in the "fight" to "Save Our State." 24 Who
would vote against saving their state? Motivation through fear of Islam is
a component of a bigger movement that has been developing since the
September 11 terrorist attacks.125 The Republican state legislators in Ok-
lahoma sought to build on this tried-and-true strategy through the ra-
117. Nicholas Riccardi, Oklahoma May Ban Islamic Law, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2010, at 6.
118. Matt Smith, Arguments to Take Place in Oklahoma over Ban on Islamic Law in Courts,
CNN.coM (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:21 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/1 1/22/oklahoma.islamic.law/index.html.
119. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 428 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
120. Mark Schlachtenhaufen, Sharia Law, Courts Likely on 2010 Ballot, EDMONDSUN.COM
(June 4, 2010), http://www.edmondsun.com/local/xl996914371/Sharia-law-courts-likely-on-2010-
ballot (quoting State Representative Rex Duncan, Republican from Sand Springs).
121. MSNBC Live (MSNBC television broadcast June 11, 2010) (interviewing State Repre-
sentative Rex Duncan, Republican from Sand Springs).
122. Andrea Elliot, Behindan Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at Al.
123. Ambinder, supra note 115.
124. Id
125. Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship-How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-
Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1043-44 (2012) (noting the history of anti-
Islam sentiment including Attorney General Ashcroft's negative comparisons of Islam and Christi-
anity and President Bush's description of the War on Terror as a "crusade").
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tionale and message behind SQ 755. Because the proposed amendment
was scrutinized by the local press as largely unnecessary to address any
true threat of Sharia law to the state,126 the resulting deviation from this
view by the Oklahoma voters has a "feel-good"l 2 7 aspect that likely
comes from the sentiment of voting for the "American" religion against
any impeding and threatening "un-American" religion. The powerful
emotion of fear of the "other" explains why a substantial portion of
Oklahomans supported an amendment that is both unnecessaryl 2 8 and
transparently unconstitutional, as indicated by the Tenth Circuit's appli-
cation of the Larson test.129
B. Protecting Against the Power of the Faction: The Tension Between the
Will of the People and Individual Rights
The Tenth Circuit balanced the interests of each party against the
public interest in determining whether to grant an injunction and found
that "when the law that voters wish to enact is likely unconstitutional,
their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad's in having his constitutional
rights protected" 3 0 and that "the public has a more profound and long-
term interest in upholding an individual's constitutional rights."' 3 1 This
subpart (1) discusses how federal courts have failed to protect religious
minorities against majority moral sentiment in the past, (2) provides
background on James Madison's theory of protecting against the political
faction with a democratic republic and how the theory has failed in the
face of a powerful moral majority faction, and (3) presents some possible
solutions to guard against majority oppression as the Tenth Circuit did in
Awad.
1. Examples of Religious Majority Oppression of the Minority
As discussed above, it is not always clear when the Lemon or Lar-
son test determines the level of scrutiny to be applied to the challenged
government action. 3 2 It is also not clear why discrimination among reli-
gions receives the heightened Larson strict scrutiny standard while gov-
ernment actions that promote religion over non-religion receive a lesser
Lemon standard.133 In other words, laws that benefit a particular religious
group while also burdening non-religious minority groups are not viewed
by the court as essential to strike down as are laws that favor and burden
126. See supra notes 112-14.
127. See supra note 112.
128. See Ali, supra note 125, at 1029; supra notes 112-14.
129. See supra Part II.C for a discussion regarding the Awad court's holding that the Amend-
ment is void of a legitimate, compelling government interest and not narrowly tailored to address the
alleged government interest.
130. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 11l1, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012).
131. Id. at 1132 (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010),
aff'd, 670 F.3d I'11 (10th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
132. Seeid at 1126-27; Patrick-Justice, supra note 57; Evans, supra note 56, at 361 n.12.
133. Patrick-Justice, supra note 57, at 81-82.
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different religious denominations.134 The following examples of polyga-
mous marriage practices and same-sex marriage illustrate when a law
benefits or promulgates mainstream Christianity while burdening histori-
cally "unaccepted" practices based upon a penchant of mainstream mo-
rality. Laws that are fundamentally based upon majority Christian beliefs
and designed to burden those outside of that majority should be just as
suspect under the Larson standard as are laws that burden one religion
over another because the Establishment Clause's protection extends to
people's freedom from majority religious influence from the govern-
ment.
First, courts have allowed the government to violate First Amend-
ment religious rights through the power of the majority in the treatment
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its historical prac-
tice of polygamy. The foundational case against polygamous marriage is
Reynolds v. United States.'35 The Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment did not protect Mormons who believed that they must en-
gage in polygamous marriages to fulfill the tenants of their religious
teachings'36 because marriage is a civil contract within the scope of gov-
ernment regulation and states can determine the form of marriage as they
wish.'37 The true motivation behind this ruling is hinted at in the Court's
statement that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mor-
mon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and
of African people."' 38 This dictum seems to indicate that it was not con-
tract law nor states' rights on which the Court was opining, but rather on
a belief that Western European religion is "America's religion" and that
foreign or unfamiliar religious practices are not protected by the First
Amendment because they are not in the mainstream. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed this view a few years after Reynolds in Davis v. Beasonl39
when it stated, "Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civi-
lized and Christian countries."l 40 Denial of religious protections in these
cases was based upon what American society would find morally dis-
tasteful rather than upon the First Amendment's protection of religious
practice.
Second, the Court has discussed the role of the morals of the majori-
ty faction in cases that concern laws pertaining to sexual orientation. This
discussion is relevant to how the Court views the protection of unpopular
minorities in the context of American mainstream religious values be-
134. Id.
135. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
136. Id. at 161 ("[1]t was an accepted doctrine of that church that it was the duty of male mem-
bers of said church, circumstances permitting, to practise polygamy . . .
137. Id. at 165-66.
138. Id. at 164.
139. 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
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cause the legal issues surrounding lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) rights and same-sex marriage are often framed in terms of reli-
gious values. In Lawrence v. Texas,141 the Court struck down a Texas
anti-sodomy law by overturning Bowers v. Hardwickl4 2 and relying heav-
ily on Justice Stevens's dissenting argument from Bowers that "the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particu-
lar practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law pro-
hibiting the practice."l 43 Justice Scalia offered a warning in his dissent in
Lawrence that if morality were no longer a compelling government inter-
est, the Court would be bound to strike down a variety of laws pertaining
to polygamy, prostitution, and obscenity, among others. 1" However, this
warning against invalidating morality as a compelling government inter-
est is amiss because the Court has been moving in the direction of dele-
gitimizing "morality as interest" for the past two decades.145 Although
Lawrence was a positive step in protecting LGBT rights, the Court has
yet to decide further on the constitutionality of state restrictions on same-
sex marriage.14 6 At best, the Court's protection of unpopular minority
groups by condemning governmental actions based upon a religious
moral majority has been inconsistent, outdated, and incomplete.
2. Madison's Cure of the Democratic Republic and Its Failings
In The Federalist No. 10, James Madison defined a faction as "a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of pas-
sion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the per-
manent and aggregate interests of the community." 4 7 Madison recog-
nized the common fear of majority power as a threat to private rights to
which he offered two solutions: (1) remove the root cause of a faction or
(2) control the power of the faction.14 8 The first solution, he argued, is
more undesirable than is the majority ruling faction itself.149 Dismantling
the faction completely would require eliminating the liberty of the demo-
cratic system (so as not to allow the majority to gain power through vot-
ing) or forcing all citizens to have the same opinion, which is impracti-
cable.5 o
141. 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
142. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
143. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See discussion infra Part Ill.B.3.c.
146. See Tom Goldstein, The Proposition 8 Oral Argument, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 26, 2013,
11:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/the-proposition-8-oral-argument/ (arguing that the
Supreme Court, after hearing oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry, will likely not decide the
merits of whether California's ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional).




150. Id at 51-52.
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Madison proposed that the only way to protect against the power of
the majority faction is to control its effects on decision making that may
be detrimental to the minority or to individuals.'"' He argued that a true
democracy will always suffer at the hands of a powerful faction, but a
democratic republic will better serve to protect the minority from oppres-
sion. 152 According to Madison, elected officials have the experience and
wisdom to better determine the long-term public interests of the nation
than does the majority of voters, including for the protection of individu-
al rights and minority groups, because it is within the duty of their posi-
tion to protect the public good.'53 Additionally, a representative govern-
ment in the form of a union of states is prophylactic against faction op-
pression because it is more difficult for factions to develop and organize,
and the influence of any majority group that is successful in rising up in
one state will likely be checked and tempered by the other states of the
union, preventing the faction from spreading.154
James Madison recognized the potential and power of a majority
faction that rises up within a democratic government,'5 5 even pinpointing
religion as a particular source of faction power. 5 6 His proposed solution
to oppression of minorities by a powerful majority faction was to control
the effects of factions through a representative governmental system that
seeks to (1) represent the people through wise public officials who can
better determine and uphold the public interest, and (2) widen the repre-
sentative scope so that factions are less able to communicate and organ-
ize into powerful forms.157
Madison's theory of a representative government depends upon the
election of representatives "whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations."' This
basic premise proved untrue in the events leading up to Awad, as demon-
strated by the vast support that the ballot proposal had in both houses of
the Oklahoma state legislature, passing with an 82-10 vote in the house
and a 41-2 vote in the senate. 59 Those representatives who supported the
ballot proposal failed to recognize and uphold the "long-term interest in
upholding an individual's constitutional rights"' 60 as the Awad court did
151. Id. at 54.
152. Id. at 54-55.
153. Id. at 55.
154. Id. at 57-58.
155. Id. at 50.
156. See id at 52 ("A zeal for different opinions concerning religion .. . divided mankind into
parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than, to co-operate for their common good.").
157. Id. at 54-55.
158. Id. at 55.
159. See Ambinder, supra note 115.
160. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
2013] 8 19
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and Madison presumed all good public officials would. Madison's sec-
ond guard against the faction-a representative government that
"[e]xtend[s] the sphere"' 6 1 of the people represented, preventing the de-
velopment of factions by limiting communication and organization-is
also problematic in a modern world that Madison was unable to imagine.
In an age of Internet communication and mass media, people with similar
interests, be they religious, political, or otherwise, are substantially more
able to connect and organize into larger factions and spread their mes-
sage to others quickly and effectively.1 6 2 ACT! for America's radio ad-
vertisementl 63 is an example of how much wider a message can be
broadcast today to catalyze support than in Madison's far-flung, slow-
moving republic. The safeguard of distance between factions to inhibit
organization and communication is no longer a viable precaution against
wide-ranging, powerful majorities.
The failure of Madison's two safeguards will lead to more frequent
occurrences of majority factions wielding greater power. Religious fac-
tions, in particular, have distinguishing features that make them even less
likely to be constrained by Madison's defenses.'1 Religious factions are
arguably less subject to be persuaded to change their position and more
resistant to compromise because they base many of their positions on
pre-established religious teachings and principles rather than on personal
opinion.' 65 They are also more organized within a community of com-
mon believers, while often being more isolated from people who are non-
believers.'6 6 Madison assures us that even if a majority faction gains
governmental control in a particular state, the wide scope of a democratic
republic will keep the majority faction from spreading and influencing
other states in the Union.' 67 This theory is only partially accurate. As of
September 2012, anti-Sharia law bills have been introduced in twenty
states, 168 and House Bill 825 was proposed in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives to ban courts from considering any legal codes outside of
codes developed in U.S. courtrooms.169 It appears that the wide scope of
Madison's representative government has not prevented the spread of
anti-Sharia movements engineered by a majority faction. However,
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 57.
162. See Peter Dahigren, The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Disper-
sion and Deliberation, 22 POL. COMM. 147, 154-55 (2005).
163. See Elliot, supra note 122.
164. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional
Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 372 (1995).
165. Id at 372-73.
166. Id.
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 57-58.
168. Moni Basu, Rising Anti-Islamic Sentiment in America Troubles Muslims, CNN.com
(Sept. 5, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://religion.blogs.enn.com/2012/09/05/rising-anti-islamic-sentiment-in-
america-troubles-muslims/.
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House Bill 825 did receive public criticism from various religious
groups, causing it to be sent back to committee for now,'70 and suggest-
ing that expanding the reach of this type of legislation to a national level,
and therefore a more diverse population, might temper the movement.
Although Madison's safeguards have largely failed in the realm of anti-
Sharia legislation, there are other solutions to minimize the effects of a
majority faction.
3. Alternative Solutions
In his survey of anti-Sharia initiatives from the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks through the 2010 Oklahoma ballot initiative, Yaser Ali
proposes some solutions to stem the public's fear of Islam and the crea-
tion of anti-Islam legislation.17 ' First, he proposes public education about
actual Sharia law to deflate the threat being purported by supporters of
the anti-Sharia legislation and eliminate the public's unfounded fear of
Islamic takeover and culture wars. 172 Second, Ali encourages public offi-
cials to take a stronger stand against religious intolerance and anti-Sharia
legislation to dispel the generated fear of Islam.173 This harkens back Jo
Madison's argument that enlightened public officials have a "love of
justice"174 and will speak up for the minority. As discussed above, this
theory largely failed in the face of the large support for the anti-Sharia
proposals from the congressional representatives who failed to protect
their vulnerable religious minority constituents.'
As public and political opinions remain in flux, one option to coun-
teract anti-Sharia legislation is for the judiciary to remain vigilant in en-
forcing the First Amendment's protection of minority religions that may
be currently unpopular. Courts that are presented with a question of reli-
gious minority oppression should follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit in
Awad. Judicial enforcement of the Constitution to protect the rights of
vulnerable minorities is well-established.176 In determining whether there
should be any religious exception for Jehovah's Witnesses to a state law
requiring schoolchildren to salute and pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag,
the Supreme Court recognized:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as le-
gal principles to be applied by the courts. .. . [F]undamental rights
170. Id.
171. Ali, supra note 125, at 1067.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 55.
175. See Ambinder, supra note 115.




may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections. 177
The Tenth Circuit followed this reasoning in its Awad decision, citing
several precedents establishing that a majority vote cannot outweigh the
constitutionally protected rights of individuals.178
The Larson test should continue to be applied to laws that attempt
to single out an unpopular religion and should even be expanded to ques-
tions of moral majority oppression, such as laws that discriminate based
upon sexual orientation. The First Amendment's freedom of religion
should be construed to include freedom from religious majority influence
in government actions. The Supreme Court hinted at this in Romer v.
Evans79 when it decided upon a Colorado state constitutional amend-
ment that repealed all local ordinances creating a protected status for
sexual orientation, holding that "desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."180 Historical-
ly, the LGBT community has been "politically unpopular" among those
espousing the religious and moral majority sentiment.'8 1 The next logical
step in protecting minorities singled out for discrimination based upon a
moral agenda is to extend the Larson test to require that all government
actions based upon majority Christian morality have a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest." 8 2 The reasoning in Romer, therefore, would not al-
low for government to invoke morality as a basis to discriminate against
unpopular or minority lifestyles, choices, or viewpoints because it would
not be considered a compelling governmental interest by the Court. 8 1
CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause's protection extends to groups burdened
by government actions that support the religious majority in creating
"American" values. Because the government is precluded from establish-
ing a national religion, courts must apply a strict scrutiny standard to
laws based upon the practices or beliefs of the majority religion that ap-
pear to create a burden on non-adherents. The problematic issue is less
the oppression of one religious minority and more the powerful control
of one religious majority that can affect the secular freedom of those who
177. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
178. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) ("[G]ranted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be
exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."); Coal. for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Tjhe court merely reminds the people that
they must govern themselves in accordance with principles of their own choosing.").
179. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
180. Id at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
181. See supra Part Ili.B.1.
182. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245-47 (1982).
183. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
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do not hold the same moral values. A moral majority should not be able
to dictate the morals of individuals. So long as religious or secular prac-
tices do not harm others 84-- whether by following the tenets of Sharia
law, engaging in polygamy, or maintaining same-sex relationships-the
government should not be able to establish a moral law against such
practices through a majority vote either in Congress or on a ballot. The
Tenth Circuit in Awad was able to clearly articulate why SQ 755 violated
the First Amendment's protection for minority religion, but the judicial
system must continue protecting minority interests against a powerful
religious moral majority at work.
Renee Sheeder
184. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972) ("A way of life that is odd or even
erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is differ-
ent.").
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